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Synopsis 
This thesis examines the philosophical drivers behind the education policy agenda 
pursued by the New Labour Government and will test the assertion that: 
Mrs Thatcher had a project. Blair's historic project is adjusting us to it. 
(Hall, S. 1998.14. p 28) 
The research considers the legislative policy, practice and continuities between 
Conservative and New Labour governments and critically analyses the 'Third 
Way'with particular reference to modernisation, competition and the restructuring 
of the welfare state in response to globalisation. The thesis also examines the 
growth of the private sector in state education, the development of the Private 
Finance Initiative in both policy and operational terms and draws conclusions 
about the implications for the governance of education of the trend towards a 
'liberal state', where individual choice is perceived to be more effective and 
efficient than a model of governance based upon social values. 
The qualitative nature of this thesis includes consideration of the issues involved 
in the changing concepts of citizenship and consumerism within the evolving, 
redefined welfare state; examines the assertion by Marquand (2000) that 
incessant marketisation has generated a culture of distrust which has corroded 
the values of professionalism, citizenship, equity and public service and draws 
conclusions about accountabilities within a modern social democracy. 
The study includes an analysis of education legislation and a critique of policy 
intent in the broader context of societal impact. This incorporates an analysis of 
primary texts, government policy statements as well as Green and White Papers, 
compared and evaluated with contemporary research literature. 
Coupled with a case study of the Private Finance Initiative in Stoke-on-Trent the 
theoretical triangulation (Denzin, 1970) is combined with witness accounts of the 
4 complex phenomena' associated with a Private Finance Initiative' (Adelman, 
1980) and enabled cross cutting perspectives to be illuminated and the knowledge 
and understanding of modernisation extended. Such triangulation extends 
knowledge by clarifying meaning by the identification of different ways in which 
modernisation is perceived in both theoretical and practical terms (Silverman, 
1993; Flick, 1998). The thesis considers within the reality of the case study the 
importance of the local democratic voice and local political actions in educational 
governance, including the political/professional/public interface. This leads to 
conclusions about the need for a modern social democracy to explore the concept 
of accountability to the citizen as well as the consumer of services within a 
framework of evolving local policy networks and emergent patterns of governance 
within state education. 
In essence this thesis examines whether it is a superficial assertion to equate the 
'Third Way'with neo-liberalism (Marquand, 2000; Driver and Martell, 1998,2000; 
Giddens, 1998,2000) or that the plurality of 'Third Ways' have translated into 
operational definition, legislation and policies within a model of education which lacks 
a coherent and identifiable national drive and is therefore critically dependent upon 
local interpretation and local political response. It also reaches conclusions about 
the citizen - state relationship, the validity of the concept of the 'social investment 
state' and suggests constituent elements of a 'fourth way' as a contribution to the 
issue posed by Whitty, (2000), 'how can education best help reconstruct the social 
fabric and new concepts of citizenship - and who shall influence its design? (p 8). 
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INTRODUCTION 
The author of this thesis has worked in education administration for thirty 
years, the last eleven (1995 - 2006) as a County Education Officer and, 
whilst the role of researcher in developing this thesis has been informed by 
a professional working knowledge of the governance of education, the 
thesis aims to extend knowledge and understanding of the subject based 
upon the evidence gathered and, in developing conclusions, the application 
of professional expertise, the essence of which relies upon an objective 
analysis of policy development and implementation. 
This dissertation combines a critical analysis of education legislation, policy 
texts, speeches and current literature, together with an illustrative case 
study of a local education authority, to examine the modernisation 
programme pursued by New Labour since 1997 in respect of public 
services. The dissertation is qualitative in nature and moves from an 
analysis of legislation and commentary on central government's positions 
into the use of primary material and human interaction at local level and 
then, drawing upon both areas, considers the implications of modernisation 
for the governance of public education. The case study does not set out to 
reach conclusions about whether the use of the private sector or the private 
sector finance initiative is a force for'good'or otherwise - it does, 
however, reflect upon the critical importance to modernisation of local 
political interpretation, extends knowledge of modernisation in a local 
context and indicates that a fourth way vision relies critically upon local 
voices, local actions and the reconstruction of a local public realm. 
The terms ' new', 'modern', 'modernise' and 'modernisation' are descriptors 
chosen by New Labour to describe their underlying purpose in government. 
The terms occur 609 and 176 times respectively in 53 speeches by Blair 
between 1997 and 1999 (Fairclough 2000 p18). The pursuit of the 
modernisation agenda is rooted in and stems from the 'Third Way' 
strategies advocated by Giddens (1998,2000); an attempt to move beyond 
Old Labour (socialism and Keynesian social democracy) and the New 
Right (neoliberalism) in response to globalisation and the economizing of 
education within which policy enables economic interest to dominate 
educational process, content and delivery structures. The'Third Way'was 
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the essence of Labour's philosophy in the period before, and subsequent to 
the 1997 general election. The revision of what had been seen as Labour's 
political purpose, Clause 4 part 4 of Labour's constitution was seen as 
representing a 'clear, coherent route between the Right (especially the 
nineteenth century Liberal new right) and the old, neo Marxist Left', the new 
'Third Way', (Straw, 1998, para 15). 
The new goal for Labour was social inclusion (Levitas 1998, Giddens, 
1998,2000) favouring economic growth, entrepreneurship and wealth 
creation through a path, which steered between traditional definitions of 
socialism and neo liberalism. This claim of a new path has led to attempts 
to place it on a left-right continuum (Driver and Martell, 2000), which 
assumes such a clarity of approach that a positioning can be enabled. 
An alternative view is that the 'Third Way' is an emergent strategy or a 
practice without a theory (Wright, 1996) and is capable of embracing a 
plurality of third way strategies, (Marquand, 1998, White, 1998). 
It is, however, clear that the educational third way pursued by New Labour 
represents to a significant degree policy adaption; that the Education Act 
(2002) is built upon the 1988 Education Act initiated by the Conservatives, 
and that modernisation is a 'shorthand term for an ambitious and 
transformative project, begun in 1997 but building upon previous phases of 
modernisation', (Ozga 2002, p 322). This perspective was suggested by 
Mandelson who said that the New Labour strategyis to move forward from 
where Margaret Thatcher left off, (Mandelson & Liddle, 1996, p xx). In 
order to analyse the concept that the 'big idea' is in fact, that there is no big 
idea, (Economist 1998, Kay, 1998) and that Labour's modernising strategy 
is rooted in the pragmatic requires consideration of the 'values' agenda and 
an examination of how far the third way lacks coherence between claimed 
values and policies and within and between specific policy initiatives. This 
requires a focus upon Labour's legislative record, focussing on three 
primary principles which have spanned education policy from 1988 to 2000, 
passing seamlessly from Conservative to Labour governments: 
Choice and competition. The commodification and consumerisation 
of education. 
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Autonomy and performativity. The managerialisation and 
commercialisation of education. 
Centralisation and prescription. The imposition of centrally 
determined assessments, schemes of work and classroom methods, 
with audit and control driven across the system. 
(Ball, 2001 ap 46) 
Ball (2001) reinforces the views expressed by Crump (1998), David (1998) 
and Whitty (1998) that a scrutiny of the continuities between Conservative 
and Labour indicates policy emanating from inherited foundations. The 
continuities were summed up by Esland (1996) who argued that, since the 
1970's 
Education's traditional liberal, humanistic values have been 
divided and abandoned by the New Right and replaced by a 
totalising and unreflexive business oriented ideology 
expressed through a discourse based upon markets, targets, 
audits, quality performance and human resource 
management. (p 20). 
This aspect of the modernising agenda is considered in this dissertation in 
the context of the Education Act (2002) which mapped out a future for a 
public education service incorporating a multiplicity of service and resource 
providers and enabling the further development of a permeable boundary 
between the public and private sector as set out in Chapter One, p 11- 43 
of this dissertation. This engagement of the private sector within the public 
domain can be seen most clearly in the growth of the private finance 
initiative, a focus for this study with reference to policy analysis, evaluation 
and a case dissertation. The New Labour Party published a business 
manifesto in 1997 promising 'active promotion of public/private 
partnerships to renew Britain's infrastructure'. The plan emphasized New 
Labour's ideological transformation: 
In the future public/private partnerships will play an increasing role in 
procuring public services and investment. The old argument as to 
whether public ownership was always best or whether privatisation 
was the only answer is behind us. The truth is there are some 
things that the private sector does best and others where the public 
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sector is appropriate. In many more cases a combination of both 
public and private sector is necessary. A new Labour government 
will take a practical approach. 
(Labour's Business Manifesto, 1997, p 9) 
The plan indicated how a Labour government would re-energise the private 
finance initiative with a task force based in the Treasury, priorities being set 
and the process being driven forward at a pace. Key points of the plan 
promised that PFI deals would proceed without delay, that there would be 
more rigorous appraisal of potential PFI contractors, guidance on the 
tendering process would be given, there would be an urgent review of 
legislative frameworks to ensure public bodies had power to enter into 
contracts with the private sector and there would be a requirement for local 
government to involve small business in partnership deals where possible. 
The development of private sector involvement in public sector provision 
permeated government thinking, particularly with regard to the provider role 
of local government and this is considered in Chapter Three, p 53 - 81 of 
this dissertation. In its White Paper on Best Value, published in March 
1998, (DETR 1998(a)) the government said, 'what matters is what works - 
the form of service delivery should not be determined by ideology. Both 
public and private sectors have important roles to play, often in partnership' 
(p 3) reflecting the fourth paragraph of Blair's introduction to the 1997 
Labour Party manifesto: 
New Labour is a party of ideas and ideals but not of outdated 
ideology. What counts is what works. The objectives are radical. 
The means will be modern. 
(Blair, 1997 (b) p 1) 
The fact that what works (Barber 2001) is, in itself an ideological position is 
overlooked. The implications of private sector growth in the state 
education system for the governance of education, and accountability to 
the citizen as well as the consumer, raise key questions about democracy 
and these are addressed in Chapter Five, p 128 - 156 of this dissertation, 
with reference to the public realm. 
In his foreword to Turner's book (Just Capital - The Liberal Economy, 
2002) Ralf Dahrendorf wrote that 'there is much to be said for the claim 
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that in recent years ...... we have gone too far in reducing the public sphere 
in order to stimulate private initiative' (p 2) and goes on to comment that 
the 'political language of the third way seems exhausted', (p 5). The social 
role of the state is seen to remain vital and growing in importance because 
I unless well managed (it) can fracture the social compact on which modern 
capitalism must be based', (p 5). 
Turner (2002) asserts that 'globalisation plays a useful polemic purpose for 
many on the New Left' and 'provides a useful cover for the retreat from 
socialism' (p 40) - and this from a former Director General of tile C. B. I. 
Quoting Gray (1999) who perceived the 'Washington consensus' of global 
free markets as a dangerous threat to welfare states and cultural diversity 
Turner (2002) argues that nation states possess choices in respect of the 
moderation of capitalism and the simplistic equation of there being no 
alternatives should not be adequate reason for rejecting the objectives of 
social inclusion which have been the aims of the European social model. 
As Gray, (1994) observed 
The danger of the rhetoric of globalisation is that it reduces the 
scope of democratic political life to marginal adjustments in the 
management of market constitutions. It thereby closes the political 
process to questions about the contribution made by market 
institutions to the satisfaction of human needs. 
(Gray, 1994 (a) p 16). 
In a similar vein Stiglitz (2002) argued that the greatest challenge in 
response to globalisation lay in changing the mind sets of governments and 
institutions to accept their responsibility to exercise choices in the evolution 
of the social fabric; to ensure the centrality of social justice as an objective, 
and citizen empowerment beyond existing structures, to achieve it (p 227). 
There are three research questions addressed in this dissertation: 
Whether 'modern isation' is a coherent philosophy generating legislative 
and policy change within a values framework, which is capable of 
rational analysis. 
Whether the developing role of the private sector necessitates the 
introduction of new systems of public accountability. 
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What emerging and new constructions of professional, evidence based 
practice, accountability and policy science may be required to ensure 
that education policy is, in reality, more accountable to the deliverer, 
recipient and citizen. 
This thesis presents the research in five interlinked Chapters starting with 
an outline of the policy context within which modernisation is considered by 
an analysis of the Education Act, 2002 and earlier legislation, seeking to 
distinguish 'government' and 'governance' as key terms and concepts used 
in the thesis. In particular the concept of governance refers to the move 
from a rigid system of central control by government to the engagement of 
a range of stakeholders at community or locality level each exercising a 
range of powers. 
The emergence of 'governance' and the importance of this concept was 
encapsulated by Rhodes, (1966). 
Central government is no longer supreme. The political system is 
increasingly differentiated. We live in a 'centreless' society in the 
polycentric state characterised by multiple centres. In place of a 
single sovereign authority there is a multiplicity of actors specific to 
each policy area. (p 652) 
The thesis moves on to outline the methodology adopted and sets out the 
key research questions, the research design and the reasons for the case 
study being on the record and not anonymised. In Chapters Three and 
Four of the thesis data collection is considered alongside the policy 
development of the Private Finance Initiative. The final Chapter of the 
thesis draws conclusions from the research, suggests future policy 
considerations and reflects upon the research process in terms of the 
outcomes of the work and the perceptions of the researcher. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
The Education Act (2002) and Labour's 'Third Way'. 
This Chapter examines the modernisation agenda by a reflective 
consideration of the Education Act, 2002 and its antecedents, as part of 
testing the assertion by Hall (2003) that, inter-alia, the Act represents 
further adjustment to accommodate Mrs Thatcher's project. The Education 
Act (2002) established a legislative framework, which enabled the 
proposals set out in the White Paper, 'Schools - Achieving Success' 
(DfES, 2001). The modernising agenda and'Third Way'of New Labour 
has been criticised within the Labour Party by the traditional left wing 
socialist and Marxist groups as well as by former social democrats such as 
Hattersley and the ideological divide can be seen most clearly by those 
who subscribe to the pursuit of 'equality of outcome' or'equality of 
opportunity', with the latter having the potential to create a more stratified 
and socially unequal society, (Hill, 2001). This can be seen in policy terms 
in the September 2001 White Paper, 'Schools Achieving Successwith the 
proposed expansion of specialist schools, the selection of pupils by 
4 aptitude' and additional funding for those pupils in specialist schools - 
strategies welcomed by the Daily Telegraph (6/9/2001) but criticised by 
others as 'a shameful step back to the 11 plus' and 'offers those rejected 
by the system only the stigma of institutional failure', (Jenkins, 2001), 
reducing issues of equality to 'little more than trickle down excellence' (Hill, 
2001, p 7). 
The Education Bill (2001) continued the legislative and policy programme 
followed by Labour between 1997 and 2001. It had as a central hypothesis 
the improvement potential of the self managing school operating within a 
centralised model of accountability. The government's aspirations for the 
legislation were clear: 
It begins a new phase of educational reform: a phase of reform that 
starts from the belief that schools themselves have the capacity to 
lead change; renews our programme to raise standards and 
strengthens the teaching profession; and seeks to create a culture of 
collaboration between schools. 
(Ashton, 2002, Col. 536) 
The Conservatives highlighted and attacked the centralising powers 
contained in the Bill. 
The Bill is a massive contradiction; it advocates an extension of 
autonomy and freedom but within a strait jacket of central power and 
prescription wielded by the Secretary of State. Without more detail no 
one can predict the impact of this Bill, containing, as it does, the 
mother of all Henry VI II powers. 
(Blatch, 2002, col. 543) 
This theme of central power, intervention and diversity being an integral 
part of the Bill was emphasised by Blair who commented that'high 
minimum standards will be secured by stronger public accountability... and 
more effective intervention in weak and failing schools, including, where it 
will raise standards involvement of the voluntary and private sectors' 
(Times 5/9/2001). The role of the private sector and greater diversity are 
hallmarks of the Education Bill (2002) which envisaged a greater role for 
the private sector in both local authorities and schools together with an 
expanding use of the Private Finance Initiative to secure capital 
investment, and a two-tier system for schools and local education 
authorities, with earned and licensed autonomy giving linked institutional 
freedoms to expand and with relaxation from some aspects of legislation. 
These three issues were central to the Education Act (2002) and further 
promoted the twin accountabilities of the education service to the market 
and the state, an issue elaborated upon by Whitty (2000) and Ball (2001 a) 
with Ball (2001 a), describing New Labour's ensemble of policies' 
embracing: 
The modelling of internal and external relations of schooling and 
public service provision more generally upon those of commercial, 
market institutions (p 47). 
Taken together, the ensemble of policies produce, as Clarke (1994) 
suggested, 'new orientations, remodel existing relations of power and affect 
how and where social policy choices are made' (p 42). 
In an earlier contribution to the debate on Labour's emerging education 
policy Hutton (2001) expressed the view that'our educational system is 
about to be fragmented and its staff demoralised... the government will 
12 
reveal that, whatever it may say, it acts on the profound belief that the 
public sector is irredeemably bad. Only turning it over to the private sector 
offers any sustainable improvement'. (Observer 8/7/2001, p 30). Hutton's 
perception of the role of the private sector warrants consideration alongside 
the Labour government's pursuit of economic growth and social cohesion 
through what Sanderson (1999) described as a: 
synthesis of public values and private dynamism, involving 
stakeholding, partnerships, social inclusion, improved education, 
modernisation and rewarded achievement. (p 8). 
The 'Third Way', an international socio-political response to globalisation, 
(seen as distinct from liberal capitalism/free market beliefs and democratic 
socialism/demand management, state role beliefs) was the cultural core of 
Labour's philosophy in the period before and subsequent to, the 1997 
general election. The'Third Way'favoured economic growth, 
entrepreneurship and wealth creation as well as greater social justice, 
steering between and rejecting traditional definitions of socialism and neo- 
liberalism, a way of marrying together an 'open, competitive and successful 
economy with a just, decent and humane society' (Blair, 1997(a) p 14). 
The Education Act (2002), in terms of marketisation and privatisation 
policies, reflected what was seen by Whitty and Gordon (1997) as part of 
an international development with trends towards greater diversity, 
flexibility and choice within an education system. Having considered 
post/neo fordism explanations Whitty (2001) considered the work of Neave 
(1988), in his accounting for the shift from the bureaucratic to the 
evaluative state, which entails a rationalisation and wholesale redistribution 
of functions between centre and periphery such that the centre maintains 
overall strategic control through fewer, but more precise policy levers 
contained in overall mission statements, the setting of system goals and 
the operationalisation of criteria relating to output quality. 
A performative strategy, accompanied by a regeneration of the Third Way 
through radical new forms of the marketisation of public services was 
central to Blair's belief: 
'We should be far more radical about the role of the state as 
regulator rather than provider ......... 
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We should stimulate new entrants to the schools market. 
We should be willing to experiment with new forms of co-payment in 
the public sector. (Blair 2003 p 4) 
This chimes with the transforming role of the state seen as being 'to supply 
a framework of rules and regulations within which the free market, including 
crucially the labour market, would be self-regulating'. (Gray 1998, p26-27). 
How far, however, can the modernisation programme be said to be a policy 
continuum - not unique to New Labour but building incrementally on what 
had gone before? 
Modernisation 1944 - 2004 
Along with Ranson (1985) and Simon (1988), Ozga (2002 p 334) sets out 
three waves of modernisation post 1945. The first (1944 -1,970) is seen as 
a period of consensus, with a prevailing belief in the 'human capital theory' 
(Simon 1988) which equated investment in education to increased 
productivity and economic growth. The framework of the 1944 Act, which 
had created a complex web of interdependent relationships among the 
manifold participants remained unchallenged, with strong leadership from 
central government on policy issues but broad agreement on process. 
Simon (1998) saw the oil crises of the mid 1970s, the swing against 
comprehensive education and the criticism of education from the right - (a 
series of Black Papers) - and the left (that education reinforced inequalities 
and perpetuated hierarchical structures) - culminating in the 1976 Ruskin 
speech by Callaghan, which gave credibility to the developing critique of 
education. This second post war phase, from the late 1970s saw the 
publication of the 1977 Green Paper'Education in Schools'which 
reasserted central government's legitimate concern and responsibility for 
standards and the curriculum and the election, in 1979, of a Conservative 
government wedded to the ideology of the free market. 
The 1980 Local Government Act, reflecting Thatcher's economic 
philosophy of seeking to reduce the frontiers of the state and increasing 
individual choice was followed by the Local Government Planning and 
Land (No 2) Act in 1980 which introduced a 'block grant'for local 
government and this indicated central governments shift in concern from 
the general to the particular, with local authorities judged by national 
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standards. The watershed Act, which moved from fiscal instruments of 
control to the establishment of a new philosophy of national education 
policy direction, was the 1988 Education Reform Act, which introduced a 
6 consumer orientated approach'to education and proposed the diminution 
of prod ucer-do mination of policy and implementation. The government 
was dominated by the view that markets and bureaucracies were in 
opposition to one another and that markets were the guarantor of a free 
society. The1988 Act introduced arrangements for a National Curriculum 
together with pupil testing and school league tables; provision for schools 
to 'opt out' of local authorities; new arrangements for inspection and the 
funding of school budgets based on pupil numbers. 
A third phrase began with a newly elected Labour Government which had 
campaigned on a platform of the centrality of education to their vision for 
the country. The framework which they inherited other than nursery 
vouchers, was broadly accepted and the challenge for LEAs was seen as 
both delivering higher performance and greater value for money. The 
government maintained a 'revised view of LEAs, 'agnostic' about their 
future, concerned more with outcomes and less with means'. (Lodge, 2000, 
p 5). There was, however, a clear determination to address the 
revitalisation of local government by a programme of modernisation with 
local government's raison d'etre being viewed as the engine of 
modernisation and innovation (Blair 1998(d)). The education 'legacywas a 
formidable challenge for the new Labour government, and it had been 
argued that 'we are not well equipped and it is time for a national crusade 
to raise achievement all round' (Holland, 1996, p 2). 
In 1997 the government embarked upon a 'crusade'with their vision set out 
in 'Excellence in Schools', published 67 days after their election victory, 
and declaring that it was the government's wish to 'change attitudes 
towards education and foster a realisation that education matters to 
everyone' (DIFEE, 1997: 3) and predicting that by 2002 'there will be a 
greater awareness across society of the importance of education and 
increased expectations of what can be achieved, ' (DFEE, 1997: 14). 
The machinery of the DfEE was marshalled to spearhead the standards 
agenda and specific targets were set for pupil attainment in literacy and 
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numeracy at the end of Key Stage 2. The Prime Minister, in a speech to 
the IPPR (described by The Times as the 'carrot and semtex' approach to 
local government) sketched out his vision of the crusade for change, a 
crusade which was necessary because the 'government was elected with a 
bold mandate to modernise Britain'. (Blair, 1998 (d), p 1). 
He highlighted four themes which included a radical overhaul of the 
processes of local government; new disciplines to ensure standards in 
public life; new powers to work in partnership and greater discretion over 
finance all of which should lead to new strategies to secure a local 
democratic legitimacy. 
The modernising agenda for local government was non-negotiable, relied 
upon the introduction of a best value regime, new partnerships with the 
private and voluntary sectors as service providers and, in the absence of 
an acceptance of this challenge a threat'if you are unwilling or unable to 
work to the modern agenda then the government will have to look to other 
partners to take on your role'. (Blair, 1998, (d) p 22). 
The I PPR speech was clear in intent - no obstacles at local or central 
government levels would be allowed to stand in the way of achieving the 
government's objectives, the strategy was 'top down. 
The Secretary of State was not immune from the drive for reform: his task 
now was 'not to tinker in Whitehall, but, leading a newly activist and 
interventionist Department to promote successful change in every 
classroom in the country' (Barber, 1996b p 30). One of the Labour 
Government's first executive actions was to sign the Council of Europe's 
Charter of Local Self-Government which provided basic safeguards for 
protecting the role of local government in state systems. The Prime 
Minister's view was that local government was to be 'modernised, 
reinvigorated, reborn and energised' (Blair, 1997 (a)). 
To begin the change process six Green Papers were issued in 1998 
containing proposals for modernising and renewing local government and 
dealing with three broad themes, political, managerial and financial change. 
The role of local Councillors was seen as one of 'community leadership', 
with a re-structured local Council, establishing a 'Cabinet' system and a 
scrutiny function to challenge the executive. The processes of local 
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government had to become more efficient, transparent and accountable. 
On the financial front universal budget capping was to be abolished and 
compulsory competitive tendering replaced by a process of 'Best Value', 
designed to instil a quality service in considering where provision should be 
secured from. The Government viewed 'Best Value'as a major component 
of the required improvement in local accountability: 
Best value will be a duty to deliver services to clear standards - 
covering both cost and quality - by the most effective, economic and 
efficient means available. 
(Modernising Local Government: DETR, 1998 p 64) 
Best Value could be viewed as a negotiated concept, within a framework of 
target setting, the publication of an annual performance plan and the 
inspection of local Best Value strategies within an increasingly demanding 
central government focus on performativity (Byrne, 2000). This new 
governance was implied in a speech by the Secretary of State when he 
challenged local government at the North of England Conference in Wigan: 
Over the next year, I will challenge Education Authorities to look at 
what tomorrow's education service should look like - bearing in 
mind that if there is not a local and accountable service, we will have 
to invent one. (Blunkeft, January 2000, p 4) 
This 'third phase', New Labour's modernisation agenda, sought to 
distinguish itself from the Conservative's phase two by the pursuit of 'global 
economic success with a measure of social justice' (Ferguson, 2000 p 206) 
and, 'implies a re-imagining of politics... not confined to system redesign' 
which can only be 'understood by a scrutiny of its guiding ideas, which are 
derived from social capital theory'. (Ozga, 2002, p 333) 
If 'social capital' is created by networks of 'civil engagement', which inhabit 
the space between the state and the market it necessarily acts as the link 
connecting new and emergent forms of governance, capable of 
demonstrating the deficits of existing democratic structures. It is in this 
governance revolution that New Labour, 'seamlessly connects (to) 
Thatcherism', (Hall 2003, p 3). 
The concept of 'entrepreneurial governance, ' seen to embrace 
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marketisation in every sphere of government is seen as being the 
essential core of the true meaning of modernisation, and that: 
New Labour has adapted the fundamental neo-liberal programme to 
suit its conditions of governance -that of a social democratic 
government trying to govern in a neo-liberal direction while 
maintaining its traditional working class and public sector middle 
class support. New Labour has a long term strategy, a 'project'; the 
transformation of social democracy into a particular variant of free 
market neo-liberalism. (Hall, 2003, p 2) 
One of the building blocks which have enabled a situation within which 
marketisation in education is seen as the'new common sense'(Hall, 2003) 
and reflects policy adaption is performance management. 
Policy Continuity 1986 - 2004 - Accountability via Performance 
Management 
The measures set out in the White Paper, 'Schools Achieving Success' 
(2001) and the provisions of the Education Act (2002) can be said to fulfil 
the central thrust of the 1988 Education Reform Act which sought to 
introduce a consumer-orientated approach to education and the diminution 
of perceived producer domination of education policy and its 
implementation. The 1988 Act was, in part, a recognition of the political 
imperative to move education, and schools in particular, into an open 
market, and reflected policies espoused by the 'No Turning Back' group of 
MPs, (1986), the Hillgate Group, (1986) and the Institute of Economic 
Affairs, (Sexton, 1987), responding to the challenge of globalisation and, as 
they saw it, the need to inject competition as a driver of economic 
response. 
The deregulatory measures and diversity proposals in the White Paper 
(2001) and the Education Act (2002) take to maturity the concept of the 
self-managing school having to raise standards because of market 
pressure: 
If the system were changed to one of self-governing, self- 
managing budget centres, which were obliged for their 
survival to respond to the market, then there would be an 
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inbuilt mechanism to raise standards and change forms and 
types of education in accordance with the market demand. 
(Sexton, 1987, p 6). 
The creation of 'quasi-markets' in education services from 1988 to 1997 
stemmed from a combination of devolving responsibilities to the rim of the 
system whilst strengthening the hub, a construct suggested by Baker, then 
Secretary of State. Whitty (2000) quotes McKenzie (1993) who argued that 
central government had 'actually increased their claims to knowledge and 
authority over the education system whilst promoting a theoretical and 
superficial movement towards consumer sovereignty'. (p 17). The degree 
of change, from collectivism to individualism, from a focus on outcome to a 
focus on opportunity - features which were to be reflected later in third way 
modernising strategies, were reflected upon by Maden (1988) who quotes 
MacLure in contrasting the intentions of the 1988 Education Act with the 
1944 Education Act when he suggested that, 
Where he (Butler) saw the object of educational reform as the 
creation of social harmony and social cohesion, the enterprise 
culture would substitute aims of self-reliance, competition and 
wealth creation. It would reward effort and punish idleness'. (p 66). 
This theme was elaborated by Ball (2001 a) who argued that the New 
Labour government was attempting to create a model of schooling which 
was essentially fordist and micro managed in order to achieve economic 
policy via education and promoted as a key element in the'policy 
panopticon'the use of highly prescriptive systems of accountability. Within 
this model performance management, in the fullest sense of the term, 
holds institutions and professionals to account to an externally shaped 
outcomes agenda. For teachers the introduction of an externally imposed 
agenda confirmed new professionalism as a government expectation, 
lacking generation within the teaching profession and losing the potential 
impact upon teacher culture such internal professional ownership would 
carry. Thompson in 'The Performing School', (Ed Gleeson/Husbands 
2001) quotes Rodger, (1995) in support of the view that no definition of 
professionalism is 'likely to be internalised in that profession's own 
consciousness of itself, unless it corresponds to the profession's own 
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deepest intuitions of the service it has to offer and the values which are 
consonant with that service. ' (p 46/47). 
For teachers and other professionals in schools the strategies of target 
setting within a framework of an 'increasingly promiscuous accountability' 
(Fielding, 1999 p 277) are outward manifestations of the 'social 
entrepreneurship' aspirational third way process to secure cultural 
adaption, signalling a 'shift to a business narrative based on doing what 
works', (Gleeson and Gunter, p 146) the necessary monitoring of which 
has created a strengthened regulatory regime. This, in turn, has weakened 
the professional voice and allowed the volume of the'few'to overwhelm 
the many, with inspection as the top down tool of suppression. 
This aspect of performativity has been a critical tool of modernisation in 
practice. 
Performativity - Inspection 
Since the introduction of OfSTED in 1992 and allied inspectorates the 
growth of inspection of public services in England has been significant and 
what has changed is how many inspectorates there are, how many 
organisations are inspected, how often they are inspected, and how much 
all of this costs and for what gain. The increase in inspection can be linked 
to an increase in 'performativity' in the public sector, defined as: 
A technology, a culture and mode of regulation that employs 
judgements, comparisons and displays as means of control, attrition 
and change. The performances (of individual subjects or 
organisations) serve as measures of productivity or output, or 
displays of 'quality', or'moments'of promotion or inspection. As 
such they stand for, encapsulate or represent the worth, quality or 
value of an individual or organisation within a field of judgement. 
The issue of who controls the field of judgement is crucial. (Ball 
2001 c, p 210) 
Since New Labour's election victory in 1997 inspection costs have more 
than doubled, from E250 million in 1997 to over E550 million in 2002/03. 
OfSTED has seen large increases in its spending, mainly due to its remit 
expanding to include inspections of funded nursery education (1996), LEAs 
(1997), Further Education (1999/2000), Connexions (2000) and Childcare 
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for under 8's (2000) as the performative agenda grew. The link between 
service improvement and the growth in inspection is tenuous. The 
Government continues to argue however that: 
Inspection has a key role to play in the public service reform 
agenda, having the potential to report on comparative performance, 
information in the local and national context and on qualitative 
aspects of delivery that matter to customers. 
(Inspecting for Improvement: developing a customer focused approach 
Office of Public Services Reform, 2003 p 11) 
Whilst the growth ir inspectorates is beginning to be questioned by 
politicians (see for. instance the Role of External review in Improving 
Performance, report for the Public Services Productivity Panel Dec 2001, 
or The work of OfSTED in 2003104, Select Committee on Education and 
Skills Sixth Report session 2003/04), they, the inspectorates, continue to 
act as the main body for holding the public sector accountable to the state. 
Accompanying increasing centralisation and the principle of performativity 
is a government focus on choice. Choice is one of New Labour's four 
principles of public sector reform and is seen as an effective instrument for 
promoting quality, responsiveness, efficiency and equity in public services. 
For choice to be an effective mechanism for improving services it is argued 
that there must be: 
Information - users must be provided with the information and 
advice to enable them to make their choice. 
Consequences - choice provides powerful feedback on the quality 
of services and in some cases this will be incentive enough to 
change and improve services. 
Alternatives - alternative providers must be available 
Entrance and exit - need to be ways of dealing with failing providers 
and encouraging new providers to emerge 
(Public Administration Select Committee, 2005 p 2) 
These conditions can be seen as a justification for inspection, the first in 
particular, whilst the latter two are often invoked as a result of particularly 
poor inspections, for instance the privatisation of Leeds and Islington LEAs. 
Cynically inspection could thus be seen as a means of bringing the market 
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into the public sector, with poor inspection reports 'justifying' intervention by 
private sector organisations despite them having no track record of being 
able to perform any better. Increasingly the remit of inspectorates is 
changing, from a compliance/value for money model to one where they 
must generate improvement in outcomes of the service being inspected. 
Inspectorates themselves are also being asked to prove their own value for 
money and make efficiency savings. Within a performative culture school 
inspection, even with a greater focus on self-evaluation will continue to 
mean that 'measurable criteria is put forward so we make the measurable 
important instead of making the important measurable. What follows is 
frustration and alienation on the part of teachers and pupils. ' (Linde, 2001 
p 2) 
Corry and Martin (2005) raise the issue of accountability in respect of 
'Ins pecto rates', and reflect upon the need for democratic input into their 
activities and public reporting, with service delivery standards being 
modified within the mosaic of multi-level governance. 'Community' scrutiny 
implies the growth of horizontal accountability as possibly being more 
reflective of a citizen's life and experience and requiring new inspectorial 
inputs more adjusted to a local template. The development of scrutiny 
arrangements around, for example, PSA 2 initiatives, coupled with the 
emergence of local area agreements could begin to instil momentum into 
the community accountability assessments of the local environment and 
reinforce the role of elected representatives. 
Fielding (2001 a) questioned whether OfSTED was the product of a 
democratic society and asked: 
given the change in government from right wing Conservative to an 
avowedly centre left Labour since OfSTED was first introduced, is 
there any evidence that different models of democracy have left 
recognisably different strata within the archaeological sites of 
accountability (p 698). 
The conclusion arrived at is 'apparently not' and in distinguishing between 
'accountability' and 'responsibility' Fielding (2001 a) suggests that OfSTED 
fails to gain a foothold on the ladder of participatory democracy and 
concludes: 
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Underlying these failings is not so much a failure of consistency or 
intention - OfSTED is eminently consistent with the demands of 
international capitalism and the frameworks of performativity (see 
Gleeson and Husbands, 2001) which guide its intellectual and 
practical expression (p 702). 
Fielding (2001 ap 705) suggests a need to counter the trend towards the 
6 evaluative state' (Elliott, 2001 a) and reshape the arguments for a 
democratic state, with attention focused on the 'corrosive' consequences of 
'the separation of means from ends in the policy making process' (Elliott, 
2001 b). In setting outcomes the processes for achievement must embody 
values and relations and the concern is, that: 
the more successful the evaluating state becomes in regulating 
public service provision to achieve its targets the more it will 
generate outcomes that undermine the public realm and the social 
value embedded in it. (Elliott, 2001 b in Fielding, M, 2001 (a), p 705). 
In promoting the case for the revival of local democracy there is a need to 
move beyond performative accountability and into communal individual, 
professional and consumer responsibilities - focussing on community good 
and stemming from within rather than without, (Ranson, 1993,2000). The 
Joseph Rowntree Foundation in its evidence to the Commission on Local 
Governance in March 2002 suggested that at the local level of a Council 
'there should be an acceptance that accountability is primarily to the local 
tax payer and more local control over how money is spent rather than 
raised'. (p 5). 
Ranson (2003) argues that 'accountability is a multi layered concept whose 
meanings need unravelling' and suggests that'to be accountable can 
reveal very different social relationships, of regulation as against 
deliberation, and relations that express different evaluative practices and 
criteria which embody divergent modes of securing trust in the public 
sphere', (p 460). The conventional definition of 'accountable' is to be 'held 
to account' and is best described as an evaluative performance report 
placing accountability within the tiered processes of bureaucracy. If the 
phrase 'giving an account' is adopted then performance is accounted for by 
narrative, which has a sense of time, reason and explanation. Quoting 
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G IN iddens (1984) -'to be accountable for one's activities is both to explicate 
the reasons for them and to supply the normative grounds whereby they 
may be justified', Ranson (2003, p 461) suggests that when accountability 
is grounded in commentary of meaning and value resulting conflicts of 
purpose can be avoided by the mutual acceptance by all involved about 
institutional purpose and practice - confirming as he sees it 'Durkheim's 
(1957: 91) conception of dialogue between governors and the governed as 
the best means of democratic accountability. 
Thus 'to be held to account' implies a process which limits professional 
expression (Husbands and Gleeson 2001), whereas'giving an account', 
with an implied professional discretion, carries with it developmental 
potential and unity of purpose. 
The concept of verticaland horizontal accountability applies in the 
provision of public education services to both market accountability 
and political accountability. Market accountability is driven by the 
business need to survive by securing and delivering service contracts 
to the satisfaction of the commissioner. This carries an accountability 
to the customer and a need to demonstrate an ability to respond 
when required to changing circumstances and, in addition, a 
secondary accountability through effective financial management 
which demonstrates a robust process for service delivery. The latter 
accountability of efficient financial management has been a driver for 
the privatisation of public services, based upon perceptions of a 
cheaper and more effective set of processes than in the public sector. 
The political framework of accountability relies upon the democratic 
process, within which those who are accountable render an account 
to the citizen, who has given a permissive authority to act to those 
elected or appointed within the public realm. (Ball, et al, 1997) 
There are potential conflicts between the market and political 
accountabilities and these are driven to some degree by the value 
systems underpinning each driver. On the one hand a drive for 
improvements in efficiency, effectiveness and responsiveness to the 
consumer in a market model which relegates social justice to the 
sidelines and ignores the class politics of education. On the other the 
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need to consider collective expressions of public interest within the 
context of an individualised system and the consideration of output 
measures, which are localised, qualitative and bespoke. 
The provision of a service carries a set of norms and purposes which 
determine the processes deployed and are value based. The need 
for a service should include considerations of social justice, which 
then raise the issues of accountability and relationships to the 
commissioner, the consumer and the citizen. The 'modernising' 
policies of the last twenty years have seen, in education policy, the 
implicit values in the 1944 Act being abandoned with the passing of 
the 1988 and 2002 Education Acts, and a new ideology promoted: 
Education's traditional liberal humanistic values have been derided 
and abandoned by the New Right and replaced by a totalising and 
unreflexive business oriented ideology expressed through a 
discourse based on markets, targets, audits, quality performance 
and human resource management. (Esland, 1996, p 20). 
The privatisation policies of Labour and the emergence of private public 
partnerships in response to globalisation has been described as leading to: 
6 new markets which disaggregate public sector services and 
reintegrate them into the market as a series of commodities. In 
these frontier markets the boundaries between the public and 
private sectors are being redefined and public need is subordinated 
to the governing principle of exchange value'. (Rutherford, 2004, 
p 2) 
This drives further towards a liberal state where opportunity and choice by 
individuals, economic efficiency in the market place and citizenship, being 
akin to consumerism, reign supreme. The emerging organisational 
cultures, performativity dominated, are seen by Elliot (2001 ap 203) as an 
'integral part of the neo-liberal project of re-engineering society as a free 
market for goods and services', stemming from a societal context which 
has a global context and separates the economic value of educational 
outcomes from the community, personal and broader social needs they 
serve. 
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This aspect of the model of performance management, in professional 
terms, was seen as challenging by Gleeson and Husbands (2001), who 
reflected that: 
To secure control of performance management ...... requires 
policy practice initiatives that ensure that learning and human 
agency drives policy this will involve giving greater 
democratic voice to professionals and community, in 
anticipation that both government and professional are up to 
the challenge,,: (p 228/229). 
The emergence of a dual accountability, through the market and the state 
with the diminution of the professional voice and influence is seen by 
Whitty (2000) to be demonstrated by the legislative programme pursued by 
the neo-liberals. This 'twin' accountability created sets of emergent quasi 
markets in education, introduced consumerism and the climate within 
which 'producers' competed. The inter connectivity between globalisation 
and the economizing agenda, the reconfiguration of global capital requiring 
nation state responses by way of, inter alia, systemic redesign of education 
strategy and supply found response in England by the vigorous injection of 
market policies into the education sphere. 
Ball (2001 a) perceived the education reform package to consist of three 
connected policy technologies - the market, managerialism and 
performativity. The new culture of competitive performativity, with targets, 
incentives and a degree of autonomy designed to enable institutional 
redesign leads to a position where survival in the educational market place 
becomes the common purpose. Managerialism is deployed to promote the 
culture of accountability and the institutional tools of appraisal, review, 
performance related pay whilst enabling individualisation actually demands 
adherence to the organisational culture. 
This radical change agenda is expressed in part in the following framework 
of accountabilities (Whitty, 2000 p 2) which set the context for the neo- 
liberal Thatcher/Major agenda for education; seeing social inequality as a 
product of individual action in the exercise of choice and education 
reaffirmed for its contribution to economic as opposed to individual growth. 
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Table I 
Accountability through the 'Market' 
Assisted Places Scheme, 1980 Education Act 
Reformed Governing Bodies, 1986 Education Act 
City Technology Colleges (CTCs), 1988 Education Reform Act 
Grant Maintained Schools, 1988 Education Reform Act 
Local Management of Schools, (LMS), 1988 Education Reform Act 
Open Enrolment, 1980 Education Act and 1988 Education Reform Act 
Specialist Schools, 1993 Education Act 
New Grammar Schools, Proposed in 1996 White Paper 
(Whitty, 2000, p 2) 
The connecting thread for these policy measures (Tables 1 and 2) is the 
'diversity and choice continuum', liberating individual consumer choice 
whilst at the same time enforcing institutional accountability to central 
government by regulatory and market strategies. 
Table 2 
Accountability through the State 
National Curriculum, 1988 Education Reform Act 
National Curriculum Council, 1988 Education Reform Act 
National Assessment, 1988 Education Reform Act 
School Examinations and Assessment Council, 1988 Education Reform Act 
Officer for Standards in Education (OFSTED), 1992 Education Act 
School Curriculum and Assessment Authority, 1993 Education Act 
Funding Agency for Schools, 1993 Education Act 
Teacher Training Agency, 1994 Education Act 
Qualifications and Curriculum Agency, 1997 
(mmy, zuuu p z) 
The election of a Labour government in 1997, which sought to 'link its 
traditional concern with equality with a new recognition of diversity' (Barber, 
1997 p 175), saw the emergence of theThird Way, 'as a pragmatic 
strategy, built around the basis of what works, a self-contained ideology 
combining market demand and principles of social justice. Ball (2001) 
reinforces the views expressed by Crump (1998), David (1998) and Whifty 
(1998) that, despite the policy programmes of New Labour, a scrutiny of 
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the 'continuities' between Conservative and Labour indicates building 
Policy on inherited foundations. As Blair stated in Labour's 1997 Manifesto, 
6 some things the Conservatives got right. We will not change them'. (p 3) 
The new Labour rhetoric was that of 'partnership' but the reality was 
business as usual, with an increasingly tight regime of targets, value for 
money and performance management. 
As Barber (1996b) reflected: 
As central government's power over macro-economic policy has 
waned, so its power., to control education has grown dramatically. 
Here, after all, is ar policy area where national politicians now control 
all the crucial policy levers; the extent and distribution of funding; 
accountability; inspection; the curriculum, the assessment and 
qualifications framework, the training and development of teachers 
(p 10). 
His prescription for an incoming Labour government was the establishment 
of performance targets and a demand for increased accountability in 
exchange for greater investment in the education system; the release of 
untapped potential in private - public sector partnership and no change in 
the power of the state to control but the culturing of collaboration and trust 
within the system. The reality was an emphasis upon standards, the skills 
deficit and an adherence to the fiscal policy inherited from the 
Conservatives. The new political culture involved 'market liberalism' 
marching in step with 'social progressiveness', (Giddens, 1998). The latter 
could be seen in the establishment of Education Action Zones, 
Neighbourhood Renewal Strategies and the resource targeting to inner city 
areas. The pursuit of 'equality' operated, however, within an environment 
that emphasized rather than diminished, the differences between schools 
and their competitive ranking, compounding the inequalities. 
Whitty (2000) listed what he perceived as the performance management 
drivers: 
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Table 3 
Reduction of class sizes in KS1 
Extension of Specialist Schools policy 
Community, Voluntary and Foundation Schools 
Standards and Effectiveness, especially in literacy and 
numeracy 
Revised National Curriculum to include Citizenship 
Education Action Zones/Excellence in Cities 
Performance Management/Performance-Related Pay 
General Teaching Council 
(Whitty, 2000 p 3) 
What should accompany this table is a parallel schedule of legislative and 
policy measures that have weakened the coherence of educational 
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planning at a local level by an increase in dýrect accountability to the State 
or via appointed bodies with a consequent growth of the democratic deficit 
and the further weakening of local government's responsibilities, such as: 
Table 4 
The Learning & Skills Council Academies 
The Connexions Service GM - Foundation Schools 
The growth in specific grants Government privatisation and Social 
The Early Years Partnerships Funding, New deal, Education Action Zones 
New models of provision Building Schools for the Future 
The Admissions Forum OFSTED/CPA/Intervention 
The Schools Organisation Committee CCT, Best Value, Brokerage 
The Schools' Forum Student Finance 
Funding Agency for Schools 
The majority of bodies in table 4 reflect the growth of the 'new magistracy' 
- the appointed as opposed to the elected, a trend inherited and expanded 
by New Labour without the merest policy discontinuity from that pursued by 
their predecessors. 
The Growth of the 'appointed state'- Managerialism in Action. 
The growth of direct accountability to the relevant Secretary of State for the 
provision of public services, described as the 'patronage state', (Skelcher, 
1998) had, by 1995, led to six and a half thousand executive and advisory 
quangos, with 76,000 individual appointments, responsible for an annual 
expenditure of E60 billion by 1996 (Hall and Weir 1996), a growth of 50% 
from the 1978-9 position, creating what was described as a 'chain of 
managerial regulation extending from the state to local institution to local 
practitioner'. (Esland, 1996 p 31) 
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Esland (1996) points to the paradox inherent within the new manageralism 
and contrasts the post Fordist vision (co-operation, teamwork, lifelong 
learning) with the Fordist reality of labour relations expressed in legislation 
from 1979 to 1997, with, as he states 'significant elements of neo Taylorism 
as the defining feature of the new managerial culture' (p 33). The direction 
and delivery of public education and training in England has moved, in 
large measure, from the locally elected to the appointed sector and the 
bypassing of local government by, ý inter alia, the measures set out in Table 
4 which have enabled a significant growth in central ideological control. 
Increasingly funding streams and salaries are fashioned, and used, to 
reward ideological complianceto the prevailing performative climate. 
Ball (2001 a) suggests a 'paradigm convergence' of education and social 
welfare policies in response to globalisation, with the emergence of 
underlying principles, mechanisms and outcomes for both governance 
structures, institutions, and individuals, in terms of access and opportunity, 
in nation states with differing 'political and social welfare strategies' (p 48). 
The 'New Labour' strategy of developing a model of education which is 
Fordist and micro-managed can be seen as having a 'paradigmatic 
similarity to policies in other developed nations', (Ball, 2001 ap 54) and 
places 'New Labour' within the emerging international orthodoxy as a 
leader and promoter of liberal economics. 
The desire to achieve micro management through the apparatus 
established by the State reflects the view that in terms of securing 
ideological compliance: 
The creation of non-elected single purpose agencies has 
allowed central government to maintain constraints on local 
authority spending while at the same time channelling 
increased resources through organisations more in tune with 
government policy, (Shaw, 1993 p 182). 
This can be exemplified by the establishment of the Learning & Skills 
Council in April 2001, responsible for all post 16 education and training and 
a budget of E5.5 billion. A new funding formula for post 16 school based 
education and training was introduced in the financial year 2002/03, 
producing significant shifts in institutional allocations and in some cases 
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forcing local government to cut the 11-15 age weighted pupil unit. This 
policy initiative was implemented without a debate at the level of the local 
Learning & Skills Council Board about the effects and impact of the 
application of the policy at local level and secured, at a stroke, nationally 
funded, formula based, outcome focussed strategy, removing local 
discretion and institutional autonomy. 
The growth of the appointed state (quangocrasy) and the privatised 
(outsourced contracts) state has clearly removed functions from local 
government with appointed bodies directly accountable to, and only 
responsible ultimately, to the Secretary of State. All of the functional 
separations, in terms of the loss of the democratic voice coupled with the 
performance agenda contribute to the growth of quasi market driven 
strategies and have considerable implications for the strategic, operational 
and accountability framework of the governance of public sector education. 
This development of a dual accountability to the market and the state is 
seen by Whitty to 'reflect a broader tendency for liberal democracies to 
develop along the lines of what Gamble (1988) called the 'strong state' and 
the 'free economy' with the extension of the free economy into education 
and welfare provision (Whitty 2000 p 4), in response to the 'new orthodoxy' 
identified by Carter and O'Neil (1995) and supported by Levin (1998: 131). 
Five main elements of this new orthodoxy are seen to be the improving of 
national economics by tightening a connection between schooling, 
employment, productivity and trade; the enhancing of student outcomes in 
employment related skills and competences; the securing of more direct 
control over curriculum content and assessment, together with reducing the 
costs to government of education and, at the same time increasing 
community input to education by more direct involvement in school 
decision making and pressure of market choice, (Ball, 2001a). 
At the heart of the dual accountability is a belief and trust in one sector, the 
private and mistrust of the other, the public, exemplified by the increasingly 
regulated public sector and the virtual absence of regulation for private 
capital operating in the public domain. From open, published trading 
accounts and associated codes of statutory conduct in one domain, the 
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public, there are closed, unpublished and limited information sets operating 
outside of an other than minimalist regulatory environment, the private. 
It is in the Education Act (2002) and the White Paper, 'Schools Achieving 
Success' (2001) that the New Labour intention of deepening the 
engagement of the private sector in public sector education can be 
uncovered. 
The White Paper'Schools Achieving Success (2001) and the Private 
Sector 
To make sense of the Education Act (2002) the White Paper'Schools 
Achieving Success' (2001) needs to be'6onsidered in parallel with the 
related six consultation papers issued in September 2001. The White 
paper set out an intent to celebrate the achievements of the previous four 
years and the fact that Ministers believed that external providers had a key 
role to fulfil is evident throughout the document, as the summary states: 
We believe that allowing new partners to work with schools can 
raise standards further by stimulating new thinking, particularly in 
tackling some of the most intractable, unresolved problems. We 
want to make it possible for schools to establish new partnerships 
with public, private and voluntary sector bodies, which could, for 
example, provide strong management support. 
We will keep appropriate safeguards and clear lines of accountability 
in place. 
White Paper'Schools Achieving Success'(2001) DfES (Para 5.22 p 43) 
This summary implied significant deregulation of the local authority and 
school system, coupled with unspecified safeguards and new 
accountabilities which were not set out and which were to be dealt with, 
subject to the passage of the Bill, in post legislative regulation following 
consultation but by passing Parliamentary scrutiny. A central theme, 
providing an insight into the philosophy being promoted can be found in the 
chapter of the White Paper dealing with 'Excellence, Innovation and 
Diversity'which insists: 
New providers can benefit pupils by bringing fresh ideas and 
perspectives and particular skills and expertise to schools. Similarly, 
the stimulus and competitive pressure that new entrants can bring to 
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the sector can have the benefit of driving up performance more 
widely. 
White Paper'Schools Achieving Success'(2001) DfES (Para 5.22 p 43) 
The key terms 'competitive pressure' and 'new entrants' signalled a clear 
desire on the part of Ministers to see the further development of markets 
for education services with price pressure representing the bottom line. 
The potential extent of deregulation, intended to 'free up schools' was 
extensive and the wide ranging practical consequences of the extent of 
deregulation implied were not addressed, and in particular, the issues of 
governance and accountabilities within a pluralist system were assumed, 
but subsidiary to the perceived performance outcomes, notwithstanding 
their impacts on institutional and individual practice. The focus was on a 
continued managerialism and success driven expansion -a licensed 
autonomy for teachers who succeed in crossing performance thresholds 
and an ability for schools deemed successful on output measures to 
expand, at the expense of neighbouring institutions. The continued pattern 
of marketisation is clearly implied with unit costs, particularly in the 14-19 
phase of education, becoming more visible and comparable when a range 
of placements for students is enabled. 
The new orthodoxy could be said to respond directly to the challenge set 
out fourteen years earlier at the annual conference of the Conservative 
Party: 
the smug complacency of too many educationalists has left our 
national educational performance limping behind that of our 
industrial competitors (Baker, 1987, p 2) 
In October 2000 a New Labour government policy paper'The Role of the 
Local Education Authority in School Education'was published, and, 
reinforced the focus on the need to expand the diversity of providers, 
particularly the private sector within the education service. 
The concept of the autonomous school and the ability to operate more 
freely as a business was reinforced in the policy paper with Schools being 
seen as the key unit of delivery, responsible for their own performance, 
conduct and discipline, building repair and maintenance and employment 
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related issues. The LEA role is described as covering special educational 
needs, access, school improvement and strategic management. In 
considering the more effective discharge of the LEA functions the policy 
paper set out three specific proposals for local action and suggested that 
local education authorities should encourage a more open market for 
school services, explore the sharing of school improvement responsibilities 
with groups of schools and develop service delivery partnerships with the 
voluntary and private sectors. The paper also indicated that central 
government would develop national standards and competencies for those 
involved in school improvement services and that accreditation would be 
required for such individuals. Clearly this licensing of local inspectors or 
advisers could create a market for the provision of advisory services with 
central government or a contracted provider acting as the regulator. 
The policy paper trailed the further delegation of El billion of expenditure 
from local government to schools with an emphasis on the expansion of the 
number of service providers and the need to enable schools to exercise 
real choice in purchasing decisions. 
One key section underlines the drive to market expansion. 
A number of external providers, from the public, private and 
voluntary sectors, have entered the market, but far more are 
needed to enable even the majority of schools to exercise a 
genuine choice. The Government will continue to look to all 
Authorities to operate their traded services openly and at full 
cost, and to help those schools who need it become better 
purchasers. It will improve the transparency of reporting on 
expenditure by Authorities, and supplement that by publishing 
guidance for schools this autumn on effective purchasing. This 
should encourage more external providers to enter the market. 
'The Role of the Local Education Authority. DfES (2000) (Para 23. p 13) 
What is clear from the policy paper is the determination on the part of 
government to secure competitive, market driven expansion of service 
provision to schools, either singly or in groups. The market is perceived as 
the improvement mechanism, the public sector the arena for mediocrity, 
cushioned from the disciplines of the market. Again, from an earlier age of 
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Conservative government a Treasury note of guidance on 'Selling 
Government Services into Wider Markets' (1992) stated: 
The Government's policy is to restrict the size of the public sector 
and in general the presumption is that services should, wherever 
possible, be provided by the private sector rather than the public 
sector, with the public sector buying in the services as necessary. 
The fact that a public body can provide a service as well and as 
cheaply as any outside supplier is not in itself a reason for extending 
public sector activity. (Maden 1998, p 65) 
Given the presumption in favour of the private sector what of the Local 
Education Authority, local democracy and the future? 
Local Education Authorities and the Education Act (2002) 
The Prime Minister's view that local government was to be 'modernised, 
reinvigorated, reborn and energised' (Blair, 1997a) could not rationally be 
applied to the education function of local government given the legislative 
and policy actions taken since the election of a New Labour Government in 
1997. Barber (1 996b) had earlier suggested a managerial strategy for 
LEAs - discounting totally the democratic accountability at local level 
argument entirely: 
The next government will face the choice of either taking education 
out of local authority hands altogether or unlocking their creativity. 
The argument for the former would be that a national funding formula 
would be fairer and that schools have sufficient experience of self- 
government now to go it alone, supported perhaps by ten regional 
outposts of the WES which could be based at the already established 
Regional Government Offices. (p 30). 
Barber went on to suggest a sharper inspection regime for LEA's with the 
survival of an education function in local government entirely dependent 
upon its contribution to the standards and improvement agenda: 
Any new lease of life for LEAs is conditional on their demonstrating 
their success in promoting improvement. 
Continuous improvement, in other words, is more important than the 
continued existence of LEAs. If they continue to prove their worth so 
be it: if not, other solutions should be sought. (p 31). 
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The implication that central government's agenda should reinforce the 
quasi-market reforms, indeed strengthen the measures derived from micro- 
economic theory from the early 1980's to the mid 1990's could not be more 
stark. In particular the clearest indication of managerialism can be 
established by comparing the Education Act (2002) with the Local 
Government White Paper'Strong Local Leadership, Quality Public 
Services' published on 11 th December 2001 (DETR, 2001). Such a 
comparison reveals on a wider front has been suggested about Labour's 
education strategy that it appeared to be adrift 'in a turbulent sea of 
confused philosophies and values' (Fielding, 2001) with competing 
Departments of State, locked into their own agenda. Whilst the New Labour 
government's national education strategy is close to the neo-liberal 
tradition the strategy from the Department of the Environment reflected 
what could be considered a third way signpost, with strategies to develop 
localised and bespoke cultivation of social capital and community building 
initiatives (DETR White Paper (2001) see p 41 of this dissertation). For 
education a third way is difficult to detect. In action the government gives 
credence to the perceived 'fundamental hollowness' of the third way, as 
described in The Economist (Goldilocks Politics, The Economist, 
December 1998)'when trying to give an exact meaning to this philosophy 
is like wrestling with an inflatable man. If you get a grip on one limb, all the 
hot air rushes to the other'. (p 74). The Education Bill 2001 was described 
as 'intending to transform secondary education, achieve the goals of the 
White Paper and constituting a major reform of the education system' 
(Summary Booklet, 1.1,1.2,1.3). The same booklet described the Bill 
under three broad head'ings, 'Innovation and Partnership', Deregulation' 
and 'Reform'. The Committee Stage of the Bill's passage started on 11 th 
December with a deadline for completion of this stage by 24 th January, 
consideration by the House of Lords before Easter and enactment by mid- 
July 2002. The Socialist Education Association said that the Bill 'confirmed 
their worst fears' about the Government's intentions, arguing that: 
Little attention has been paid to the feedback on the White Paper 
and the Bill is now going to be rushed through the House of 
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Commons. The Bill confers wide-ranging powers on the Secretary 
of State, thereby diminishing the power of LEA's. These are 
unprecedented powers, which give her the ability to waive or vary 
any statutory requirement in any school she chooses. (Education 
Journal, Issue 58, p 8) 
The Bill had four centralising provisions that restricted local flexibility of 
response to particular circumstances and needs in that it would remove a 
number of significant powers from local government, including powers in 
relation to planning new schools, restructuring sixth forms, the exclusion of 
children and the provision of advice on head teacher appointments. 
Secondly it would significantly increase the powers available to the 
Secretary of State, including powers on matters that it could be argued 
should be determined locally such as the membership of school governing 
bodies and the determination of the information governing bodies and 
heads give to their local council. Thirdly it would introduce new consent 
regimes, requiring a council to secure the Secretary of State's consent 
before it could act, in relation to, for example, school innovation and land 
disposal, and fourthly it would implement a reserve power enabling the 
Secretary of State to ring fence education resources and thus override the 
authority of local Councils to make decisions about the resourcing of local 
priorities within the public realm. 
The centralising nature of the Education Act (2002) weakened the role of 
an elected local authority, further diminished constitutional aspects of local 
governance and consolidated the strong state/free economy described 
earlier. There are some aspects of the Education Act (2002) which merit 
particular comment; planning new schools, intervention and financial 
changes. The Act paved the way for the City Academies programme to 
expand, enabling private, voluntary and faith groups to establish new 
schools whose running costs are met by the State. This can include 
consideration of City Academies being developed through the private 
finance initiative route. 
Academies are publicly funded but established as a company, limited by 
guarantee, hence independent and self-serving. They can be wholly owned 
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and operated by the private sector, can agree levels of pay and institutional 
conditions of service for staff and select ten per cent of pupils by aptitude. 
It can be argued that the social stratification of school provision by the 
I choice' legislation and family mobility, together with the expansion of 
specialist schools with powers to select enables individual and institutional 
choice to compound inequality and widen the class divide and that this is 
central to the reality of the 'Third Way' as much as it is the antithesis of the 
rhetoric of social justice contained in 'Third Way' voices. 
The provision of new maintained schools is also changed as a result of the 
2002 Education Act. In process terms the LEA identifies the need for a 
new school, which has then to be verified by central government, after 
which the LEA secures site and planning issues and then the Secretary of 
State decides what sort of school will be developed and by whom it will be 
operated, reflective of the desire to centralise, command and control on the 
part of government. 
The Act also paved the way to a more diverse model of intervention when 
failure on output measures is recognised at LEA or school level with 
Ministerial powers to direct the use of private sector and/or other parties. 
There was an expectation that LEA's with failing schools would consider 
private sector partners as a matter of routine and had to justify the reasons 
for not so doing in their action plans to improve the school. In resource 
proposals the concept of ring fencing the education budget within local 
government has been consistently opposed by local authorities on the 
grounds that such a step would weaken local accountability diminish local 
democratic decision making and encourage local authorities to reconsider 
their current expenditure, some E230 million above the level of standard 
spending assessment (2001/02) at the expense of other local services. 
The financial proposals in the Act determine nationally the accounts 
systems for schools and create a national system capable of bespoke 
bench marking, cost analysis and well fitted, should it be required, for 
operation directly by central government or another national, regional or 
sub regional body. The need for system uniformity is seen at its sharpest in 
these particular proposals. 
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The Education Act (2002) confirmed in many aspects of the legislation the 
paradox explored by Ball (2001): 
Labour are attempting to realise economic policy in education by 
creating a model of schooling which is essentially Fordist and micro- 
managed. This is based on a decontextualised, 'basic skills' 
approach which stands in stark contrast to the 'high skills' 
knowledge based, post Fordist economy portrayed in Labour's own 
policy texts and policy rhetoric. (Ball, 2001 a, p 53). 
The rhetoric which asserts that people, (teachers) are the critical resource 
and that only through their development can an organisation succeed is 
betrayed by policies which are founded in a belief in technical rationalism, 
viewing people, (teachers) as technicians and in doing so stifles and 
encourages risk averse strategies. The commonly accepted belief in a post 
Fordist model to resolve what Finegold and Soskice (1988) defined as 
England's industrial failure, namely low levels of education and training, 
short term financial costings, low pay and poor output quality is unresolved 
when technical rationalism remains a driving force. Such reliance does not 
lead to the two virtuous circles described by Ball (1991), in Hodkinson 
(1997), 
First, high skills lead to high productivity which leads to high wages. 
Secondly high investment in training leads to high standards which 
leads to high aspirations. (p 71). 
It does not lead to such aspiration because the emphasis within a 
technically driven system is upon measurable outputs. That which is often 
most valued in education cannot be measured and teaching to defined 
performance criteria - witness the loss of non Schedule Two provision in 
FE which has led to a diminished quality of education. The measurable 
outputs in, for example, vocational education and training are system 
designed to equip employer led labour demand within a system which itself 
has consolidated the employer position, as opposed to the learner, in 
determining need. The definition of need itself, based upon weak labour 
intelligence and inadequate forecasting concludes in a substitution of 
qualification achievement for skill acquisition or development. The central 
issue is what is valued, by whom, for what purpose, within what framework 
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of understanding and governance and accountability. An examination of 
the provisions of the Education Act (2002) provides ample evidence and 
audit for the assertions of neo-Fordism, micro-management and a limited 
licensed authority for institutional and individual professional ability to 
innovate, within a framework of output measurement capable of focussed 
inspection. 
The modernisation strategy could not, therefore, be said to be liberating in 
the public arena of education. 
Labour's Modernisation Strategy - Paradoxes and Reflections 
The critics, from both ends of the spectrum (Ball 1998,2001; Tooley 1995, 
1996,1999) are, for different reasons persuaded of the fundamental flaw in 
Labour's strategy - that the narrowness of the approach to learning and the 
ideology and pursuit of performativity are, in Ball's (2001 a) terms 
9 antithetical' to the high skills knowledge economy of their rhetorical 
aspiration. However, given the prevailing narrowness of the vision the 
search is seen to be for solutions to the objectives derived from a 
concentration on output measures. As Barber (2001) indicates: 
The challenge for the twenty first century is surely to seek out what 
works. The issue is not whether the public, private or voluntary 
sector alone will shape the future, but what partnerships and 
combinations of the three will make the most difference to student 
performance. (p 39). 
Not society. Not the pursuit of equality or social justice but 'performance'. 
This does not include the development of student's abilities to think, create, 
imagine, behave, act or appreciate in a wider societal context. 
This raises the issues of what constitutes performance in a societal context 
and the implications of individualism within an education service 
subjugated to economic need. The deeper underlying context is the need 
to redevelop the concept of education fulfilling personal need and not solely 
the perceived needs of the market. The attraction of Barber's challenge is 
that his objective, the resulting goal can be quantified and therefore be 
perceived as a product - capable of market delivery by any or a 
combination of providers as earlier identified by Barber (1999). 
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That there may be a different perception or vision of society between the 
public, private or voluntary sectors is not part of the equation. Partnerships 
rest upon values which are mutually agreed and cannot be taken as 
assumed, else the venture fails. The criteria of what constitutes 
performance is arbitrary for example and is not based and primarily rooted 
in values. In contrast the local government White Paper, 'Strong local 
leadership, Quality Public Services' was intended to set out a new vision of 
local government and the foreword set out Blair's commitment to: 
a partnership between central and local government, reflecting the 
critical importance of local authorities as a tier of democratic 
government delivering high quality services to local people. 
(DETR 2001, p 4) 
The DETR White Paper (2001) restated the government's four principles 
for public service reform and suggested that there should be national 
framework of standards and accountability, and that within this framework 
there should be devolution to local councils to encourage diversity and 
creativity, as well as the freedom to respond to and meet their communities 
needs. This in turn would require the building of local capacity in 
recognition of the need for flexibility at the front line and this flexibility would 
enable more choice for the consumer which was essential. 
In addition there was an expressed desire to give councils the 'tools they 
need'to make the improvements local people want to see and proposals to 
establish greater freedom to set local spending priorities and reduce ring 
fenced grants, both in direct opposition to the reality of the Education Act 
(2002) as was the proposed abolition of consent regimes which are set to 
expand dramatically given the clauses in the Education Act described 
earlier. The theme throughout the White Paper (2001) was one of 
transforming central-local government partnerships using local public 
service agreements as a key mechanism. Both the language and intent of 
the White Paper stand in direct contrast to the Education Bill, representing 
a failure of two key Departments of State to harmonise strategy in a 
coherent, joined up way. The Education Bill was focussed on diversity, 
marketisation and privatisation - defining features of educational 
modernisation. 
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This marketisation of education, reinforced by manageralist strategies has 
been a particular feature of the education agenda pursued by New Labour. 
Education is seen as a product or commodity, with competition driving 
efficiency and individual choice being preferred above collective and 
accountable political decision making. This view relegates the role of the 
State to one of market promoter and regulator and, as Dale (1994) argued 
marketisation and the promotion of the market to the consumer would 
inevitably lead to the depoliticisation of education policy, making the 
replacement of societal, collective decisions subject to the common 
denominator of individual benefit. This, as with the application of 'choice' in 
social arenas beyond education, benefits those empowered and able to 
use strategies to enable successful choice outcomes and represents a 
deployment of garnered cultural capital, leading to an apparent 'fairness' in 
outcome despite the process starting point. In essence individual choice 
rewards those in a position to manage the system and polarises outcomes, 
with the middle class succeeding as other groups fail. This runs counter to 
the concept of a welfare state; by the transfer of social risk from society to 
the individual division is reinforced and differentials in levels of provision 
are magnified. It also affects the concept of citizenship and the rights of a 
citizen which exist apart from the market. 
This issue is at the heart of the New labour strategy in pursuing a 'Third 
Way' of reforming the welfare state. Powell (1999,2000,2003), reflecting 
Driver and Martell (1998) and Levitas (1998), set out a tabular 
representation of change which has resonance with the underlying issues 
definition which are a central paradox of New Labour. 
Dimensions of the Third Way in Welfare Policy 
Dimension Old Left Third Way New Right 
Approach Leveller Investor Deregulator 
Outcome Equality Inclusion Inequality 
Citizenship Rights Both Responsibilities 
Mixed Economy of 
welfare 
State Public/Private; civil 
society 
Private 
Mode Command 
and Control 
Co-operation 
/Partnership 
Competition 
Social Expenditure High Pragmatic Low 
(Powell 2003) 
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Powell (2003) suggested that Labour were moving to a D. I. Y. Welfare 
State, and in quoting Grice, (1997) argues that the intention would be for 
individuals to take responsibility and the attendant risk in compiling their 
own welfare package from state, voluntary and private sectors. 
The portrayal of the Third Way as a value driven, moral project is a key 
feature of New Labour as Blair emphasises 'equal worth, opportunity for all, 
responsibility and community' insisting that 'human nature is co-operative 
as well as competitive, selfless as well as self interested; and society could 
not function if it were otherwise' (Blair, 1998c p 6). He thus seeks to 
reassert democratic socialist values and set these into an ethical 
framework grounded on the left. There is, however, no linkage between the 
rhetoric and how it relates in practice to a depoliticised and 
detraditionalised education policy in practice. Taken together the 
depoliticisation of policy and the remodelling of the rights of citizens and 
consumers, which the market has driven, require a response which could in 
political, consumer and citizenship terms give effect to some of the values 
agenda pursued within the Third Way and point to a Fourth Way. 
It is this linkage between legislation, privatisation and the values agenda 
within welfare state reform which is further addressed in succeeding 
chapters, starting with the emergence of the alignment of 'modernisation' 
and the increased use of the 'private sector' as having the same meaning. 
This Chapter begins to lead to an emerging thesis that modernisation is a 
coherent philosophy which generates systemic change within a values 
framework and, as such, is capable of rational analysis; addressing in part 
the first key research question set out in the introduction p 9, and further 
considered in the Chapters which follow, starting with an explanation of the 
methodology adopted, the research design, a refinement of the key 
research questions and the parameters of the case study undertaken as 
part of the research. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Methodology 
Aims 
The aim of this study is to explore, analyse and critically examine the 
education policies pursued by New Labour from 1997 with a specific focus 
on the centrality of private sector engagement in education and the 
intended as well as the unintended consequences of this strategy for 
society and traditional concepts of citizenship. It attempts to be an 
insightful review of 'modernisation' in practice informed by personal and 
professional experience from working at a senior level in a Local Education 
Authority, and was undertaken within the framework of revised ethical 
guidelines adopted by the British Education Research Association in 2004. 
In considering an appropriate methodology the research questions set out 
on page 9 in broad philosophical outline were refined in order to sharpen 
and focus the lines of enquiry to be pursued. The thesis deals with three 
key questions: 
Does the new governance of education require a new system of 
accountability? 
Does the performativity of the private sector require public scrutiny 
and regulation? 
Is the new governance of education as dependent as the past on 
local actors to orchestrate delivery in a meaningful way for a local 
community? 
Objectives 
In order to secure the aims of this study it has been necessary to 
understand what is meant by the term 'modernisation' in the context of 
national education policy, and identify legislative strategies adopted as 
exemplars of the modernisation agenda. In addition it was necessary to 
chart the growth of private sector involvement in education and reflect upon 
the changing nature of local policy networks in education, including the role 
of democratic bodies such as Council's with an education function. This, in 
turn led to consideration of the implications of a changing pattern of 
governance and accountability within the education system for the citizen 
and service consumer. 
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The research design sought to engage the twin spheres of legislation and 
policy development with reference to the Private Finance Initiative and the 
emergence of the private sector in education with the empirical challenges 
of the real world as seen in the use of an open and non-anonymised case 
study. The concentration on the Private Finance Initiative was designed to 
illustrate the emerging practices, structural changes and interactions 
between stakeholders in the new governance of education by both a critical 
analysis of policy development and a case study of its implementation in 
order to empiricaliy investigate the research questions and draw 
appropriate conclusions. The research design was flexible and the case 
study field work refined following the analysis of literature and primary 
source documents in that I did not 
regard a research design as a blueprint for a mechanical process of 
data gathering and evaluation. To the contrary, the scholar must 
have the flexibility of mind to overturn old ways of looking at the 
world, to ask new questions, to revise research designs 
appropriately, and then to collect more data of a different type than 
originally intended. 
(King, Keohene and Verba, 1994, p 12) 
The use of a literature review enabled an overview of contemporary 
research to be obtained and made the analysis of primary source 
documents, relevant to the case study, to be evaluated in context, thus 
shaping the lines of enquiry in the case study research. 
Qualitative research that in general terms means 'any kind of research that 
produces findings not arrived at by means of statistical procedures or other 
means of quantification' (Strauss and Corbin, 1990, p 17) also accepts the 
complexity of the social world and the inherent relationships which are, of 
necessity, complex within that world. (Cronbach, 1975, p 126). 
The research incorporates a summative evaluation of New Labour's 
education policy, with the purpose being that described by Robson (1993), 
'to assess the effects and effectiveness of something, typically some 
innovation or intervention policy, practice or service'. (p 170) 
As such it seeks to meet Suchman's (1967) definition of an evaluative 
study, (quoted in Robson 1993) namely a method of determining the 
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degree to which a planned programme achieves its desired objectives 
whilst recognising that any conclusions must be seen within an unfolding 
policy dynamic that is evolving, (Robson, 1993). The research is, in this 
case, seeking to extend knowledge and is rooted in reality and not 
stemming from a position in which 
the researcher shuns the messy world of short term practical 
problems in favour of penning intellectual obscurities, masquerading 
as profundities whilst dreaming of academic recognition. 
(Hargreaves, 2001, p 201). 
As such it contributes by a duality of methodological approach, theoretical 
analysis and case study, which enabled triangulation and validity and 
hence reliability in the narrative, (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994) and it portrays 
through the case study outcomes of research in the real world concerning 
real human beings in real places acting in real contexts and produces real 
outcomes, (Robson, 2002, p 3/ 4). 
Triangulation is seen as relevant where a complex, controversial 
phenomenon requires illumination and a focus on theoretical perspectives 
of private sector work in the public sphere are, in this case complemented 
by the case study research and the attempt to represent policy and 
legislative change visually, following the gathering of individual perception 
which was then aggregated. The multi method approach, allowing two or 
more perspectives to shape conclusions could be said to be 
methodologically appropriate and be considered as the primary criteria for 
methodological quality assessment, (Patton, p 39) and as meeting the 
definition of triangulation, the employing of more than one theory 
participant, method or analysis (Robson 2002, p 553) countering threats to 
the validity of the research (Robson, 2002, p 175). 
Gorard and Taylor, (2004) argue that triangulation is about 
complementarity and not mutual validation, with different methods 
producing different aspects of the wider phenomenon and outcomes then 
being put together, with each perspective's unique evidence contributing to 
the whole and in some aspects, being mutually reinforcing, (p 8). 
it is from this perspective that this research has been undertaken. 
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The research includes a critical and comprehensive documentary analysis 
through the consideration of primary texts, incorporating process depiction 
of reality as well as contextual analysis (Silverman, 2000 Patton, 1990). 
This includes H. M. Treasury, Department for Education and Skills, and the 
Office of the Deputy Prime Minister's legislative programmes, guidance 
policies and plans. It also considers reports from national bodies such as 
Parliamentary Select Committees, House of Lords Proceedings, Hansard 
Debates, the Education and Social Research Council, academic and 
commissioned research reports as well as press commentary and political 
party programmes and publications. Locally, the case study focussed on 
the City of Stoke-on-Trent Council Resource Committee reports, Policy 
Committee reports, Education Committee reports, correspondence 
between key local networks in Stoke-on-Trent, the business case for a 
Private Finance Initiative (PFI), as considered by Stoke-on-Trent City 
Council local media reports and external audit reports concerning Stoke- 
on-Trent to which I was given open access. This analysis enabled a 
comprehensive chronology to be assembled and policy linkages or gaps to 
be identified. 
The study therefore combines a critical analysis of primary texts and 
research literature with a detailed case study which includes interviews with 
key players in a private finance initiative undertaking. The introduction to 
Chapter 4, page 82 sets the scene and the use of a case study (Robson 
1993) has been used to explore the key questions in a real-life context, as 
part of a strategy of enquiry aligning documentary analysis, including 
primary source data such as Minutes of the Education Committee in Stoke- 
on-Trent reports to other Council Committees and written reports by the 
Director of Education in Stoke-on-Trent together with participant 
perception. The intention was to combine an analysis which describes and 
interprets settings, within the context of policy initiation, operationalisation 
and outcome, from a position of 'empathic neutrality' (Patton, 1990 p 55) 
and insight, based upon my role as an active participant in change 
processes in education at a County level, having to understand, define, 
plan and mediate national and local strategy in a large Local Education 
Authority. 
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The case study of a Private Finance Initiative in Stoke-on-Trent involved 
the use of semi structured interviews to address the key questions and the 
use of conversation to obtain specific research information, (Robson, 1993) 
and provided individual perspectives on their engagement with the policy 
implications of the Private Finance Initiative in a real life setting. The 
interviewees included, interalia, party political leaders from the case study 
authority, Senior officials - The City Treasurer and Director of Education, 
Teachers' Professional Association representatives, representatives of 
Transform Schools the private sector delivery company, and 
Headteachers. The sample was as broad and representative as was 
possible, given the time constraints upon the researcher and not all 
interviews are reported upon - particularly where repetition occurred. The 
intention was to capture national, local and institutional perspectives on the 
nature of policy in practice and consider whether the levels of engagement 
in change strategies as seen by Salter and Greenway (2003) in the Health 
Service had a resonance. Participants were invited to formally confirm their 
participation in writing before the process started and undertakings were 
given that the published outcomes would not identify individuals, 
organisations or institutions unless interviews were agreed to be 'on the 
record' interviews. In particular I fully observed the B. E. R. A. guidelines 
(2004) in conducting the interviews, fully aware of my responsibilities to the 
participants, and established voluntary informed consent before the 
research began. All interviewees were informed about the purpose of the 
research, the process employed and the nature of the thesis and its likely 
eventual location in a library and open to public scrutiny. In addition the 
right to anonymity and entitlement to privacy was discussed. In every 
individual case the interviewees specifically waived that right and were 
willing to be identified, their interview used, subject to the discretion of the 
author, and felt individually and collectively that the story of the Private 
Finance Initiative in the City of Stoke-on-Trent should be recorded. I gave 
full consideration to the case for anonymising the case study and felt, on 
balance, that the use of a real world, named case study, would carry 
greater authenticity in adding to the knowledge of policy development and 
its implementation than an unidentifiable case study. The transcripts show 
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real people, in a real world, facing multiple challenges in governing 
education in a contemporary educational setting and illuminate the 
literature review and primary source documents with perceptions of living 
history. There are some gaps in the reporting of interviews and some 
gathered evidence has been used as informing the researcher and the 
analysis of events, whilst care has been consciously taken to avoid 
observer bias. All interviews were tape recorded and transcribed, believing 
as I do that such a strategy is 'Indispensable' (Patton, 1990 p 348) in order 
to fully capture the rich data contained in interview situations. 
The use of an interview, the one to one relationship, secured at least two of 
the three purposes suggested by Cohen and Mannion (1992 p 309), the 
second descriptor being that ascribed to Tuckman (11977) namely the 
principal means of gathering information having direct bearing on the 
research objectives and by providing access to what is 'inside a persons 
head, (it) makes it possible to measure what a person knows, (knowledge 
and information), what a person likes or dislikes, (values and preferences), 
and what a person thinks, (attitudes and beliefs). 
The purpose of the interview was more, therefore, than the descriptor 
applied by Moser and Kalton (11971) as 
a conversation ...... with the purpose of eliciting certain 
information 
from the respondent. (p 271) 
My own professional development as part of the Ed. D course, coupled with 
wide ranging professional experience as a senior and reported upon local 
government figure and the skills required to succeed in that environment 
conferred the 'theoretical sensitivity' required of a researcher (Strauss and 
Corbin, 1990) and, in terms of policy analysis and judgement hopefully 
carries some weight with readers. 
The trustworthiness of the interviewer is also considered to be a key issue, 
(Robson, 1993), and my reputation within the case study authority and as a 
long standing County Education Officer was helpful in the process of acting 
as both practitioner and researcher. 
The issue of the Private Finance Initiative is complex both in scale and 
interpretation and as such the assertion of Miles and Huberman (1984, 
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P 46) that the researcher should have 'some familiarity and a strong 
conceptual interest' enabled a focus to be brought to bear in interviews and 
the following up of emergent issues within the semi structured nature of the 
interviews. The issue of trustworthiness in this research rests upon an 
interpretation or perception of events, and that to argue a reality of case 
subject to no other interpretation is naive. However, the seam of gathered 
evidence is wide and possessed of theoretical triangulation by virtue of 
literature and policy review. The City of Stoke-on-Trent case study stands 
uniquely as a factual record of events and memories of process in time - 
reflected by key players in their own language and their own constructs of 
reality. 
Yin (1994) defines a case study as an empirical enquiry which 'allows 
investigation into a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context, 
especially when the boundaries between the phenomenon and context are 
not clearly evident' (p 13). 
In this case the study of Stoke-on-Trent PFI is explanatory of actions in 
time dealing with the questions of how and why (Robson, 1993). When 
6 voice' and wriften evidence are combined, the analysis of local policy 
papers, minutes, notes of meetings with interviews, it enables an 
interpretive approach to be taken in terms of individual meanings and 
perceptions of events and issues, (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994). 
This case study was felt to be appropriate and viable for three reasons 
advanced by Benbasat (1987 p 370). 
It is necessary to study the phenomenon in its setting. 
The researcher can ask 'how' and 'why' questions, to understand 
the nature and complexity of the process. 
Research is being conducted in an area where few, if any, previous 
studies have been undertaken. 
In terms of the latter point there is little published research work on PFIs in 
education and in terms of Stoke-on-Trent no previous written description of 
the process incorporating the contemporary voice of participants. The case 
study therefore stands as a statement of actual events gathered from 
records and data interweaved with participant recollection. I would argue 
that the use of a case study in this dissertation meets the threshold criteria 
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set out by Hitchcock and Hughes, 1995, in that it deals with a rich 
description of events within a chronological narrative, it combines analysis 
and a description of events focussing on key actors, highlighting specific 
issues of relevance and an effort was made to vividly but not sensationally 
report the outcomes, (p 317). The case study complements the earlier 
theoretical policy analysis and has a strength in its reality with clear 
triangulated perceptions of, for example, the debate over services, where 
the key players confirm a pattern of events that, taken together portray an 
undisputable reality. The case study also enables the reader to understand 
the connectivity of ideas and abstract principles (Cohen, Mannion and 
Morrison, 2004 p 181) and, in this case the illumination of central-local 
government action, reaction and inaction in real life time. It therefore 
contributes and informs in varying degrees and is referenced in differential 
qualities according to the point of the research rainbow the facet of 
research touches - from factual, written, undisputable reports to the 
descripton of a local Member of Parliament conducting business whilst 
shopping, (Eisner, 1991, p 30 - 31). The case study examined the term 
4 modernisation' as it applies in practice and enabled the development of a 
conceptual model of change in operation and what implications for the 
policy process might be inferred building on the earlier literature analysis. 
The linking of national policy imperatives to a practical situation by the use 
of primary textual analysis alongside emerging critical literature and 
research studies has enabled tentative conclusions to be drawn about the 
6 modernisation' process and the use of the private finance initiative for 
capital, governance and learning strategies in the education service. The 
intention beyond this was to explore new and emerging dimensions of 
governance and areas for change as a guide, as Eisner 1991 (p 59) stated; 
'Guides call our attention to aspects of the situation or place we might 
otherwise miss. ' The analysis therefore offers a perspective within the 
evolving policy dynamic and hopefully contributes to the developing 
research literature in the area of 'modernisation' and governance by 
addressing the implications of private sector engagement in the public 
sector of education and putting these aspects or perspectives together. 
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The final Chapter Five of this thesis deals with key question three, as set 
out in the introduction, p9 and deals with what emerging and new 
constructions of professional, evidence based practice and accountability 
may be required to ensure that education policy is, in reality, more 
accountable to the deliverer, recipient and citizen in the light of the 
preceding chapters and the research findings. 
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CHAPTER THREE: Data Collection: PFI policy development. 
Accountability, Performativity and the Private Sector 
Having examined the continuities of national policy this chapter focuses on 
the aspects of policy in practice which involves the private sector in the 
provision of public goods and services. This in turn raises issues of 
accountability and political perceptions of local government on the part of 
central government. The Education Act (2002) gave statutory expression to 
the New Labour emphasis on promoting the role of the private sector in 
public education either through outsourced activity, intervention strategies, 
public-private partnerships or the provision of capital in private finance 
initiatives. The intention to introduce diversity by an expanded 
engagement of the private sector raises the need to consider the issue of 
accountability, in the context of performativity; seen by Elliot (2001 ap 203) 
as an 'integral part of the neo-liberal project of re-engineering society as a 
free market for goods and services'. 
This aligns with the identification by the World Trade Organisation, charged 
with liberalising the global exchange of goods and services, of the welfare 
state, in particular the education and health spheres as areas which could 
be opened to market provision. In this the New Labour government were 
seen to be pace setting and by 2002 the term 'modernisation' had, in terms 
of Local Education Authorities become synonymous with privatisation. The 
virtuous circle of diverse provision could be seen when a Local Education 
Authority failed an inspection, leading to a private sector intervention, 
branding the local authority a failure; unlike the strong and successful local 
authority which sought to engage with a private partner willingly, (see p 
61/62). In either case public service became to a greater or lesser degree 
privately provided. The DfES policy paper, 'The Changing role of LEAs', 
(DfES, 2000) had described LEA's as 'brokers' of services to schools, with 
a responsibility for creating open markets for these services, an 
enforcement of challenge to their own traded and market provision. The 
interface between public and private trading in operational terms is 
explored later, but in the framework of performativity, defined in principle as 
stemming from a societal context in which the economic functions of social 
systems, like education, are separated from their personal and social 
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functions and rendered subordinate to them, (Elliot, 2001 a, p 205), there is 
a need for emergent and robust accountability mechanisms to both citizens 
and commissioners, particularly if policy and targets are driven from 
outside the local democratic expressions of community and professional 
voice, thus creating a void in a localised and accountable relationship. 
In considering the three dominant accountability mechanisms, democratic, 
value for money performance audits and market mechanisms there are 
clearly deficiencies in each. Current representational models have become 
weaker as an expression of the democratic voice, value for money audits 
presuppose a framework of defined standards or indicators against which 
I performativity'can be assessed and the market rests upon individual or 
institutional accountability as opposed to community accountability. There 
is, therefore a need for new, emergent structures of accountability within a 
contemporary setting. In creating a'new public management system'by 
re-engineering schools and local authorities to work within a model of 
regulatory control which concentrates governance at the centre and seeks 
regulatory compliance the evaluatory state, which deploys quasi markets to 
strengthen secondary regulation, must consider and develop accountability 
strategies to include the existing and planned growth of private sector 
provision in the public domain. This becomes particularly important when 
the use of the private sector affects the characteristics of the delivered 
service and, as Crouch, (2003), observed, private markets within the 
welfare state lack the features associated with the emergence of diversity 
and innovation within a market, namely a large number of competing 
companies, with broad scope for new products and no serious 
consequences of failure. Within the public education system the number of 
producers is relatively small and the risk factors low - it is an area within 
which market distortion is developing - the concept of marketisation being 
inappropriate as the market itself is impure. With a small customer base - 
the contract specifier usually being central or local government and the 
absence of a direct relationship with the actual consumer of services or the 
citizen as paymaster the defining feature of the education market, as seen 
by Crouch (2003) is 
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One in which oligopolistic providers make deals with monopsonist 
customers. (p 14). 
Within this definition issues of accountability between commissioner and 
supplier ought to be capable of comprehensive construction, with risks 
minimised and good models of transparent specification capable of inter- 
commissioner communication. Thus, in Private Sector Initiatives it could 
reasonably be expected that from the contractual growth over recent years 
a good practice model for commissioning would have been developed. 
That this appears not to be the case is explored within the case study. This 
agenda for greater diversity, seen by Elliott (2001 a) as an essential part of 
the new performance culture in the public sector, had as a central element 
the weakening of 'intermediary bodies; (Gray, 1998), such as professional 
associations and interest groups by strategies such as competitive 
tendering, performance related and profit related pay initiatives as well as 
sharp, focussed performative inspection and public reporting. Within this 
the 'transforming role of the state' must be beyond the limited role set out 
by Gray (1998) namely; 'to supply a framework of rules and regulations 
within which the free market, including crucially the labour market, would 
be self-regulating' (p 26 -7). 
In reality a range of contracts need renegotiation when diversification takes 
place and the branded areas of public provision, hitherto exempt from the 
market place because of citizenry status, move to commercial isation, 
redefining the citizen's entitlement to public goods and services as Marshall 
(1963) quoted by Crouch (2003) argued. In turn the residualisation of 
public sector provision raises issues about local authority provision 
increasingly becoming the clearing house for social casualties with 
universal, as opposed to specialist service provision being delivered, and 
thus increasingly accountable, outside the current democratic locus. At this 
point a wider debate about strategic planning comes into play and as 
Wright (2004) observes: 
Public services represent a contract between the state and its 
citizens, and the terms of that contract need to be specified more 
explicitly. (p 2). 
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The potential conflict of interests with a single company acting in 
inspectorial and provider modes is enabled by the absence of a public 
framework of regulation, scrutiny and accountability for the private sector's 
discharge of contract to the citizen as opposed to commissioner, as central 
government's intervention in local authorities has demonstrated. 
The Private Sector - Intervention in Local Authorities and Key 
Players 
The 1999 Local Government Act powers have been used by central 
government to intervene in authorities assessed under the 
Comprehensive Performance Assessment process to be 'poorly 
performing'. Martin and Bovaird (2005) support the view that the 
assumption on the part of central government has been that there is 
some kind of causal relationship between standards of governance 
and levels of service performance (Skelcher, 2003). The government 
also clearly saw service improvement being effectively achieved by 
public-private partnerships, and the ODPM created the 'Strategic 
Partnering Taskforce'to encourage a range of innovative public- 
private partnerships 'as one of the principal options open to 
authorities in achieving step-changes in performance' (DETR, 2001, 
p 9). The annual survey outcomes undertaken by the ODPM to 
evaluate the impact of the best value regime suggest that there is 
strong evidence that the internal cultures of authorities have changed 
with a marked emphasis in the willingness of authorities to accept 
public-private partnerships, and figures suggesting 85% of Councils 
being open to accepting private sector engagement in 2003, up from 
45% in 2001 and 57% of Councils perceiving a partnership with the 
private sector to be a key factor in service improvement, (Martin and 
Bovaird 2005, p 52). In general the survey confirms that partnership 
working has increased with Councils working with other public bodies, 
the voluntary and the private sector and evidence that there is a 
positive and statistically significant link between increased partnership 
working with the private sector and improvements in CPA scores - with 
no such link stemming from increased partnership work with the 
public/voluntary sectors. This finding could be reflective of the scale of 
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private as opposed to public or voluntary partnership activity, with the 
rapid private sector expansion since 1997 as a central element of the 
government strategy. 
The role of OfSTED in the privatisation programme has been crucial, with 
central government's intervention at institutional or local government level 
following on from a critical OfSTED report. As many OfSTED approved 
inspectors are private consultants or companies there are areas where a 
small number of private companies have potentially conflicting interests, 
particularly where the same company inspects and reports, is an approved 
WES contractor to offer consultancy and is also a DfES approved 
contractor to provide educational services. 
The Centre for Public Services, 2003 indicated this potential conflict in 
tabular form: 
Approved Contractors and Inspectors 
School Inspector Training Serco, Nord Anglia, Cambridge Education Associates, 
Tribal Group 
School Inspection Services Serco, Nord Anglia, Cambridge Education Associates 
Approved List for Capita, Serco, Nord Anglia, Cambridge Education 
Consultancy Associates, Arthur Anderson/Birmingham City 
Council/APS Keele, Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & 
Young, Office for Public Management, 
PriceWaterhouse Coopers, Lorien 
Approved List for Providers Capita, Serco, Nord Anglia, Cambridge Education 
Associates, Centre for British Teachers, WS Atkins, 
Tribal Group, Bevan Ashford, Arthur 
Anderson/Birmingham City Council/APS Keele, 
Include, Pannell Kerr Forster/Prospects/Nabarro 
Nathanson, CEM, Camden LBC, Hampshire LEA, 
Essex LEA[Windsor & Co. 
(OfSTED website: Training in Inspection Skills list, List ot inspection Contractors; 
Local Government Chronicle 2002). 
There has been significant private sector involvement in the intervention 
strategies in local education authorities deemed to have failed an OFSTED 
inspection. The first LEA to experience WES intervention under the 
Schools Standard and Framework Act 1998 was the London Borough of 
Hackney in June 1999. 
Under Section 8 of the Schools Standards and Framework Act the 
powers of the Secretary of State are sweeping in that if the Secretary 
of State is satisfied that an LEA is failing in any respect to perform any 
such function, he is empowered to give directions to the LEA to 
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secure the function being performed in such a way that it meets 
specified objectives, or require the function be undertaken by a third 
party specified by the Secretary of State on behalf of the LEA and at 
its expense, again in such a way to meet (the Secretary of States') 
specified objectives. The Secretary of State may also require that any 
contract or other arrangement made by the authority with a third party 
contains certain specified terms and conditions. (School Standards 
and Framework Act, 1998, Section 8, p 7/ 8) 
This is clearly a micro-managed process with the Secretary of State being 
the driving partner in initial contract specification and invoking her authority 
in order to develop a consent regime which required her specific authority 
for any contractual variation sought by the local authority. 
Following Hackney there have been 18 cases of direct intervention 
following poor reports from OFSTED. In every case consultants from an 
approved government contracting list were appointed to advise when 
intervention was deemed necessary. Some local authorities such as 
Southwark, Bradford, Hackney, Islington, Leeds, Walsall and Waltham 
Forest have experienced partial or full privatisation in their education 
services. Others such as Haringey, Sandwell and Liverpool retained 
control of service provision but have a private sector partner advising on 
management and strategy. Where intervention has taken place the private 
sector engagement has been limited to a small number of companies, 
according to the Centre for Public Services (2003). 
Local Authority Contractor Details 
Bradford Serco School Improvement, Admissions and 
Special Educational Needs 
Hackney Nord Anglia & Learning School Improvement & Ethnic 
Trust minority achievement 
Haringey Capita Management contract - no 
outsourcing of services 
Islington Cambridge Education Seven years and worth E78.2m Mott 
Associates Macdonald as partner 
Leeds Arms Length Company: Capita is strategic management 
Education Leeds and Capita partner to Arms Length Company 
Lincolnshire Centre for British Teachers School Improvement and Advisory 
Services 
Rotherham Windsor & Co and Essex Brokerage for traded services 
LEA 
Sandwell Nord Anglia Provision of Senior Managers 
_ Southwark Atkins 5 year contract for entire LEA except 
early years and Adult education which 
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are scheduled to transfer at later date 
Surrey PPP in procurement for 
private partner 
LEA trading company to trade with 
other LEAs 
Swindon Tribal Tribal to appoint senior management 
Thurrock Capita Capita provided strategic 
management 
Walsall Serco School Improvement 
Waltham Forest EducAction (Serco and 
Amey) 
Joint Venture between Serco and 
Amey running most LEA services 
(Centre for Public Services, 2003, p 18) 
In March 2005 the CBI published a report, 'The Business of Education 
Improvement' claiming that in LEAs subject to private sector intervention 
,; there had been a faster rate of improvement in pupil performance than in 
other LEAs deemed to be failing but subject to other intervention strategies 
or public - private partnerships. The report was welcomed by the DfES 
and received wide publicity despite the fact that the conclusions about the 
relative success of the private sector interventions are superficial and 
challengeable on four counts. Firstly issues of relative cost and finance are 
omitted and this invalidates any meaningful conclusion that the private 
sector is 'best'. Secondly the'Raising Standards' KPI's are too narrow a 
measure of LEA effectiveness and even on this methodology value added 
measurements would have been more meaningful than raw trends and little 
or no account is taken of the context of intervention. Thirdly the 
interventions are variable, over different times and through different 
companies and finally the report's methodology is flawed in its use of 
comparator 'control groups'who cannot meaningfully be so described. 
The report did, however, achieve its publicity purpose and there was 
not, at the time, any critical academic review of the report's 
shortcomings and its particular use of data to promote the claimed 
superiority of the private sector, written, as the report appears to have 
been to please its commissioner - the CBI. The report sought to 
justify what the government acknowledged to be the drive to engage 
the private sector, 
What I entirely accept is that recently, particularly under this 
government, the nature of involvement of education with the private 
sector has expanded. There is no doubt that the area in which we 
perhaps invited private sector involvement that has pushed the 
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boundary between private and public is the work that we have 
invited them to do with Local Education Authorities. 
Estelle Morris, MR Minutes of Evidence, 15.12.1999 House of Commons, 
7 Question 161) 
An exchange between Helen Jones, M. P., a Member of the Education 
and Employment Select Committee and the Minister of State, Estelle 
Morris, MP who was giving evidence provides an unreported insight into 
Ministerial thinking about local Councillors, private sector engagement and 
contractual performance. 
Helen Jones 
One of the things / think we have to get right in all of this is preserving the lines of 
democratic accountability when the private sector is involved either with LEAs or 
in running schools. Perhaps you could tell us how you see those lines of public 
accountability working when, for instance, a private company is involved in 
delivering services in schools with an LEA still operating above it? Where are the 
lines which make it clear that the LEA, the elected members, actually have some 
accountability for those services? 
Estelle Morris 
/ think that it is a very important question, one of the things about contracting 
out is that it does define the relationship between elected members and the 
provider ... So / see it as / always thought 
it should be, which is reflecting local 
wishes, being a voice for the electorate, parents and people in their wards, 
and in the case of where we have contracted out actually monitoring the 
contract. / see it being elected politicians who have that obligation to 
actually monitor the contract. What it prevents them doing is interfering in 
the delivery of services. In some under-performing LEAs that is what local 
elected councillors have been doing, interfering with the delivery of 
services. They never should have been doing that and in some ways I think 
this process helps to define the relationship. 
Helen Jones 
Let us say, there is a private contractor working in a school and for various 
reasons the local people may not be satisfied with those services. How in that 
situation can they work to improve services through their local representatives? 
Estelle Morris 
By talking to the provider about what they were dissatisfied with, they could 
either be dissatisfied with the contract that was drawn up or they could be 
dissatisfied with the performance of the provider against the contract, and 
whose fault that would be would differ in both those cases. / suspect it is no 
60 
different from local authorities contracting out the refuse collection or cutting 
the grass, there is a contract there and part of the local elected councillors' 
accountability is how well they have negotiated that contract and what they 
have actually put in it. / hope they would do one of two things; either say to their 
constituents, "I will defend what I put in that contract and you can vote me 
out at the next election", or secondly, that clearly they are not delivering the 
contract and go in and do something about it. 
Minutes of Evidence, 15/12/1999 
House of Commons p 4, para 204,205 
So, the role of the local Councillor is to monitor the contract but not 
interfere in service delivery, to negotiate the outsourced contract and 
subsequently if problems arise talk to the contractor... but not interfere in 
delivery. 
The public sector trade union, UNISON, (2001 a), estimated that the value 
of the contracts in failing local education authorities was a conservative 
E800 million. In reality the market is much larger. There are authorities 
such as Bedfordshire, Northamptonshire, and Lincolnshire where the local 
education authority has chosen to work with the private sector. In her 
evidence to the Education and Employment Select Committee (June 2000), 
the Minister of State, Estelle Morris confirmed that: 
The Government believes that both the public and the private sector 
have a part to play. Certainly as far as the Local Education 
Authorities are concerned the private sector is here to stay. 
(Education and Employment Select Committee, 2000 para 11) 
In June 2001 the Institute for Public Policy Research published a report 
"Building Better Partnerships" which questioned the notion that public 
service workers have a distinctive ethos and promoted the view that the 
ownership of public service assets was a secondary issue to the quality of 
service provided. A suggestion in the report was that local authorities 
should publish an annual diversity statement showing the amount of 
inhouse spending compared to the amount spent locally on external private 
sector contractors. 
At the same time the then Minister of State at the Department for Education 
and Skills, Estelle Morris, (2001) confirmed to the NAHT annual conference 
that 'the way the law stands at the moment some local authorities cannot 
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use the private sector from a position of strength. What we want to do is to 
amend the legislation so that if you are good you can use the private sector 
willingly', (p 3) She announced a E1.8million project aimed at encouraging 
local education authorities to develop innovative ways of working with the 
private sector and other partner organisations. 
In July 2001 a government discussion paper was circulated proposing that 
private/public sector organisations awarded contracts to turn around weak 
or failing schools should be given a "controlling interest" on the governing 
body. The paper suggested that the contractors and/or the Secretary of 
State would be able to nominate enough governors to give them a majority 
and thus control the recruitment and firing of staff, the performance 
management process and curriculum development. 
Throughout the summer of 2001 a debate ensued within the Labour party 
and the educational press on the private sector's role and involvement in 
public education. A poll carried out by MORI for The Times (3d 
September 2001) revealed strong public opposition to any expansion of the 
role of the private sector in public services. Two thirds of those polled 
believed that education and health should be provided completely or mostly 
by the state. In terms of identified Labour party supporters over 70% 
expressed opposition to any increased role in public provision. At the 
height of this debate CAPITA the private company that had taken over 
education services in Leeds and the London Borough of Haringey, 
announced record profits up to 62% to E31.3 million, giving shareholders a 
dividend increase of 36%, ten times the annual pay award offered to 
teachers that year. 
The developing role of the UK's private education industry could be one of 
the drivers of future economic growth in the British economy and the 
government's drive to engage the private sector is building up export 
potential for a worldwide market within the knowledge economy, (Monbiot, 
2002). There is emerging evidence beginning to show that international 
competitiveness in the private sector is being shaped by educational 
experience and innovation in the UK. The American market is also seen as 
increasingly attractive to such private sector operators as Nord Anglia, 
CAPITA and Serco. 
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The growth in public-private partnership activity under Labour has been a 
particular feature of their public service strategy, rising from E75 million in 
1997/98 to F-700 million in 2001/02 and predicted to reach E2.7 billion by 
2005/06 (Local Government Chronicle 2003). 
In the outsourcing strategies applied to local education authorities there is 
no information publicly available about the costs of contracts, contract 
variation or contract setting up costs. These are seen to be commercially 
sensitive and held outside of public scrutiny within the Department for 
Education and Skills. The citizen, rate payer or tax payer is therefore 
unable to consider what element of profit is being taken out of a contract by 
the private sector and, there is an inability to bench mark and compare 
value for money costs. This raises the issue proposed by Whitty (2000) of 
the need for the creation of adequate safe guards within a wider and more 
diverse provider base in public education and becomes even more 
essential when private sector operations fail and, as in the case of 
Bradford, the Secretary of State for Education and Skills expresses serious 
concern about the performance of Serco, with a 10 year E360 million 
contract to deliver education services. It could also apply to Southwark, 
where WS Atkins pulled out of a five year El 00 million contract or 
Hackney, where Nord Anglia terminated their contract. In a speech to the 
Business of Education Forum Tooley (1999) identified seven virtues of the 
profit incentive in education. Firstly the desire for expansion. Excellent 
state schools ought to be able to expand as a business in order to satisfy 
market demand. As part of this proposition successful schools could take 
over failing schools and make a profit from the enterprise. The second is 
that schools and colleges should organise their own quality control, by 
setting their own curriculum and awarding their own in house qualifications 
or shopping for qualification accreditation on the open market. A third 
virtue of for profit education rests upon the capability of brand names to 
maintain standards and consumer loyalty. Fourthly the profit motive would 
lead to investment in research and development and in order to avoid a 
reduction in market share there would be constant and significant 
investment in forward planning. The fifth virtue is the potential of the 
private sector to ensure teachers are properly rewarded and outstanding 
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excellence is disseminated throughout the company. The sixth virtue of the 
profit motive is seen to lie in capital investment and the returns that could 
be available. 
Many of the Tooley virtues of for profit investment can be seen to be 
capable of being delivered through the Education Act (2002) and policy 
initiatives such as the expansion of popular schools, fast track foundation 
status processes, the lauding of profitable public ventures - Thomas 
Telford School - and the growth of Academies and the consequent cheap 
purchase of public assets and influence in the public sphere. 
In order to understand the societal, stratified, citizen and consumer 
accountability strategies which a diverse pattern of providers in the public 
sector might warrant some exploration of the current and potential scale 
and nature of private sector engagement in the public sphere is required. 
The World Education Market Conference in 2002 considered a report from 
Knowledge Quest Ventures which conservatively estimated that the global 
education market exceeded two thousand billion dollars, with significant 
potential for growth, if the barriers of public sector monopolies in nation 
states could be removed. The European Roundtable of Industrialists has 
argued that 'state education is a market opportunity and should be treated 
as such', (Monbiot, 2000). 
Increasingly the UK is seen as the international promoter of the benefits of 
privatisation - allegedly the Department for International Development paid 
E93,000 to the Adam Smith Institute in 2005 to support the production of a 
film, destined to be broadcast in India, promoting the benefits of 
privatisation - and this only one element of some E28 million paid to 
consultants from the Institute between 2001 - 2004 to promote privatisation 
(Private Eye No 1139 1 9th August 2005 p 29). Capital Strategies, an 
independent corporate finance house associated with American Capital 
Strategies, a listed investment bank, published a report in February 1999 
on the 'Business of Education'which assessed the 'outsourcing market' in 
the United Kingdom being worth E10 billion and market capacity to sustain 
growth of 20% per annum. The report projected the growth of the private 
sector market share in the United States doubling to reach 25% of the 635 
billion dollars spent annually on education and training - citing three market 
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leaders in Edison, Sylvan Learning Systems and Nobel Learning 
Communities. Whilst it is difficult to accurately assess the growth in the 
outsourcing market from 1999 to 2004 an indication of scale can be 
gathered from a consideration of the annual reports and accounts of the six 
major players in the education consultancy and service provision market. 
Some indication of the scale of capital growth was reported by Loynes, of 
Capital Economics Limited, quoted by Duncan in The Times, (14 March 
2005) - that potential state liabilities incurred by the Private Finance 
Initiative stood at E60 billion or 5% of gross domestic product. Further 
consideration of the economies of the Private Finance Initiative, from a 
company perspective, are difficult to gauge in terms of investment range, 
return and secondary market engagement. A review of Serco's accounts 
(one of the six - the others being Tribal, VT Group, Capita, Nord Anglia 
and Mott Macdonald) indicates the difficulty of establishing clarity about the 
capital investment and private finance initiative activity of the company. 
First PFI is accounted for under a range of headings - joint ventures, 
subsidiaries, investments and particularly secondary markets in equity 
stakes, whose worth cannot be ascertained from the published accounts. 
Secondly whilst the company reports that PH accounted for 8% of gross 
profit and 12% of turnover some 43% of pre-tax profit came from "joint 
ventures" which would include an unquantified element of PFI activity. 
There is, therefore, an issue of public accounting for the profitability of PFI 
investment. 
The broader company accounts for the six companies for 2004 reveal a 
picture of significant growth in public sector markets and optimism about 
the future growth potential - hardly surprising when fewer than 1% of the 
companies in the FTSE index provide public sector outsourcing services to 
a market that represents 40% of the UK's gross domestic product, a market 
central government is determined to open up. Whilst there are a range of 
private companies involved in public sector education they are rarely 
reported upon and the activities of the six major companies, by volume of 
central and local government market share of revenue service provision is 
informative and illustrative. 
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Serco 
A multinational company, market value of f-1.1 billion with contracts in rail, 
roads, defence, health, justice and education delivering compound growth 
in turnover since 1988 of 25% a year. Provides support, leadership, advice 
to over 500 schools and eight Local Education Authorities including the 
running of two LEAs, Bradford and Walsall. An order book of E12.7 billion 
in 2004, turnover of E1.7billion and identified opportunities for a further E16 
billion of work. Employs more than 40,000 people and has used the 
experience gained in the British outsourcing market to expand overseas. 
The Sunday Times (22 May 2005) in an analysis of Serco observed that, 
'The Labour government is committed to public sector reform and 
there is one way to get it: outsource more because the private sector 
can deliver efficiencies where the public sector cannot. In this 
respect Britain may lead the world ....... 
(Steir, Sunday Times 22/5/2005 'Business' p 12) 
VT Group (VT Education & Skills) 
Vosper - Thorneycroft has its roots in shipbuilding - with expertise in 
warships, tugs and barges. It moved into training in 1996, careers advice 
provision in 1999, education consultancy in 2001 and was selected in 2004 
to deliver a F-11 00 million partnership contract to provide services to schools 
in Surrey for a seven year tenure with an option to renew beyond that for a 
further eight years. The VT group formed a joint venture group in 2005 with 
the construction specialist, Costain, called 'Learning 21'to address 
opportunities offered by the Building Schools for the Future programme. 
The intention is to offer a full design, build and operate service and the new 
group is targeting Local Education Authorities in the North West, West 
Midlands and London for potential partnerships. 
Mott MacDonald Group 
One of the earliest companies to enter the outsourcing market. Cambridge 
Education Associates Limited, formalised a partnership arrangement with 
Cambridge Education Consultants and the companies merged. The new 
company became part of the Mott MacDonald group although Cambridge 
Education Associates retained its identity for trading purposes. The merger 
made economic sense in bringing together CEA - successful in the UK and 
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CEC which provided overseas educational consultancy. The parent group, 
Mott MacDonald has an annual turnover in excess of E300 million and a 
staff of 4,500. Operating profit rose from E7.6 million on 2000 to F-46.7 
million in 2004 and future growth from outsourcing, particularly overseas is 
anticipated. 
CEA won the contract to manage the outsourcing of Islington, the 
Teacher/Headteacher Assessment Performance programme, remains one 
of the largest contractors for OFSTED inspections and is a major provider 
of training for inspectors. It also carries out inspections of Independent 
Schools - another potential market. 
Nord Anglia pic 
Founded in 1972 Nord Anglia operates through three Divisions, Nurseries, 
International Schools and Outsourcing with thirty-four companies and 4,500 
staff. In 2005 the company secured a contract to inspect Further Education 
Colleges, let by OFSTED and worth F-26 million over four years, in addition 
to an existing contract to inspect 178 schools and a contract to train 
additional inspectors to work alongside HMI. The group refocused its 
business strategy during 2004, selling Hull Grammar School to the Church 
Schools Company for E4.2 million and its remaining UK schools to Global 
Education Management Systems for El 1.9 million. The GEMS company 
plans a network of 200 schools in the UK, offering cut price independent 
education. Further reference to the appointments made to the GEMS 
advisory board can be found on page 72. Following the disposal of the 
schools portfolio the group purchased E73 million of day care nurseries, 
making Nord Anglia the market leader in a fragmented market. The 
Nurseries Division of the company was the most profitable, with turnover 
increasing from E2.6 million in 2001 to E23.4 million in 2004 and prospects 
for future growth seen as strong with the governments tax and national 
insurance rebates reducing actual childcare costs for higher rate taxpayers 
from April 2005. The company sees early years provision as capable of 
'providing growth and outstanding returns for the company' (Annual Report 
and Accounts 2004 page 8) whilst it also plans to 'leverage our market 
leading position in the UK to develop new nurseries overseas, (p 11). 
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Tribal Group 
Tribal is one of the fastest growing companies in the public sector market 
with only 4% of gross revenue by market in 2004 coming from the private 
sector and education, health and local government accounting for eighty 
eight percent of business. The group was the second fastest growing 
company floated on the stock exchange between 1998 and 2002; growing 
from 3 employees at inception in 1999 to over 1,900 by 2004 and claiming 
to have a contractual relationship with 80% of secondary schools, 75% of 
local authorities and 95% of Further Education Colleges. Turnover grew 
from E17.5 million in 2001 to E186 million in 2004 and profits rising from 
E1.9 million (2001) to f-20.1 million (2004). The company was appointed by 
OFSTED to provide regional inspection services to 7,000 schools in the 
Midlands and South of England - making the group the largest provider of 
contracted inspection services. Of the major companies in the outsourcing 
market Tribal has been the most acquisitive of smaller companies. 
Capita 
Capita is the market leader in the provision of business process 
outsourcing to the public and private sectors in the UK. Turnover grew by 
19% to E1,285 million in 2004 and profits by 22% to E121.2 million. The 
company also reported the acquisition of 12 major contracts in 2004 with a 
value of E1.36 billion, an increase of 122% over 2003. The growth came 
from both public and private sectors; in education the company won a5 
year contract to deliver the National strategies for the DfES, a contract to 
implement the 'new relationship' school improvement partner strategy, 
continued to operate 'Education Leeds', administered the national 
Education Maintenance Allowance System and the operational processes 
of vetting employment status via Criminal Record checks. The company 
recruited 5,000 staff during 2004 leading to a total workforce of 23,000. 
Capita also administers on behalf of Central government, the Criminal 
Records Bureau (E400 million), the Teachers Pensions Scheme (E60 
million), the Child Trust Fund Accounts (F-439 million over 20 years) and 
the National Education Strategies (E177 million over 5 years). In 2005 
Capita opened two offices in India, pretax profits rose 18% to 
68 
E74.7 m in the first six months of 2005 and turnover was up by 11 % 
(Municipal Journal 4.8.2005 p 15), a significant rate of growth and 
profitability. 
The Private Sector - Scale, Accountability, Influence Scale 
Public sector markets have offered significant opportunities to the private 
sector since 1997 with spending on consultancy services rising from E600 
million in 2000 to E2.15 billion in 2003 (Management Consultancies 
Association) making the public sector the single largest UK consumer of 
consultancy services. Spending on education alone rose by 6% a year 
between 2002-2004 in revenue terms and capital investment is set to reach 
E4.1 billion a year by 2006. The impact of the 2004 Spending Review and 
the implementation of the Gershon efficiency report will lead to a 
substantial personnel reduction in Whitehall, particularly in the Department 
of Work and Pensions and Education & Skills which will lead to further 
consultancy services, confirming central government's position as the 
largest single consumer of consultancy services. 
Accountability 
It is impossible from the published accounts to ascertain the detail of 
business turnover and profit from outsourced or intervention activity on the 
part of local or central government; it is impossible to isolate private finance 
initiative activity, particularly potential secondary market engagement on 
refinanced or repurchased capital, and it is, therefore, difficult to attribute 
'profit' to specific turnover or activity. This leads to the issue of central 
government and the public reporting of financial transactions. It is 
impossible to quantify how much, in total, is spent by central and local 
government, schools or agencies on outsourced activity. Under the cloak of 
commercial confidentiality there is no vertical or structural accountability of 
what Rutherford (2003) termed a 'frontier market' in terms of cost, value for 
money or impact of outcomes. 
The issue of accountability is, therefore, one critical issue which needs to 
be addressed, not just in terms of contractual performance but the societal 
issues raised by Freedland (2001), namely the triangular relationship 
between government, citizen and the private supplier of services. The 
absence of any direct link between the supplier and citizen in terms of 
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performance, with government removed from direct operational 
accountability and the inability, therefore, to enforce individual issues 
because service users are not'customers' in a contractual sense, leaves 
government accountable for policy outline and exposed on the electoral or 
political relationship with the citizen, (Besby and Ghatak, 2003). 
The House of Commons Select Committee 7 th Report 29/6/2000 on the 
Role of Private Sector Organisations in Public Education was concerned 
about public accountability and commented that: 
A theme identified by many who submitted evidence to us was the 
need for clear and effective lines of accountability. At this point, 
however, we state a principle which should underpin any 
consideration of the transfer of public education services to 
organisations working in the private sector. We recommend that the 
ultimate responsibility for the quality of service provided to users of 
the education service remain with locally elected representatives. 
This principle is at the heart of public accountability, and should not 
be compromised by the involvement of private sector organisations 
in service delivery. 
(House of Commons para 23) 
A key element in accountability is openness - and a publishing of key 
information. There is undoubtedly a level of secrecy surrounding private 
sector companies which is not compatible with public accountability but 
which, with a small amount of regulation, could be overcome. As an 
example, the careers service was contracted out but neither the DfES nor 
the Careers Service Inspectorate could identify how much profit the 
individual careers services are making. This information is not, apparently, 
collected because of commercial confidence. Whilst commercial 
confidence in respect of individual organisations is understandable it is in 
the public interest for aggregate data to be available. Public money is 
spent on the careers service yet there is no information nationally not even 
in percentage terms, about how much is spent on service delivery, how 
much on profit and how much on monitoring and evaluating provision. 
There is a similar lack of information around key PPPs and PFI projects - 
as well as the Department for Education and Skills key contracts. 
70 
The modernisation agenda has seen the emergence of a range of bodies, 
appointed, elected, selected; public/private and voluntary delivering 
services in the public sphere. There is, at present, no coherent pattern of 
accountability - to whom and for what and as Corry and Martin (2005) point 
out this raises the issue of 'who should have the right to scrutinise whom, 
for what and how? ' The locking together of scrutiny and accountability 
should enable clarity about the latter if there is a clearer understanding 
about the former. Accountability in the education system is hierarchical, 
with power being devolved from the centre, i. e. the Secretary of State and 
public scrutiny therefore having a vertical dimension. Added to this is the 
issue of performativity and the targets and output measures placed on 
groups such as school governors or local politicians where close scrutiny of 
performance is, in effect, an accountability mechanism. i 
Given the Local Government Act 2000 and the duty to promote 'community 
well-being' a key issue is whether elected bodies, with their democratic 
legitimacy should have an oversight or leadership role in scrutinising all 
groups operating in the public realm, as there is in respect of health 
services. 
Research suggests that local authorities need to reshape their relationships 
with service users and taxpayers and that the key considerations should 
include devolving decisions to neighbourhood level and developing new 
forms of relationship with citizens and service users, based on citizen and 
user co-operation and co-delivery of services whilst at the same time 
communicating more effectively with the public and ensuring good 
customer care, (Martin and Bovaird, 2005). 
Influence and Individuals 
The expertise, knowledge and experience of the private sector has grown 
by the recruitment of public sector employees and the consequent loss of 
'authority' and skill base on the part of government, centrally and locally. 
This loss of competence accelerates when contracted out national 
functions - e. g. the national strategies - have outcomes which are publicly 
inspected and reported upon but over which the 'inspected', the LEA, has 
no influence over implementation and which leaves the private sector with 
contractual duty but no responsibility. Tribal Group claims to have recruited 
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twenty-five Directors of Education over the past three years; former 
Directors are key figures in every one of the major private suppliers. It is 
not only in operational expertise that the private sector has recruited. 
Having launched a new education business VT Group plc announced the 
appointment of Baroness Blackstone, a former Minister of State at the 
DfES, as a non-executive Director and in a press release said that'Tessa 
Blackstone will bring to the Board a wealth of experience in government 
matters and in education', an area where VT is targeting a substantial 
expansion of their business. 
GEMS the' no frills' private education operator actively recruited a 
formidable array of advisers to their Board: 
Sir Gareth Roberts, President, Wolfston College, Oxford, and Chairman of the 
GEMS Board. 
Sir Mike Tomlinson, former Chief Inspector for Schools, Chair of DfES Working 
Party on 14-19 Reform, Chairman GEMS Advisory Board. 
Professor John MacBeath, Chair of Educational Leadership at Cambridge 
University, Adviser to Unesco and OECD. 
Nick Stuart, Director General Schools Policy, devised the 1988 Education Reform 
Act and Education Act 1993. 
James Sabben-Clare formerly Headmaster of Winchester College and Chairman 
of the Head masters' Conference. 
Elizabeth Passmore OBE formerly Director of Inspection at OfSTED. 
(The Times. 25.5.2005 p 3). 
To underline the company's ability to recruit at the highest level GEMS has 
also secured the services of a group of 'special advisers, ' including Lord 
Puftnam, Adviser to the WES, Graham Able, former Chairman, HMC, and 
Sir Michael Bichard, former Permanent Secretary, DfES. The Board and 
special advisers have knowledge of and presumably access to the 
'educational establishment'. 
Meanwhile in 2004 Fergal Roche moved from GEMS to head up Business 
Development at VT; in 2005 Capita recruited Mark Pattison (former 
Director Blackburn) from Serco's Bradford operation to head up the new 
National Strategies Contract, working with Ian Harrison, former Director at 
Newham, competing with VT headed by David McGahey, former Director 
at Buckinghamshire, and Tribal's education operation led by Peter 
Simpson, former CEO at Brent. Meanwhile Sir Mike Tomlinson continued 
72 
his work at Hackney and in 2004 Tim Brighouse was appointed a Non 
Executive Director of Research Machines, a leading ICT supplier. 
Organisational influence can also be seen in one of the'new' Labour 
bodies promoting the modernisation agenda, the New Local Government 
Network, established in 1996 and funded in the main by the private sector. 
The network was described as 'the provisional wing of the consulting and 
contracting sector' (Beecham, 2002 p 5), referring to the published list of 
private sector partners within the NLGN including, inter alia: 
Accord Deloitte Manchal Parkman 
Amey Fujitzu Nord Anglia 
BT Ledra Price Waterhouse Coopers 
Capita Interserve Serco 
CBI KPMG Tesco 
Cambrid. qe Education Modena Vertex 
The influence of the NLGN within the Labour Government has been 
significant - and particularly so in education, with Dan Corry, a Director of 
the NLGN acting as Special Adviser to Ruth Kelly, Secretary of State, and 
previously holding similar positions at the DTI and the DTLR. The NLGN 
are in favour of more executive Mayors -a view argued by Lord Filkin, a 
former Labour Whip in February 2001 - who had been paid El 29,000 for 
his services as a trustee of the NLGN in the previous two years. 
On the capital investment front, Apax Partners Holdings, Europe's second 
biggest private equity firm has raised and advised on over $12 billion of 
investment and has significant influence within government. Funds are not 
available to members of the public and in 2002 Apax published a vision for 
private equity and entrepreneurship which concluded: 
A north European countries will provide the most hospitable 
framework for entrepreneurs globally, with the Netherlands, 
Denmark and the United Kingdom filling the top three positions'. 
(The double helix, Apax 12/6/2002 p 4) 
Sir Ronald Cohen, a founding partner and Executive Chairman of Apax 
Partners Worldwide, Chairs the Social Investment Task Force, was a 
former member of the DTI UK Competitiveness Committee and is 
considered a supporter of the Chancellor, Gordon Brown. 
The appointment of Mike Grabiner, a Director of APAX, to the 
Chairmanship of Partnership for Schools, a joint venture between WES 
73 
and Partnerships UK to secure the 'Building for Schools for the Future 
Programme' by Ruth Kelly was announced in February 2005. 
At the very centre of the group of key players exercising both 
organisational and individual influence is Sir Cyril Taylor, the Chairman of 
the Specialist Schools Trust since 1987, adviser to the past nine 
Secretaries of State, an active Conservative until 1997 when, upon 
appointment as adviser to David Blunkett, he resigned from the Party. A 
history of educational policy over the past twenty years would be 
incomplete without Sir Cyril, who has effortlessly moved from the 
establishment of the CTC Trust (1987) to advising Ruth Kelly on what 
Charles Clarke, as Secretary of State referred to as a 'specialist' secondary 
system. By 2005 2,382 secondary schools, 76% of the total, had specialist 
status and the Specialist Schools Trust's Sponsor of the year was named 
as Philip Green the owner of high street fashion retailer, 'The Arcadia 
Group', for his sponsorship of 50 schools with a contribution of E1.25 
million, and E10 million in the first fashion retail skills 'Academy'. 
Sponsored by over 45 of the largest businesses in Europe, with over 46 
associate sponsors Sir Cyril, knighted by both Conservative and Labour 
Governments, is worthy of study. When a history of education policy is 
written Sir Cyril, who will take charge of the Academy programme, will be 
judged as one of the central figures of the latter decades of the 20th century 
- shaping philosophies, policies and perhaps politicians. 
Meanwhile in Downing Street changes occurred in 2005 -a consulting 
company McKinsey's recruited Sir Michael Barber as 'global adviser on 
public sector reform' as Downing Street simultaneously recruited David 
Bennett, former partner - (McKinseys) to head the Downing Street Policy 
Unit. 
Crouch (2003) argues that the nature of markets in education leads to 
government involvement (civil service involvement) in an intense lobbying 
process with, as already indicated, a small number of key players and he 
asserts that 'a small number of firms have enjoyed a far closer political 
relationship to ministers than have local authorities ' (p 48). It is clearly 
easier to deal with a private sector voice, anxious for contractual reward 
and therefore out to please, than a local government official able to 
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respond independently and constrained to report at a local political level 
the tenor of debate. There is a need for'openness' in the process and 
subsequent reporting upon the award of government contracts and as an 
illustration the contracting in 1999 of Hay McBer to design the Payments by 
Results system for teachers at a cost of E3 million, without competitive 
tendering, would have been a breach of financial regulations in local 
government and was a breach of European procurement rules. It does, 
however, confer enormous power upon officials. This is critical when we 
have a situation where 85% of the inspection process of public education is 
carried out by private contractors, where the Primary and Key Stage 3 
national strategies are privately delivered and where the vast majority of 
capital investment in state schools will be privately financed and delivered. 
That there is a 'closeness' between central government and the private 
sector which is unhealthy, worthy of investigation and united in opposition 
to the public sector is seen to be the case by many in senior positions in 
local government whose voices, even when raised, are ignored. 
The Private Finance Initiative is an area within which, more so than in 
consultancy growth on the part of the private sector, critical voices have 
been heard - at both national and local levels. 
Private Finance Initiative - An Overview 
The Private Finance Initiative (PFI) was launched in the 1992 Autumn 
Statement by Norman Lamont, Chancellor of the Exchequer; with the 
specific objective of increasing private sector engagement in the delivery of 
public services. PH is a form of public private partnership which combines 
a capital procurement programme and an extension of contracting out 
where revenue services are purchased from the private sector. Unlike the 
privatisation of a service the public sector has a substantial on-going role in 
PH schemes - either as purchaser, commissioner or enabler. 
In 1993 the new Chancellor Kenneth Clarke, MP established a Private 
Finance Panel to promote actively the role of the private sector in the public 
sphere and in a speech to the CBI reaffirmed the two central guiding 
principles of the PFI as being that the private sector must genuinely 
assume risk without the guarantee by the taxpayer against loss and that 
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value for money must be demonstrated for any expenditure by the public 
sector. (HM Treasury News Release 118/1994) 
However, Clarke added three qualifications to the two principles when he 
addressed the conference, insisting that the private sector would be the 
main source of capital growth, that the Treasury would not approve capital 
projects unless private finance options had been explored and that for 
projects within the PFI remit no target rates of return or profit caps existed 
or would be introduced. 
In 1995 Clarke announced a E9.4 billion list of PFI projects in his budget 
report and argued that civil servants had to enable a more favourable 
climate for the private sector across Whitehall. 
Following the election of a Labour government in 1997 the Paymaster 
General, Geoffrey Robinson, MP, commissioned a review of the PFI led by 
Malcolm Bates. The review was completed within six weeks and made 27 
proposals to speed up the PFI process - some of which, the creation of a 
task force was implemented within two months. In the first report from the 
Taskforce, the government's message was clear: 
The success of PFI is vital for Britain. Our infrastructure is 
dangerously run down. Our schools and transport networks 
are seriously neglected and all too often urban environment 
has been allowed to deteriorate. In an age of tight public 
spending, value for money public/private partnerships will be at 
the heart of a much-needed renewal of our public services. 
(Robinson, G, Treasury Taskforce 1998, p 1) 
A further review of PH by the now Sir Malcolm Bates was completed in 
July 1999 and the principal recommendation, the establishment of 
'Partnerships UK' to further the work of the Treasury Task Force was 
agreed. In September 1999, Alan Milburn, MP, in a speech to launch the 
IPPR Commission into Public Private Partnerships, (20/09/1999) set out 
the Government's position in clear unambiguous terms: 
Let me say at the outset that partnerships between the public sector and the 
private sector are a cornerstone of the Government's modernisation programme 
for Britain. They are central to our drive to modernise our key public services. 
Such partnerships are here and they are here to stay. 
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Our ambition is not to undermine our public services but to modernise them. 
We have developed new levers to bring about reforms, league tables. 
Inspections, targets, sanctions, rewards. Partnerships between the public sector 
are a further lever for change. They are part and parcel of our new modernisation 
approach. 
There is huge international interest in the UK's approach to developing 
partnerships between the public and the private sectors. It is an area of public 
policy where the UK leads the world. Over 50 countries have consulted the 
Treasury about the PF1. Some, like Italy, Holland, Ireland and Japan, are following 
us in the way we organise within govemment to deliver partnerships. Some are 
legislating to enable PF1 to happen. ' (pl). 
Interestingly paragraph one confirms the essential nature of the private 
sector to the modernisation project, paragraph three confirms the link 
between modernisation and performativity and the final paragraph the 
global interest in and nature of venture capital. By June 2000 Partnerships 
UK was established to replace the projects arm of the Treasury Taskforce 
and in March 2001, became a public private partnership with a majority 
stake held by the private sector. The shareholder list indicates the breadth 
and interest of the private sector in a venture designed to accelerate the 
development, procurement and implementation of public private 
partnerships. 
Company % 
HM Treasury 44.6 
Uberior Infrastructure Investments Limited 8.8% 
The Prudential Assurance Company Ltd 8.8 
Abbey National Treasury Services pIc 6.7 
Sun Life Assurance Society pIc 6.7 
Barclays Industrial Investments td 6.1 
The Royal bank of Scotland pIc 6.1 
The Scottish Ministers 4.4 
Serco Ltd 3.3 
GSL Joint Ventures Limited 2.2 
Boldswitch Ltd (The British Land Company) 2.2 
Source - Partnerships UK wwwpartnershipsyk. org. u (2005) 
The company has a public sector mission. 
To support and accelerate the delivery of infrastructure renewal, 
high quality public services and the efficient use of public assets 
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through better and stronger partnerships between the public and 
private sectors, (p 1). 
In essence Partnerships UK works with public sector groups to deliver 
PFI/PPP and also advises and supports central government in areas such 
as contract standardisation and emerging best practice. 
In parallel the Government had established the 'Office of Government 
Commission Commerce' in April, 2000 to take over the work of the policy 
division of the Treasury Taskforce, principally charged with modernising 
procurement in the public sector and leading for the Government in 
European and International debate an procurement. It is within the OGC 
that the Private Finance Unit was placed to develop, promote and advise 
on the use of private finance. Chaired by the Chief Secretary to the 
Treasury the Supervisory Board of the OGC included nine Permanent 
Secretaries, the Chairman of the Inland Revenue and the Chief of Defence 
Logistics, MOD - clearly a Board the Government viewed as critical to their 
public investment strategy. 
By September 2001450 PFI projects had been agreed, with a total value of 
E20 billion and the Financial Secretary to the Treasury, addressing the 
Global PPP/PFI Conference in Dublin praised the virtues of the private 
sector: 
Partnership between the public and private sectors are driving a resurgence of the 
idea of public services. Private sector ideas, private sector efficiency, private 
sector investment, are helping us to rebuild the partnership between the 
government, the tax paper, and the citizen. (Boateng, 2001, p 1) 
He continued: 
We need to instil in the public sector the virtues of efficiency in procurement, 
investment and delivery. In short, we need to instil in the public sector the 
practices that drive the growth and development of the best companies. 
I do not need to tell you about the benefits that PPP can bring. I do not need to 
tell you about. - 
The commercial dynami . sm, /. nnovation and efficiencies harnessed through 
the introduction of private sector investors 
The way that PF1 and other arrangements harness private sector 
management skills by putting private sector capital at risk 
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The benefits of competition for government business -a process of 
dialogue that drives down costs and ensures risks are distributed to 
whoever are best placed to bear them. 
How PPPs force the public sector to define the outputs they require, and 
in order to do so, engage with stakeholders more constructively than ever 
before. 
(Boateng, 2001, p 4/5) 
The language is clearly weighted - ideas, efficiency, virtue, commercial 
dynamism, innovation, skills belong to the private sector whereas the public 
sector has to be 'forced' to define outputs, have instilled the virtues of 
procurement, investment and delivery and adopt the efficiency practices of 
the best companies. 
However, in a curious reference to Thatcherism, Boateng went on to say 
that: 
Some people will say that this is the old project, this is rolling back the boundaries 
of the state. They are wrong. 
We are not rolling back the boundaries of the state, we are rolling forwards the 
performance of the state, public and private sector, hand in hand, facing the new 
economic realities and delivering the services people have the right to expect 
(Boateng, 2001, p 9) 
There are those who could argue that this was, indeed, the 'old project' 
launched some nine years earlier by Lamont. The boundary definitions of 
rolling forward the performance of the state had been set out in 2000 when 
the publication by the Government, 'Public Private Partnerships - the 
Government's Approach' defined public private partnerships as operating 
within three categories. Firstly the introduction of private sector ownership 
into state-owned businesses, using the full range of possible structures 
(whether by flotation or the introduction of a strategic partner, with sales of 
either a majority or a minority stake. Secondly the Private Finance Initiative 
(PFI) and other arrangements where the public sector contracts to 
purchase quality services on a long-term basis so as to take advantage of 
private sector management skills incentivised by having private finance at 
risk. This included concessions and franchises, where a private sector 
partner would take on the responsibility for providing a public service, 
including maintaining, enhancing or constructing the necessary 
infrastructure, and finally selling Government services into wider markets 
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and other partnership arrangements where private sector expertise and 
finance are used to exploit the commercial potential of Government assets. 
Having noted that Public Sector investment had fallen by an average of 
15% each year between 1991-92 and 1996-97, and that this translated into 
a significant decline in capital investment (H. M. Treasury, 2003) PFI - 
meeting the Investment Challenge p 14) the government set a target of 
2.1 % of Gross Domestic Product going into funding sustained investment 
in the infrastructure of public services with the level of actual spend set to 
rise from E4.9 billion in 1997 to E47 billion by 2005/06. The majority - 85% 
of this would be traditionally procured public investment, with PFI 
investment rising from 10 to 14.5%. 
The Labour Government's economic strategy sought, therefore, to 
establish a long-term approach to the planning of public expenditure and 
separating capital and revenue streams to cease the option of financing 
current expenditure at the expense of capital investment. 
There are, broadly three reasons why the PFI is attractive for government. 
Firstly that the PFI could be used in place of public sector borrowing and 
that the PSNCR - (formerly the PSBR) which is a measure of a 
government's fiscal prudence does not account for 100% of PFI borrowing, 
therefore 'off balance sheet' accounting is attractive and the true scale of 
borrowing is hidden. Secondly the government has perceived public sector 
management as inefficient and ineffective and PFI brings private sector 
skills to the fore and thirdly because under PFI the 'risk' is shared - if 
contractors fail to perform to the agreed specification they don't get paid. 
The PFI has been consistently opposed by trade unions because they 
argue that in the long term costs are higher than traditional government 
borrowing or by the sale of bonds; that public assets - land and buildings 
should not be placed into private sector ownership; that public facilities 
should be managed for people and community use not always profit, and 
finally that the transfer of public service staff to private enterprise usually on 
worse conditions of service and salary is unacceptable. Within the Labour 
Party PFI has been equally controversial, and in 2001 Blair describes a 
debate at Labour's Spring Conference over PFI as battle between 
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I reformers and wreckers. The central issue was about public sector 
workers and the 'services' element of PFI, as Prentis from Unison stated: 
we have low paid women workers, eulogised from the 
platform by Ministers but under PFI they are sold as 
commododities to the lowest bidder. 
(Socialist Worker 5/10/2002 p 1) 
On 17 th December 2004, the Guardian newspaper reported the accusation 
from the Centre for Policy Studies, a right leaning think tank, that the 
government had misused the private finance initiative and created a public 
sector liability of Ell 30 billion over the next 25 years and in similar vein 
Cohen (2004) commented that'in the long run PFI is like borrowing on a 
credit card rather than taking out a bank loan' and that 'the PF1 is an - 
Enron style off balance sheet accounting scam'. (p29) 
The refinancing of private finance initiatives is growing in significance - 
with the debt market rising from E4.9 billion to E8.2 billion and refinancing 
increasing to E1.5 billion from E487 million, a view supported when the 
Local Government Chronicle, (27 February 2004, p13) - reported that PFI 
was 'a huge part of the Government's infrastructure investment 
programme', and as such, 'was increasingly seen as an attractive 
investment opportunity for council pension fund managers'. 
The capital investment in public infrastructure has seen significant growth 
since the election of a Labour Government in 1997 and the projects being 
delivered through the PFI route had risen by 2004/05 to F-43,544 million. 
Tables 5 and 6 (Appendix One) indicate the scale of capital development 
and the growth of the Private Finance Initiative since 1997, (Partnerships 
UK). 
Given the data, the evidence and the issues raised in this Chapter there is 
clearly a need for new systems of public accountability and scrutiny to be 
developed to respond to the growing role of the private sector in public 
education. This addresses, in part, the second key question set out in the 
introduction to this dissertation, page 9 and further considered in Chapter 
Five, pages 129 to 158. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: Data Collection: PFI Policy implementation. 
Case Study - Stoke-on-Trent - Key Players 
As set out in the synopsis and the introduction an illustrative case study 
was undertaken to examine the national/local interface on a critical aspect 
of the modernising agenda. The City of Stoke on Trent was chosen for no 
reason other than it was known to the researcher and that the dissertation 
would be improved by the investigation and analysis of the local 
phenomena in terms of the Private Finance Initiative by the trust of all 
participants in the interviewer. It does not as indicated earlier, conclude 
that the use of private capital is appropriate or otherwise but it does, in a 
unique contemporary narrative, report faithfully upon local process and 
central governments dependency upon local actors to bring the 'play' to 
life. 
As a central feature of the case study interviews were conducted with a 
senior Councillor, John Beech who was a driving force behind the PFI and 
signed the contract, the Director of Education and Lifelong Learning, Nigel 
Rigby 
,a Senior Education Officer who was responsible for the PFI project, 
Mike Inman, the General Manager of 'Transform Schools - Mike Hudson, 
Derek Gray, a retired secondary Headteacher who was, and continues as 
the leader of the Professional Associations in Stoke-on-Trent and Ann 
Barber, the Headteacher of an Infant School refurbished as part of the PFI. 
In addition to these formal interviews a small number of informal telephone 
conversations with two civil servants from the Department of Education and 
Skills took place. A major disappointment was the unwillingness, (despite 
an earlier agreement), of a senior civil servant to be interviewed and go 'on 
the record' or be quoted anonymously although he was prepared to discuss 
his perceptions of the Private Finance Initiative in education generally. 
The interviews were conducted in the Civic Centre at Stoke-on-Trent by 
prior appointment. Before the interview the interviewees were informed 
about the nature of the interview, the purpose and the form the interview 
would take and asked whether they wanted to be 'on the record' or quoted 
confidentially. These issues were rehearsed again prior to the start of the 
actual interview. All interviewees were content to be 'on the record', 
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however, in every interview we ranged into 'off the record territory' -from 
talking about 'Academies', to Ministers of State and other national and local 
personalities. These areas are deleted from the transcript. 
The form of the interview was semi-structured, recorded and notes taken 
and the tapes were subsequently transcribed. 
The interviews produced rich data which enabled the researcher to begin to 
understand the complexity of the PFI project and address the 'why', 'how' 
and 'despite' issues involves. 
The beginning - events to December 1996 
In 1996 David Blunkett, MP and Peter Kilfoyle, MP visited Stoke-on-Trent 
as part of their preparations for the general election and the writing of 
Labour's education manifesto. In particular Blunkett and Kilfoyle were 
seeking suggestions about improving the attractiveness of the Private 
Finance Initiative and were keen to explore ways of funding future 
investment through off balance sheet projects, using private funding, 
without such investment having an adverse effect on the Public Sector 
Borrowing Requirement (Stoke-on-Trent Education Committee Report 
19/12/1996). A commitment was given by Peter Kilfoyle M. P. that soundly 
based, practical proposals would be incorporated in the Labour Manifesto 
and subsequently in an Education Bill. 
As Councillor Beech recollects: 
During the later part of 1995 we invited David Blunkett and Peter Kiffidyle who was 
then the Shadow Secretary of State and the Shadow Minister for Education to 
come to the city. We knew when we took over in 1997 we would be the lowest 
funded unitary authority in the country, Staffordshire was the lowest funded 
County Council and we were to get a straight forward 25% of their budget. We 
were inheriting a basket case, basket case of Special Education Needs, and 
especially with the stock we were inheriting. We estimated then that we had a 
minimum of; C200 million needed to be invested in our schools just to bring them 
up to reasonable standards. We're not talking new build we were just talking 
about patch and mend. 
We asked David Blunkett and Peter Kilfoyle if they could help us. We would be 
willing to be a pilot for any scheme they could think of In 1996 1 was invited down 
to the House of Commons to a meeting took place with Peter Kilfoyle who was 
then the Shadow Minister for Education. With him he had a senior officer for the 
Department for Education & Science, he also had 3 people from the 4Ps and 
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some bankers who wanted to talk to us. There were six authorities invited to that 
meeting. Peter Ki/foyle put his cards on the table and that if or when they got into 
power we will be continuing the PF1 regime, and the simple reason is we are 
looking for European convergence, therefore we need the capital projects off the 
balance sheet to reduce public spending. 
It is worth noting that the off balance sheet accounting for PFI was seen, in 
1996, as an attractive option and this underlines what was to subsequently 
turn out to be part of Labour's disciplined approach to on-balance sheet 
public expenditure. The dialogue with local authorities in 1996 was also 
consistent with extensions to the range of permissible Private Finance 
Initiative (PFI) schemes - in particular, the encouragement of DBFO 
(Design, Build, Finance and Operate) projects for the replacement or 
upgrading of existing facilities (building Replacement Scheme) which had 
introduced a mechanism by which a local authority could be guaranteed a 
level of revenue support in future years of a scheme. 
This involved allowing a local authority to purchase a capital intensive 
service (e. g. a new school) from a private sector provider over the period of 
a long term contract. The authority would pay for the service as and when 
it was received, in amounts set in the contract, with payments depending 
on the contractors' performance and/or the usage of the service. The 
contractor would then take responsibility for the investment in the capital 
asset, finance the investment and then manage the facility to the level of 
service specified by the local authority. In effect, this involved the private 
sector taking the business risk of committing to the investment required to 
supply the service, in return for the contracted level of payments. PFI was 
seen as having the potential to address the capital funding of new schools 
and larger scale repairs. However, it was doubtful at the time whether it 
could provide a solution for the massive backlog of repairs affecting 
schools in Stoke-on-Trent, as perceived by Councillor Beech and 
confirmed by the Director of Education and Lifelong Learning in Stoke-on- 
Trent, Nigel Rigby in his first interview: 
'We had a massive backlog of repairs ... our condition survey showed us to 
have a 
desperate need, and we had to solve it somehow. The Members before Labour 
was elected had gone down to London to talk to the Labour Party.... the Members 
had had some vision and / pay tribute to them, because they laid the ground 
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work... when the Labour Party was in government, it became possible, to try an 
innovative PFI, the door was open. That was the genesis.... there was quite a 
visionary approach from two or three local labour members actually. 
In order to qualify for approval the local authority had to demonstrate a 
number of factors, most notably that the project provided value for money, 
was cost effective and that there was a transfer of risk to the private sector. 
A meeting took place at the House of Commons on the 7 th November 1996 
between Members and Officers from Stoke-on-Trent, Enfield, Haringey and 
Newcastle-upon-Tyne with Peter Kilfoyle MP to explore practical issues 
around PFI. 
As Councillor Beech recalls: 
/ made it quite clear that there was no way it would get Stoke on Trent and 
virtually every other authority to go down the traditional PF1 model and he wanted 
to know why. / said there is no way we will relinquish ownership of our facilities 
and also all the best value and everything else that has been going on the regime 
we have good value for money services. Don't forget schools can purchase off at 
the moment who ever they like. 
Eric Wood: 
You made a political decision that whatever happened here the buildings would 
not be handed over to the private sector and you wouldn't privatise the 
workforce ?. 
Councillor Beech: 
Exactly. They were the two fundamental things for me to persuade the Leader 
and Deputy Leader at the time and the Chair and Shadow Chair Terry Doughty 
that we should be going down this route. Those were the conditions. If they 
wanted a PF1 fact finder then we would look at new ways. 
Having set out two clear preconditions for any PA in Stoke-on-Trent in 
what was described by Councillor Beech as a 'robust fashion' the meeting 
with Peter Kilfoyle MP ended with agreement that a further meeting would 
be held to discuss a range of issues, including the type and scale of 
outstanding repairs and the extent to which the repairs could be 
accommodated through existing approvals and resources, in particular 
whether there was scope for the repairs to be financed through PFI and off 
balance sheet accounting. There would also be consideration as to the 
level of interest the private sector would have in schools in Stoke-on-Trent 
as a result of their investment and whether the private sector would wish to 
deal directly with an individual school or with the local authority including 
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discussions about whether Grant Maintained schools would be in a position 
to offer security and guarantees against investment in the school. 
In December 1996 the Education Committee authorised the Chair and Vice 
Chair to proceed further with discussions (Stoke-on-Trent Education 
Committee Reports, 19/12/1996). 
The next twelve months - to December 1997. 
Stoke-on-Trent became a Unitary Authority in 1997 and inherited the 
education responsibilities from Staffordshire County Council, including 122 
schools, associated buildings and staff. The City Council was the only 
Unitary Authority in Staffordshire, with a population of 239,000, the second 
lowest Council Tax per household in the United Kingdom and a Revenue 
Budget of E263.5 million to deal with the fifteenth most deprived area in the 
country. As Councillor Beech reflected: 
We took over control in 1996 as a shadow authority sixty-nil the city. Sixty 
councillors and we won every seat it was the worst thing that ever happened. The 
local media and everybody else, the far right was saying that it was non 
democratic and / do agree. Even then to what we have now it really is politically 
incorrect in the city. We had far more opposition from our own men that we have 
ever had by the opposition group. 
The New Labour Government elected in May 1997, reaffirmed support for a 
PFI in Stoke-on-Trent as it appeared to be the only project within which 
repair and maintenance issues across a whole school system could be 
addressed. It was also estimated that around E50 million was required to 
address the problems caused by a lack of investment resulting in 
inadequate heating, poor energy efficiency, leaking roofs, crumbling 
window frames, and spalling concrete (Property Services Committee 
Report, 9/9/1997). A minimum expenditure in the order of F-25 million was 
seen to be essential, however, the levels of finance available to the City 
Council to address these issues were considered insufficient. It was also 
believed by Councillors that the environment of schools was a major factor 
depressing the achievement of children in schools. 
As Councillor Beech commented: 
We thought how can we get more out of our children when the buildings they live 
in are better buildings than they are being educated in. So how can you raise 
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their aspirations when you are asking them to come into some of the buildings we 
are. So that was one aim to raise parents and pupils aspirations for achievement. 
In February 1997, the City Council received confirmation of a successful 
bid for a GEST (Grants for Education Support and Training) amounting to 
F-65,000 in order to develop a pilot scheme under the terms of the PFI 
previously approved by the Education Committee, (Minute 39,19/12/1996). 
This allowed the Council to begin work on radical proposals to cover all of 
its schools -a new departure in that PFI projects had previously related to 
one specific building project. The proposal was based on an energy 
management project involving the upgrading and maintenance of heating 
equipment, supply of power and improvements to the fabric of 
teach ing/worki ng areas that could be linked to energy conservation - 
including attention to roofs, windows and doors together with other relevant 
parts of the building fabric. General condition surveys had been carried out 
to ten schools (as a sample) and detailed surveys were underway to look at 
energy systems and savings initiatives. 
The original concept of building a PFI project around energy efficiency 
came from two sources - Councillor Terry Doughty who was active in 
promoting Local Agenda 21 and two young consultants who had just 
founded ABROS, a financial firm which had been active in a project in Paris 
where energy efficiency in public buildings was the key theme. Nigel Rigby, 
the Director of Education recalled that: 
they suggested hanging it, the Private Finance Initiative, on an energy efficiency 
ticket originally so what you would do is reduce energy consumption... make the 
fabric of buildings thermally secure.... Ministers liked that.... I was lucky with my 
consultants. 
Nigel Rigby believed that another success factor was the low cost charged 
by ABROS - who wanted to build their reputation on the back of the Stoke- 
on-Trent project and combined enthusiasm with low costs, thus winning the 
consultancy against the longer established PFI advisory companies. It was 
suggested by Nigel Rigby and others that the consultancy costs of 
procurement were just over 1% for the whole project which was (and is) 
very low by industry standards where costs range from 2-4 per cent. 
By September, 1997, the City Council's three key Committees, Property 
Services, Education and Resources had approved the broad outlines of a 
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PFI project and the central features of the processes to be followed - all 
within seventeen weeks of the Council taking over responsibility for 
education. 
During that time several meetings had taken place with the Department for 
Education and Employment and 4Ps (Public Private Partnership 
Programmes Ltd) and an application had been made by the Authority to 
seek Pathfinder Status which involved the development of an Outline 
Business Case and (due to the size of the potential contract) the 
publication of a notice in the Official Journal of the European Communities 
(OJEC). Approval was obtained in September 1997 for f-250,000 under 
the New Deal for Schools in order to finance detailed surveys of the works 
required in all 122 schools, (Reports to Resources Committee, 12/9/1997). 
The financial principles of the scheme were also emerging and these 
included the use of a Route 1 PFI contract to attract Government borrowing 
approval and an addition to the capital financing elements of the City 
Council's Standard Spending Assessment, although the annual costs of the 
contract would have to be met through budgets delegated to schools - 
accordingly, schools would need to surrender part of their budget in order 
for the scheme to proceed. It was also considered that any funding gap 
would have to be met by the City Council and that the contract would need 
to be sufficiently large to attract private sector interest - at least E10 million, 
(Report to Stoke-on-Trent Resources Committee, 12/9/1997). 
The Council instructed Officers to ensure that Headteachers, Chairs of 
Governors, the Diocesan Authorities and representatives of teaching 
unions should be briefed and a consultation group was established which 
involved all stakeholders. This group was formally established on 11 th 
December 1997, and was made up of Councillors, Senior LEA Officers, 
Headteachers, Diocesan representatives and School Governors. 
Behind the scenes the Labour Group had given the Director of Education 
and his officers five fundamental principles which had to be met for any PFI 
to be successful, as Mike Inman, Education Officer recalled: 
The first one was that it happened with the whole estate, including the 
V. A. sector and it had to be relatively neutral to the Council's budgets. 
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The ownership of public buildings must not transfer and it had to be 
relatively neutral to school budgets. 
There should be no transfer of City Council staff to private companies. 
Councillor Beech confirmed the unwritten advice: 
It was surprisingly wasn't that difficult to persuade 98% of our Councillors at the 
very start to go down this route. We said we would not sign, we gave an 
undertaking we would not sign, we had fundamental principles that if we can't go 
any further we would go around town and say thank you very much, we've not lost 
anything, the government was going to fund the majority of the start up costs of 
the consultation. 
The five principles were also signed up to by the Professional Associations, 
as Derek Gray, the convenor of theTeachers' Joint Consultative Committee 
recalled: 
Eric Wood: 
When they started Derek, it seems to me that politicians made two key decisions 
early on. One that they would not hand over buildings and land to the private 
sector and two that they wouldn't transfer services provided by the city to the 
private sector. How far were teacher unions involved in that discussion and 
debate or was just a fait accompli? 
Derek Gray. ý 
Well at that particular point we had an Education Committee and five of us were 
on the Education Committee and we were party to that decision and we supported 
that issue that in no way must we lose ultimately our inheritance, in terms of losing 
buildings and resources etc to private companies. It was never an issue that that 
should happen, and so what happened was when this was all over everything still 
remained the property of the City of Stoke-on-Trent. We had lovely new schools 
During 1997 the technical work on preparing to move the project forward 
carried on at a pace and officers had arrived at a position where it was 
anticipated that a Joint Venture Company would be established in which 
the City Council would hold a 19% stake and that a contract would be 
entered into for 25 years with the City Council making an annual payment 
of E7 million in exchange for the company delivering an agreed level of 
repairs and energy management incorporating a capital investment of up to 
E100 million in the school estate. The City Council would have the ability to 
reduce the annual payment depending on the contractor's performance, 
(Policy Committee Report, 8/12/1997). 
A number of key complexities had already been identified by Officers 
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Including an uneven funding spread - whereby for the first seven years 
the City Council would benefit in that the Rate Support Grant would 
exceed the funding requirement by a substantial amount but for the 
following 18 years the funding would fall short of the commitment by an 
increasing amount. There was also concern over the ability of the Direct 
Labour Organisations and the Direct Service Organisations to become 
involved in the scheme; the extent to which revenue 
funding could be guaranteed and the need for the contractual 
arrangements to be finalised in readiness for the 1998/1999 financial year. 
An Outline Business Case in support of the PFI Proposal had been 
prepared in draft form and was due to be submitted to central government 
in December 1997 following the meeting of the Policy Committee on 8 th 
December 1997 with a view to obtaining their approval. A number of 
constructive challenges to the Outline Business Case were, however, 
made by members of the PFI Management Group and the Council's Policy 
Committee including questions relating to the impact of the proposed 
scheme on the City Council's workforce and, in particular, whether the 
provisions of TUPE would apply; the process to be employed for selecting 
the order in which schools might benefit from the scheme and the likely 
disruption caused to the education of children and the timescale of work to 
be undertaken at each school. (Stoke-on-Trent Policy Committee 
8/12/1997: PH Management Group, 11/12/1997). 
The DfES had also highlighted a number of issues following their 
consideration of the draft business case - including a requirement for the 
Council to provide sufficient evidence of the involvement of first class 
consultancy services from the private sector, an assurance that the system 
of communication and reporting to City Council Committees would be 
included in the case and a statement confirming that the PH Management 
Group was accountable to the Council's Policy Committee. 
The WES also wanted clarification of the fact that there was risk transfer to 
the private sector and explanations for choosing to establish a Private 
Venture Company as the appropriate vehicle for the PFI proposal together 
with an appraisal of the alternative models that might be available to the 
Council. 
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The key issue raised by central government, that of support staff services 
being part of the overall contract, was consulted upon by the Council with 
the outcome, that: 
The inclusion of soft services would not receive wide-spread support 
from a large proportion of governors and Headteachers, with the 
potential that many schools would not participate. The contract 
services Direct Service Organisation (DSO) which provided a 
number of these services was perceived as being the provider of an 
efficient cost-effective service. 
(Unison (a) March 2001 p 7) 
As a result of consultation, meetings of the Labour Group and on the 
advice of Officers, the Outline Business Case submitted to the DfEE in 
December 1997 did not include ancillary services. The trade union, 
Unison, saw the Stoke-on-Trent case as an important example of how a 
local authority could approach the issue of support staff on the terms set 
down by the government and still remain the employer of staff, (Unison, (a) 
March 2001). 
1998 - Issues begin to emerge 
In January 1998 three key meetings took place - the PFI Management 
Group (15 th), the Resources Committee (16 th ) and the Policy Committee 
(1 9th ) at which concerns about the PFI were beginning to emerge. Of 
particular significance was the potential impact of the initiative upon the 
Direct Labour Organisations and the Direct Service Organisations, the 
issue of revenue support for Voluntary Aided schools and the process for 
selecting a private sector partner. The Policy Committee meeting on 1 9th 
January agreed that of the 14 consortia who had expressed an interest in 
the PFI project, eight should be invited to the next stage - an 'Invitation to 
Submit Outline Proposals', (ISOP) which had to be completed by 20th 
February 1998. Whilst the Committee dealt with this item in private a 
number of interviewees commented upon the critical and questioning 
stance taken by Councillors in the criteria used by Officers to rank the 
bidding consortia. By 20th February seven bids were received and over 
three days presentations were made by each bidder to members of the 
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Policy Committee and the PFI Management Committee. The presentations 
were assessed using a (confidential) process against ten specific criteria: 
General understanding of the City Council's PFI Scheme 
Willingness to enter into a true partnership arrangement 
Willingness to negotiate a contract that would allow for phasing and flexibility for 
its duration 
Benefits to the local community 
Understanding of and proposals for working with schools 
Staffing structures to deliver the contract locally 
Proposals for raising the capital needed 
Understanding and thoughts on risk transfer 
Optional elements - e. g. security ideas 
Innovation that could be brought to the scheme 
(Stoke-on-Trent Policy Committee, 19/3/1998) 
By combining the Officer/Consultants evaluation of written submissions and 
the assessment of Presentations, it was decided that four bidding consortia 
be invited to enter into more detailed negotiations. Between April and July 
1998, the City Council progressed matters to the stage that they were 
ready to issue a formal invitation to negotiate to the potential contractors. 
However, prior to proceeding to that stage, the approval of the DfES, and 
the Treasury task force was required. The City Council had argued that 
their proposals complied with the Private Finance Initiative regulations 
which required Private Finance Initiative contracts to be based on the 
provision of a service or services - in this instance, the provision of energy 
and water and the provision of serviced accommodation. In order to meet 
the required standards of comfort and availability of accommodation the 
contractor would be required to invest major sums in the repair and 
maintenance of schools. 
Over this period, concerns had been expressed by the WES and the 
Treasury Task Force in relation to the proposals - on the grounds that they 
did not consider that the service aspects of the proposed contract were 
sufficient. Set against these concerns, there was a very important issue 
namely the power of schools in choosing their service provider and their 
recent poor experiences of some private sector providers under the 
Compulsory Competitive tendering regime, as a result of which they did not 
wish to be constrained for 25 years, (the duration of the proposed contract) 
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and expressed a strong preference to retain the existing flexibility of 
awarding contracts or taking out Service Level Agreements with City 
Council service providers. At a later date this issue of service providers -a 
fundamental political principle on the part of the City Council from the 
outset would resurface - at this stage the DfES and Treasury Officials were 
probing, raising doubts and attempting to change the minds of Councillors 
and Officials according to the evidence from the research interviews carried 
out and the reports considered by the Policy Committee on 20th July 1998. 
Having reviewed the existing services offered to schools the Director of 
Education reported to the Policy Committee on 20th July 1998 to the effect 
that: 
Grounds Maintenance - Schools had experimented with a private sector 
provider and had generally decided to move back to the City Council 
service provider (DLO). It was therefore recommended that this service be 
excluded from the proposed contract. 
Catering - Schools were broadly content with the quality of service that 
they were receiving from the City Council service Provider and the 
inclusion of this service in the proposed contract would not have much 
impact on the provision of serviced accommodation. 
Cleaning - The City Council service provider (DLO) provided the cleaners, 
and appointed and managed them under a service level agreement with 
the schools. Headteachers had made it clear that they valued highly the 
cleaning workforce who were often prepared to work flexible hours, work 
longer than their contracted hours and were extremely dedicated to the 
schools generally. The Headteachers did not have any confidence in a 
private sector provider being able to provide a similarly valued service. As 
a result of all of these factors, the City Council concluded that it would be 
inappropriate to include cleaning within the scope of the proposed contract. 
Caretalking - It was concluded that there would be a need for caretaking 
staff to serve both the contractor and the school but in the final analysis the 
headteacher would be required to continue to manage the caretaker on a 
daily basis for a wide range of purposes. Any transfer of employment of 
caretakers to the private sector provider would be unacceptable to schools, 
the caretakers themselves and the trade unions. Caretakers were seen as 
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being of vital importance to the smooth running of the school and that 
schools would not agree to the smooth running of the school and that 
schools would not agree to conceding management of caretakers to the 
private sector provider. Therefore, caretaking should be excluded from the 
proposed contract. 
Given the significance this issue was to assume later the critical paragraph 
of the Director's report to the Policy Committee is worth noting. 
For several months officers have resisted pressure to include a 
range of facilities management services within the contract, i. e. 
cleaning, caretaking, catering and grounds maintenance. We have 
refused to do so because this would be acceptable neither to the 
City Council nor to the schools. However, some compromise must 
be reached in order to gain acceptance for this contract. This report 
suggests that the best way forward is to link with the PFI contract a 
service that is not yet offered by the City Council, thereby placing no 
existing jobs or services in jeopardy. The cook-chill contract 
currently fulfilled by the County Council would meet this 
requirement. It would also be acceptable to schools. 
(Stoke-on-Trent Policy Committee Report, 20/7/1998) 
He went on to say that: 
The possible disadvantages for one part of the Contract Services 
Organisation must be weighed against the enormous potential 
advantages of a major investment programme in schools in the next 
quarter of a century. This is desperately needed and would result in 
significant front-loading of the investment in the earlier years of the 
contract. The total value of the contract is estimated at F-185 rn at 
current prices and, leaving aside payments for energy and other 
ancillary services, would nevertheless represent investment in the 
repair and maintenance of school premises of approximately El 30 
m. Of this amount up to E100 m would represent new money, which 
the City Council has no other way of obtaining. The ultimate prize of 
this contract is that the annual level of investment in school 
premises would be approximately 5 times greater than it currently is. 
(Stoke-on-Trent Policy Committee Report, 20/7/1998) 
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Clearly, Nigel Rigby, the Director of Education had held a principled 
position in debate with civil servants on service provision - supported by 
the alliance between schools and the Council - who had established their 
own localised performativity measure, i. e. we know what standards we 
want and they are being met! The cook-chill contract was duly surrendered 
and during the period between August and November 1998 detailed 
submissions from the four private sector bidders were invited, received and 
preliminary evaluation undertaken by officers. 
A new year- beckoned - 1999 
The four bids to secure the contract were scrutinised by Teacher Unions, 
Headteachers, other Unions and other stakeholders in January 1999, prior 
to presentations by the companies to the Policy Committee. Extensive 
evaluation of the bids had been carried out by Council Officers working in 
three sub-groups looking at financial, contractual and methodological 
issues. 
Having considered the representations and having taken advice from the 
Director of Education two companies were selected to proceed to detailed 
negotiation, prior to their'best and final offer' being submitted. Following 
this decision by the Policy Committee on 26 th January 1999 it became clear 
by late February 1999, following a report to the Resources Committee from 
the Director of Finance, that 'Best and Final' Offers would be submitted by 
mid-April 1999, prompting further evaluation and appointment of the 
preferred provider by the end of May 1999. This would enable the project 
to be finalised by July 1999, and then scheduled for further approval by the 
DfEE in August 1999 ensuring that work could be scheduled to commence 
in schools in September 1999. It was agreed that capital works to deliver 
the output specification standards would be achieved by the end of the fifth 
year of the contract, with the service aspects of the contract, (i. e. energy, 
lighting and heating, maintenance etc) being operative for the remaining 20 
year term of the contract and that the notional initial cost of the project 
would be E125m (i. e. the total cost for both capital works and services). 
Officers had undertaken financial modelling resulting in estimates for the 
total costs of the scheme over 25 years, long term interest rate changes, 
and a payment mechanism that penalised the contractor where the output 
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specification had not been achieved, with the scheme incorporating the 
requirement of PFI schemes relating to the transfer of risk to the private 
sector with the contractor assuming complete responsibility for the service 
aspects, price risks in procuring necessary resources and materials and an 
acceptance of increases in energy costs and strict achievement of the 
output specifications of the contract failing which penalties and deductions 
would be imposed. Councillors noted that the total project costs of E125m 
would be financed from three separate sources: 
A PFI credit approval issued by the Government for the capital works 
of the scheme amounting to: E75 m. 
A capital grant from the Government and a contribution from Voluntary 
Aided schools covering those Voluntary Aided capital elements that 
were not the responsibility of the City Council - totalling E4 m. 
The City Council's existing revenue budgets - either centrally retained 
or delegated to schools - amounting to E46 m. 
(Stoke-on-Trent Resources Committee, 26/2/1999; Policy Committee, 
22/7/1999). 
Finally of critical importance was the fact that unlike all other PFI proposals, 
services such as caretaking cleaning, ground maintenance and catering 
had been excluded from the scheme. In order to achieve this, a Value for 
Money exercise had been undertaken by external consultants in early 
1999. They had concluded that the private sector could not provide these 
services more effectively than the City Council's in-house provider. This 
report had been approved by the District Auditor but was yet to be 
accepted by the DfES. 
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The Battle Over Services 
The issue of the transfer of services to the private sector was one of the 
defining arguments between the City Council, supported by Headteachers, 
Governors, Unions and Teachers and central government. 
The DfES demanded that the Council should demonstrate unequivocally 
that in-house (public sector) provision would be value for money and 
delivered more efficiently than a private sector operator. That this should 
be required reflects the thinking of civil servants that value for money and 
privatisation were synonymous. 
In his report to the Resources Committee (26/2/1999) the Director of 
Education Nigel Rigby confirmed that: 
As stated previously, this project does not conform to the 
conventional form of PFI, being very innovative in nature. This is 
particularly the case for the reduced facilities management element 
of the scheme. Certain services, namely caretaking, cleaning, 
ground maintenance and catering have been excluded from the 
scheme. Under more conventional PFI proposals, these services 
would be included as an integral part of the facilities management 
operation. To justify their exclusion to the WES, it has been 
necessary to undertake a separate value for money (VFM) exercise, 
conducted by an independent consultant. The purpose of this is to 
demonstrate that cleaning, caretaking, etc are more cost effectively 
provided in-house by the Education Department and Contract 
Services DSO. This would then preclude the need for them to be 
incorporated in the PFI contract. Symonds, an independent facilities 
management consultant recently finalised the exercise, which clegdy 
indicated that the private sector could not provide these services 
more cost effectively thereby justifying their exclusion and 
demonstratinq VFM. Since the exercise has had to be a theoretical 
one, the DfES has insisted that Symonds' methodology and 
assumptions be verified by the District Auditor. This has now been 
completed and the District Auditor is satisfied with the approach and 
outcome. As a result of this process, a letter confirming the DfES's 
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support for the exclusion of these services is expected in the near 
future. 
(Stoke-on-Trent Resources Committee 26/2/1999) 
Behind the scenes other avenues were pursued to privatise the Council's 
workforce - as the Director of Education's interview revealed: 
Nigel Rigby: 
/ was pressurised - they took me out for dinner / remember, people from the 
Treasury and elsewhere and wined and dined me well, on the assumption that 
would give in and / wouldn't - because it rapidly became apparent that it would be 
crazy for schools to sign up to loss of control over their cleaning, possibly their 
catering, their grounds maintenance, their caretaking, which they can change 
whenever they like at the moment, they can change it every year if they want to, 
they were in danger of having to accept the contractor that PF1 foisted upon them 
for the next 25 years, well that's not acceptable. Schools won't accept that. For a 
long time the government thought that we'd been politically dogmatic, it took a 
long time for the penny to drop with Government officials, that actually the issue 
genuinely was the freedom of the schools to change their servicing contracts. 
The successful bidder, the Director recalls, were not party to the pressure 
to outsource: 
Nigel Rigby: 
So Balfour Beatty were very intelligent and pragmatic and were sensitive to the 
running of schools. They weren't pressing for transfer of ownership or transfer of 
staff one iota, it was all coming from the government and when the government 
realised that actually it wasn't political... ism, it was how do you get best value in a 
school? 
The pressure was not coming from 'government' in a political sense but 
from Civil Servants - including as one confided - at a 'high level'- and, as 
Mike Inman confirmed the pressure did not come from the Treasury but the 
DfIES. 
Mike Inman confirms his Director's recollection. 
Eric Wood: 
Of those five principles, were there any of those which were pushed heavily by the 
Treasury in negotiations? 
Mike Inman: 
Yes the big one of course, was the services. It wasn't the Treasury, it was the 
DES. Because if the PF1 generally seemed to be a service contract, and certainly 
the general view in the private sector / think is that that's where the money is to be 
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made, so they want capital, but over the 25 years of efficiency an services and 
that kind of think. So one of the key issues that I handled here, and a sticking 
point for 6 months as I recall talking to you about, the DES insistence that they 
weren't going to take that one without proof We had to go to an outside 
consultancy we had to agree the terms of reference with the DES for that survey, 
that particular piece of work which was to compare our services in value for 
money terms, within a PF1 contract or outside a PF1 contract with both the private 
and public sector. 
Eric Wood: 
There was no temptation to surrender, say cleaning as a kind of token to 
government? 
Mike Inman: 
Not on our side, absolutely not. It was a key issue. 
Such a key issue that the DfES, despite agreeing to an independent value 
for money study conducted under the supervision of the District Auditor, 
who had agreed the outcome in favour of the Council's workforce, refused 
to accept the report; confirmed in a telephone call 17/5/1999 to the Director 
of Education and a letter dated 20/5/1999 to the Director of Education. The 
DfES insisted upon further work being carried out and until this was 
completed there could be no public announcement about a 'Preferred 
Partner'. 
By the end of July 1999, this further work was completed - and eventually, 
with the minimum of fuss and in a possible desire to bury the outcome the 
case for in-house provision was accepted by the DfES. 
The drama had earlier included the City Treasurer and Councillors. As ClIr 
Beech recalled: 
Going back we came to the crunch a couple of times when we said we wouldn't 
go any further - on two occasions. 
We had a meeting, a rush meeting, between myself and Terry Doughty, the 
Leader then and the Deputy Leader. We had to call them out of urgent meeting at 
Hanley Town Hall and go up there and sat down in a room and debated for about 
an hour and a half. Myself and Terry had visions it would not go ahead because 
the Treasurer wanted to transfer services over. They wanted school catering. 
So there was pressure to transfer services to the private sector those services 
from what / have read that were highly rated by schools and there was no 
economic case for transferring them. 
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At that time we didn't have the evidence. We had evidence from the schools and 
what they thought of the services and the value for money. 
What the Treasury didn't tell us was that the comparative with other authorities 
and the private sector in particular, so we appointed another external consultants 
that the Treasury relied on. Our services, even to the private sector were better 
value for money at a lower cost and better quality than the private sector can 
provide, that's all we needed. We put that on the table and they backed off 
Clearly this recollection was a defining moment in the private finance 
initiative process. The City Treasurer was of the view that support services 
should be included within the project and 'they' (Civil Servants) wanted a 
private sector role within the management of cleaning, caretaking and 
catering. Councillor Beech had anectdotal knowledge that the City 
employed services were highly rated by schools and questioned the 
economic case for transferring them to the private sector. He recounts the 
needs to secure evidence of the comparative efficiency of Council 
employees, which led to the appointment of external consultants to 
examine the facts and recalls that faced with evidence of effective public 
sector service delivery'they', (Civil Servants) backed off. On the basis of 
the evidence it is astonishing that Civil Servants persisted, even after the 
verification of the facts by the District Auditor of the evidence from an 
independent consultant, in pressing the case for a private sector solution. 
Their persistence calls into question the impartiality of civil servants who, 
on the written and recollected facts, appear to have engaged in an 
ideological pursuit of an objective, regardless of the evidence presented to 
them. The views expressed by Councillor Beech confirmed the earlier 
evidence of both the Director of Education, Nigel Rigby, (interview page 98) 
and Mike Inman, (interview page 98) who confirmed that the pressure 
came from the Department for Education and not the Treasury even though 
the Director of Education believed the Treasury were involved. 
Schools and Governors 
During May and June 1999 special meetings of the Governors of every 
school had been convened with a single agenda item - the PFI proposal. 
At these meetings, Governors considered the proposed agreement 
between the LEA and Governors and a series of resolutions regarding 
participation in the scheme. A further meeting was held in May for the 
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Voluntary Aided Scheme, attended by Governors, representatives of the 
Charity Commission and the Diocesan Authorities. By 19th jUly 1999 (the 
next meeting of the PFI Management Group), all schools in the City had 
agreed to take part in the scheme. 
The Teacher Perspective 
From the outset there had been a determination on the part of the 
Councillors and Senior Officers - to keep Governors and Headteachers 
fully briefed and able to suggest change as the process unfolded. 
In 1997 the mood was positive as Derek Gray the Convenor of the 
Teachers'Joint Consultative Committee confirmed: 
Eric Wood: 
The Education Committee debated it and they made the decision, the PF1 was 
signed up to, so was that a big persuadingjob Governors and Heads, whatever? 
Derek GraY: 
I don't think they took a lot of persuading. That is my own view anyway. In my 
view there was very little anti feeling, very little concern we felt it was a rock solid 
scheme all we could do was gain from it. When we started looking at the very 
issue of... that is the level of the building stock, the building stock was deplorable 
in the city it had nothing spent on it, for as long as I can remember, no significant 
improvement at all. 
Derek Gray confirms the view that capital investment in the school's estate 
was long overdue and that the private finance initiative offered a solution. 
By 1999 the mood remained positive and the professional associations, 
trade unions and governors were united in support of the City's capital 
ambitions. It was, however, important to maintain momentum as the 
initiative moved closer to reality. 
The Political perspective 
C1/r Beech: 
It was quite easy surprisingly to persuade the schools and the governing bodies 
because we thought that would be big stumbling block. 
Eric Wood: 
How did you do that, did you take the lead as a politician? 
Cllr Beech: 
We did, we went to visit the schools, / had numerous meetings, we had the 
Governors Forum at which constantly questions were asked, we had the 
Headteacher Forums where / would go along with Nigel to speak to 
Headteachers. 
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Councillor Beech confirms in this extract of the interview the leadership he 
exercised as a local politician in attending meetings with governors and 
headteachers, working alongside the Director of Education, Nigel Rigby. 
This combination of political and professional leadership was a feature 
reflected across all interviews carried out as part of this case study. 
The Officer Perspective: 
Eric Wood: 
What about the process of getting governors and heads on board? Was that 
relatively straighfforward? 
Nigel Rigby: 
It was straighfforward in the sense that they all agreed fairly readily, but we 
actually went to every single goveming body. We went to every single governing 
body and it was only a small group of us -I went to some, Mike went to others, 
me and Mike and can't remember who else, but there weren't many of us. 
Eric Wood: 
Was that officer driven, Nigel? 
Nigel Rigby: 
Yes, that was officer driven. 
Eric Wood: 
So officers went to every governing body in the City, to explain what was 
happening? 
Nigel Rigby: 
Yes, every single one, individually, we also had mass meetings of govemors so 
they knew what was coming. Mike also put communication leaflets, quite well 
produced communication leaflets out, and we said to govemors 'look'. / went to 
some crucial... and the ones that were likely to be difficult They were OK actually, 
but the line was We're going to take your energy budget, but you couldn't make 
your energy budget any more efficient than it already is, so that's no loss to you. 
And if we'd been wasting energy, that's your fault, no one would admit to that of 
course. And he said we're going to take your energy budget. From memory, 
that's all we took, we took their energy budgets, we threw in the central repair and 
maintenance budget, such as it was, very minimal and that was about it in terms 
of the Local Authority's contribution. We didn't contribute. / mean the energy 
budget itself was significant, but the schools didn't really notice much difference 
and actually the company took the vandalism risk, they took that out of our 
vandalism risk. Now nobody knew how much that was, because under local 
management of schools, of course, the records had ceased to be held centrally. 
But it tums out it was over El million per year. 
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The interview with the Director of Education, Nigel Rigby confirms the 
intense focus on consultation with every governing body in the City and 
indicates what was subsequently to be a significant financial feature of the 
contract - that the private sector partner agreed to take on a significant but 
unquantified risk in respect of dealing with vandalism of the school estate 
which he recollects as being a cost of over f-1,000,000 a year. 
The Professional Association perspective 
Eric Wood: 
In terms of the PF1 contract, the penalties and everything else that went into it 
were teachers formally consulted about the contract? 
Derek Gray: 
Our views were taken into account but generally / think the view was that this is 
something which improves the environment of our members then lets get on with 
it. The teacher associations supported and still do, fully support the venture 
because it made a tremendous difference to the condition under which our 
members operated at every level from headteachers down and certainly it has 
been in my view a very, very impressive scheme and / certainly make a point of 
telling people that Stoke-on- Trent has really benefited in terms of New Labour 
because of input of resource into the City in terms of building. 
Eric Wood: 
So heads and governors /. n the City were quite prepared to sign up to a 25 year 
contract where they would pay a lump sum each year to the PF/ contact and that 
would cover energy, insurance, maintenance. How has that worked are heads 
generally happy with that? 
Derek Gray: 
I think now that theyjust don't notice they don't get that money any more. But 
certainly it takes a lot of weight off the school, if for instance your boiler goes out 
and you know that you haven't got to pick the bill up. You don't get the situation 
we used to have of a high school making a teacher redundancy to pay for its 
boiler. 
Eric Wood: 
Interesting. Of all of the comments I have had more than one that the school was 
warm for the first time in a long time and well lit. 
Derek Gray: 
They looked at the whole energy situation within the school and made the schools 
more energy efficient. 
Eric Wood: 
Do you think it had any impact on the quality of teaching and learning? 
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Derek Gray: 
I think the answer to that is probably no. I think it made the teachers feel more 
respected. It gave them an acknowledgement of their role and it helped with the 
morale of teachers, you go around some of these schools and they say it is 
wonderful. 
Derek Gray indicates the significant degree of support the Teachers 
Professional Associations gave to the City Council and the Director of 
Education, Nigel Rigby in pursuing the private finance initiative and 
confirms that the immediate impact of the project was the improvement in 
teacher morale and res; ect for teachers in City Schools. He also p 
expresses support for the removal from Headteachers of concern about the 
thermal efficiency of school premises and such costs being removed from 
the revenue budget managed by Governors. 
By late August 1999 the City Council was finally in a position to appoint 
Balfour Beatty as the Preferred Partner. As negotiations progressed it 
became clear that an 'affordability gap'was opening up - E4.3 million as of 
November 1999; compounded by reductions in the RSG discount factor 
from 8.9% to 7.9% which alone would add a further E3.2 million - the 
situation was serious and worsening. 
Ministers to the rescue - January 2000 - October 2000 
In mid-January the City's MPs had met with Estelle Morris, MP and briefed 
her on the widening affordability gap - she had asked for an honest 
assessment of the situation and confirmed that she would act in the light of 
that. By February 2000 the official version of events was noted in a report 
to the PFI management group, 24 th January 2000. 
As a result of this correspondence (with the Treasury) he had been 
told to make an official approach to the Minister in question. He 
confirmed that such an approach had been made and that he had 
spoken to George Stevenson who had subsequently arranged a 
meeting to take place, at very short notice, with Jacqui Smith, MP. 
Mr Rigby had been accompanied to this meeting by John Beech, 
George Stevenson and Joan Walley. He reported that they had met 
Jacqui Smith, without officials, and had sent her a briefing copy 
puffing over Stoke-on-Trent's case and he noted that, from the 
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comments that she had made during the course of the meeting, that 
she had read and digested the information provided. He confirmed 
that she was sympathetic to the situation and had said that the 
scheme was important and that they did not want it to fail. In 
addition, Jacqui Smith had confirmed that her Department was in the 
process of carrying out a survey of all PFI Contracts and that she 
had said that she would look at Stoke-on-Trent in the context of that 
review. Continuing, he indicated that Jacqui Smith had also advised 
that Stoke-on-Trent needed to help her and to provide justification 
as to the reasons why Stoke-on-Trent required additional financial 
assistance. She had reported that there were many Authorities in a 
similar position and it was obvious that she could not give additional 
finance to everyone. He felt that she had been inviting Stoke-on- 
Trent to provide criteria as part of a review and emphasised that the 
value for money aspect would be one criteria which he would 
suggest. In addition, she had also been very keen on the case with 
regard to the standards agenda and she had told him to write to her 
officials and also to put these points in writing to herself. 
(Stoke-on-Trent PFI Management Group, 24/12/2000) 
The Director of Education's recollection when interviewed reveals the very 
real nature of political and civic life.... 
Nigel Rigby: 
We were about; C15 million short of the PF1 credit that we needed. So / rang one of 
our local MPs who picked the call up / think one night in Sainsburys, and his wife 
reminds me there is no Sainsburys in Stoke-on-Trent, so must have been Tesco's, 
and she said you have the phone George, and Fl/ continue with the shopping, and 
/ said, this deal could be dead unless we get to see the Minister and we need to 
see the Minister very quickly - the Schools'Minister, Jacqui Smith, and she saw 
us, she saw us very quickly because George Stevenson was off to Australia, 
without officials, one night -/ think within 72 hours. And it was pretty clear she 
was going to give us the extra money. And it took a lot longer than that, but they 
came through. 
The Director of Education's interview confirms that the meeting between 
Jacqui Smith, M. P., George Stevenson, M. P. (Stoke -on-Trent South) and 
local Councillors did not include Civil Servants; was held within three days 
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of the issue being raised with the local M. P. and that assurances of 
government help were implied by the junior Minister. 
Following the meeting the DfES increased the level of PFI credits by E18 
million to E93 million in order to render the scheme affordable. The 
assumed funding sources for the project were: 
EM 
PFI Credits 93.1 
Revenue Budgets 52.7 
Voluntary Aided Capital Grant 4.5 
Voluntary Aided Capital Contributions 0.8 
Estimated Capital Receipts from Land Sales 0.7 
(Education Committee, 27/3/2000) 
Given the resolution of the affordability problems further efforts were then 
undertaken to finalise the procurement of the scheme by September 2000 
with capital works planned to commence in January 2001. 
By July 2000, the City Council had finalised its Final Business Case for the 
scheme. This was presented to the City Council's Executive Committee on 
24 th July and agreed. As for services... Unison (2001 a) were able to report 
success... no victory for privatisation but a real victory for Governors and 
Headteachers to exercise 'choice'- an option that senior civil servants 
would have denied, on grounds we can only speculate about. 
Stoke-on-Trent schools PFL services under DroDosed PFI Contract 
Services Included Excluded Optional_ 
Building Repair, replacement or 
Related refurbishment X 
Services Maintenance X 
Fixtures and fittings X 
Minor internal repairs X 
Insurance X 
Utilities and Utilities provision X 
Services Mechanical and electrical 
installation X 
Facilities Security X 
management Cleaning X 
Caretaking X 
Catering X 
Grounds maintenance X 
(Unison, 2001 a, p 13) 
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The Contracting Parties and financial arrangements 
The Contracting parties to the final agreement were Stoke-on-Trent City 
Council and Transform Schools (Stoke) Ltd -a company owned equally by 
subsidiaries of Balfour Beatty Ltd and Innisfree (representing equity 
investors). Under the contract, Transform Schools had responsibility for 
the Project including the design, construction, finance and provision of 
energy and water. Transform Schools, in turn, let a fixed price contract with 
the Construction Joint Venture for the design, construction and 
refurbishment of schools over the five-year construction period. The 
construction company was formed by Balfour Beatty Construction Ltd and 
Balfour Kilpatrick operating in joint venture. Transform Schools let the 
contract for the maintenance services and provision of energy and water to 
Haden Building Management Ltd -a Balfour Beatty company. The 
contract was let for twenty-five years under the principles of PFI. 
Transform Schools had raised approximately E75 m from Lloyds Bank plc 
and Dexia Ltd together with shareholder equity to fund the construction 
works. During the initial phases of the contract the Council would pay a fee 
that would primarily meet Transform Schools payments to Haden Building 
Management Ltd. After completion of work on a school had been 
completed, the fee would be increased in order to meet Transform 
School's; overheads, debt repayments and dividend payments to 
shareholders. A fundamental component of the Contract was the 
requirement to reduce energy consumption across the schools' estate. 
Transform Schools were contractually bound to deliver a reduction of 20% 
in energy consumption across the schools' estate within the first five years 
of the Contract with a further 5% reduction to follow through the 
management of energy over the subsequent five years. The reduction in 
energy would be achieved in a number of ways, including improved energy 
efficiency of plant and equipment, improved thermal efficiency of the fabric 
by additional insulation and/or double glazing, draught sealing windows 
and doors, push taps, full Building Management Systems lining back to a 
central monitoring station, working with schools in advising staff and pupils 
on energy management. 
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The wide range of regulations and contractual specifications required for 
the implementation of the private finance initiative were extensive, as a 
chart of the interconnected public and private groups demonstrates 
(Appendix Three). 
The Education Department had two roles - as an implementing body and 
as a scrutiny and performance monitoring body. Accountability to the 
'democratic voice' of the Council was a central strength in the performance 
management arrangements and re-emphasised the determination on the 
part of the City Council to exercise their democratic legitimacy. 
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The future challenges what was to be done? 
The original purpose of the Project was to address a significant 
maintenance backlog, undertake environmental improvements to effect 
reductions in energy usage of at least 25% across the estate and to 
improve educational attainment by providing a better environment for 
learning. 
The construction and refurbishment would take five years, during which 9 
new schools would be built and 98 schools refurbished. The remaining 
schools within the LEA would be progressively closed through the first five 
years in order to accommodate the changing demographic profile within the 
City. Transform Schools would maintain these schools in a serviceable 
state up until the time that they were due to close. The Council would 
continue to provide a range of services including cleaning, caretaking and 
catering. Transform Schools would primarily provide schools with planned 
and reactive maintenance, window cleaning and energy. 
Conclusion Phase 1 
As Mike Inman wrote in a newsletter to schools: 
On 27 th November 2000, Jacqui Smith (DfES Schools' Minister) visited Stoke-on- 
Trent to witness the signing of a Partnership Charter by the main participants in 
the city's groundbreaking PFI scheme for schools. This charter commits the 
parties to work in harmony to deliver the works within the project on time, with the 
minimum of disruption for pupils, staff and governors and to produce an 
environment in the schools which is conducive to the delivery of education and the 
promotion of learning in the 21st Century with the intention of raising overall 
educational standards within the City of Stoke-on-Trent. 
The signing ceremony was held at a function attended by about 100 people 
representing all the interests involved. It marked, by celebration, the formal 
contractual signing (on 26 th October in Edinburgh) of the largest schools PFI deal 
so far in England and Wales, and concluded: 
Contract signature represents the end of the beginning - now we have to ensure, 
in partnership that the project is delivered to benefit the current and future children 
in Stoke-on-Trent. 
(Schools Newslefter, December 2000, p 2) 
The Partnership Charter, signed by Councillor Barry Stockley on behalf of 
the City of Stoke-on-Trent, Reverend Father Marcus Stock, on behalf of 
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Birmingham Catholic Diocesan Schools Commission, Alan Butterworth for 
the Lichfield Diocesan Board of Education, Anthony Rabin for Transform 
Schools (Stoke) Limited and witnessed by Jacqui Smith, M. P. as 
Parliamentary Under Secretary for School Standards on behalf of the 
government set out a series of informing and jointly agreed principles for 
the governance and implementation of the project. The wording of the 
Charter is relevant in the consideration of the third key research question 
which, in part, this thesis seeks to address and it is therefore, appropriate 
to reproduce the text of the Charter: 
Whilst this Charter has no formal legal effect, we nevertheless hereby formally 
and irrevocably commit ourselves to abide by the spirit of this Charter and to 
recognise, respect and promote each others' aims and interests concerning this 
project. 
Our Philosophy 
We shall conduct our relationships in a spirit of honesty, openness and co- 
operation with a positive attitude and mutual trust and respect, recognising each 
others needs and concerns, expressing our own concerns understanding each 
others problems; adopting a flexible and innovative approach to challenges, with 
an ambition of excellence in the performance of the contract and the conduct of 
our relationship; recognising that we are a single team with an overall common 
goal, we shall aim to settle any disputes that may arise between us quickly and 
amicably. 
Our Common Goal 
To complete the works written within the project on time and with the minimum of 
disruption for pupils, staff and governors; to produce a environment in the schools 
which is conducive to the delivery of education and the promotion of learning in 
the 21st Century with the intention of raising overall educational standards within 
the City of Stoke-on-Trent. 
(Schools Newsletter, December 2000 p 2) 
Some three years later, June 2003, Stoke-on-Trent was inspected by 
OFSTED/Audit Commission who reported on the PFI scheme, that: 
The PFI Scheme, is a much needed and well-targeted initiative and represents a 
good example of effective partnership. (para 10) 
Capital funding is managed very well, with schools' own resources and those of 
the LEA being co-ordinated effectively to complement and add value to the 
benefits already in place as a result of the authority's PFI scheme. (para 52) 
Property Services were satisfactory at the time of the last inspection. They have 
improved significantly since then, mainly because of the authority's PFI scheme 
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and the effectiveness of the partnership working between the authority and its 
contractor. The quality of property services is now good ... 
Schools are now 
positive about the quality of service. (para 109) 
LEA officers and the PFI contractor work very effectively in partnership to co- 
ordinate all sources of capital in order to maximise the benefit and minimise 
disruption to schools. (para 154) 
(OFSTED 1/6/2003) 
Reflection - What Matters: A postscript beyond the Politic 
One of the specific schools highlighted by Officers in Stoke-on-Trent 
as an excellent example of the benefits of the private finance initiative 
was Jackfield Infant School. As part of the research process I 
decided to interview the Headteacher of the school to gather first 
hand the experiences and perceptions of someone who was not 
directly involved in the politics of the private finance initiative, 
representing the view of a practitioner, in order to elicit a perspective 
from a customer of the initiative. Ann Barber, the Headteacher of the 
School, agreed to be interviewed, as with everyone else in the case 
study'on the record', and the narrative which follows indicates how a 
Victorian building was transformed and that with the transformation a 
change occurred within the local community and their perception of 
their school. What the narrative omits is the many references Ann 
Barber made to the fact that the transformed school was 'warm'- this 
was clearly something she and her staff rated very highly and 
underlined the focus of the private finance initiative on energy use 
and the setting of rigorous thermal efficiency targets. 
Eric Wood: 
So what was the school like when you went there in terms of the buildings? 
Anne Barber 
The school was built in November 1886. The morning that OFSTED arrived I 
arrived to find the children 400 roof tiles over the yard and numerous windows 
broken, and OFSTED were following on after my car. It was a very bad 
experience. The school went into Special Measures because of the standards, 
the buildings and everything else. 
Eric Wood: 
So was it put to you that it was PF1 or nothing? 
Ann Barber. - 
No it was either PF1 or it was in our budget then if we wanted to opt into PF1 or if 
we wanted or needed a new roof or anything like that we had got to pay for them 
ourselves out of the budget and of course we hadn't got that money. 
Eric Wood: 
So what was the attraction for you and your governors of the contract? 
Ann Barber: 
The attraction was that it was be cheaper for us in the budget, because we 
knew the school was an old school and as the years went on it was going to 
cost us a lot more that it had been costing. There was a health and safety 
issue and a crime issue. I'd arrive at school at Y4 to 8 in the morning to find 
a drug addict asleep on the step with a hypodermic needle still in his arm 
and we just knew we had got to do something. We didn't have enough 
money to spend on backing paper for the walls because we were spending 
it all on the buildings. 
Ann Barber. 
But the interesting part is since its all been done, we've had no vandalism, we 
don't have any drug addicts, the perimeter fence is a nice perimeter fence in 
green that can be seen through, we even spent El 0,000 on playground equipment 
which we hadn't got before, and everybody said I was mad to actually spend that 
kind of money and that it would get vandalised, but it hasn't. 
Its now an absolutely lovely school, the new build has been built on in the same 
character as the original school, so it hasn't go a flat roof it's got a sloping roof and 
it's tiled and it's looks super. The playground area is super we have got tables 
parasols, we have got early years area and the whole school is now warm and 
comfortable the displays stay on the walls and it is superb. 
But it wasn't just to the children it was to the whole community, it was the staff, 
they wanted to come to school, wanted to make the school look wonderful. They 
knew that the work they put it wasn't going to be destroyed over the weekend, the 
children started taking a pride in their work, the parents started a pride in the 
community, they got involved in parent classes. 
Eric Wood 
So in essence would this be true that you and the governors were not really 
bothered about where the money came from, how the money was gathered, what 
the politics of this are but from your point of view as a professional running a 
school, it was a good deal for you, a good deal for your children and a good deal 
for the community of Jackfield. 
Ann Barber 
Most definitely. 
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Eric Wood: 
How would you sum up PF1 from a vety respected Headteacher? 
Ann Barber: 
For me it's been the best thing that has happened to Jackfield Infants School. It 
made the school the fabric of the building stable, it can probably stand for another 
100 years and it's the focus of the community and I think PF/ has been the making 
of Jackfield Infant School. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Along the way the PFI in Stoke-on-Trent had been awarded the Royal 
Society for the Prevention of Accidents Gold Award for Occupational 
Safety, and in terms of Public/Private Finance Awards had received the 
2004 Best Operational Partnership (All Sectors), the 2004 Best Operational 
Education Project and earlier in 2002 Best Operational Project over F-20 
million. 
Nigel Rigby: 
What makes PF1 works so well is that it is good value, and it is relatively 
uncomplicated and there is a good relationship of trust. 
Eric Wood: 
Excellent Final two questions, if I can. Has it had an impact on the quality of 
teaching and learning? 
Nigel Rigby: 
Yes, it's probably depressed it. I think you have to recognise that we've been 
through reorganisation which has caught a lot of schools and PF/ which has 
caught every school. And it's a big strain for the primary schools in particular. 
Eric Wood: 
And the conclusion?. It's obviously one of the proudest achievements in your 
career as Director, to get a third of a billion pounds into a City. 
Nigel Rigby: 
Yes, assuming BSF comes off.... 
/ mean if BSF goes ahead, if you combine the PF1 and BSF and various other 
sources of capital, our schools will have had a third of a billion pounds spent on 
them between 2000 and 2010. Find me another city in westem Europe where that 
is the case. 
One of the enduring mysteries for me, as a researcher, is why despite a 
final report on the Private Finance Initiative in Stoke-on-Trent being written 
by Civil Servants, according to senior officials in Stoke-on-Trent, it was 
never published. 
The Stoke-on-Trent Private Finance Initiative can only, on the basis of 
research undertaken, be described as a major success story. The Audit 
Commission had suggested in 1999 that service users and the wider 
community were fully consulted over proposals to externalise services. It is 
clear that the issue of consultation was taken very seriously in Stoke -on- 
Trent where an impressive group of stakeholders were consulted; including 
parents, school governors, school staff, other schools, the local MPs, 
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Government departments, Council members, and external audit. The 
evidence for this focus on consultation can be found in the reports of the 
PFI Management Group and reports to the Education Committee and the 
Policy Committee between 1996 and 2000. 
It is also clear that lessons learned from earlier Private Finance Initiative 
projects, particularly those relevant to education, were significant features 
of the Stoke-on-Trent Private Finance Initiative, in that from the outset it 
was agreed that trust between all parties was essential to achieve an 
improvement in the standards of educational support and that services 
needed to be specified in output and, wherever possible, outcome terms. 
Payments should be linked explicitly to the provision of the specified 
service and rigorous performance measures and bench-marks should be 
developed and used, to secure value for money and high standards of 
provision in respect of the contract, or parts of it. In addition there should 
be clear and regularly monitored performance criteria, and the LEA should 
avoid commitment to a particular partner at too early a stage. A number of 
features of the project are worth noting as examples of good practice with 
wider implications for public education. 
Partnerships 
From the outset a clear political position was adopted, based upon the 
needs of the City, concern about public service employees, the ownership 
of buildings and the advice given by the Director of Education. From the 
research the strength and unity of the political and professional axis was a 
major foundation of the PFI process and no evidence was found to 
demonstrate the policy change effects of PFI described in the work of 
Davies and Henstchke (2001) or Salter and Greenway (2003). This may 
be because, unlike the Health Service considered by Salter and Greenway, 
(2003) the education service in local government has a strong tradition of 
professional - political working and this was on the basis of the evidence in 
Council reports, and confirmed in case study interviews outstandingly 
strong in Stoke-on-Trent. The engagement of Councillors and MPs as 
chronicled in the case study narrative illuminates how a strong local 
democracy can make a difference. To supplement the traditional local 
government machinery the Council launched a Citizen's Panel in 1998 with 
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the aim of consulting the community on a wide variety of issues. The Panel 
membership was representative of the population of Stoke-on-Trent in 
terms of location, gender, age, employment status and ethnic origin. 
The Panel's primary task was to shape the Corporate Plan. Panelists were 
asked about the priorities, services and key issues for the City, and the top 
five priorities were to increase community safety and encourage crime 
prevention; raise educational achievement and opportunity for all people of 
all ages; facilitate and encourage economic development of the City; 
develop and enhance opportunities to meet the social/health needs of the 
people of the City and tackle the issue of drug addiction to build a better 
Stoke-on-Trent. 
Education was the second highest priority behind community safety. This 
prioritising of education was welcomed by the City Council, who saw 
significant community benefits following from a PFI and high levels of 
capital investment, as the final business case confirmed: 
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Anticipated community benefits 
Improvement in Building Condition 
Improve educational 
attainment 
By 
Attraction 
4: Improve skill base 
Aamct lirldustry 
Promotes adult 
education 
Boost to 
service Reduces crime 
economy 
11 
Promotes wider 
community use 
Improves Reduces 
salary base unemployment 
: t. 
Encourage greater 
use of assets 
Civic 
pTide 
Increased 
occupation 
of buildings 
More 
funds per 
school 
Financial 
benefits 
Improves 
quality 
of life 
(Stoke-on-Trent Executive Committee, 24/7/2000, p7) 
Services 
This was the major battleground and the case study demonstrates the 
battle of wills between the DfES and the Council. The role of Civil Servants 
in this process has to be questioned. How could they reject the findings of 
an independent review overseen by the District Auditor, when the total 
annual cost benefit of the delivery of services by the DSO/DLO was 
assessed and confirmed at E1.5 million? The only possible explanations 
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can be an ideological pursuit of service privatisation or a desire to make the 
contract more profitable and attractive for the private sector. There is 
evidence elsewhere of civil servants exerting heavy pressure to secure the 
outsourcing of council delivered services. In Stoke-on-Trent this pressure 
did not succeed as the case study demonstrates. The role of civil servants 
in overseeing and advising on large contracts ought to be reviewed and the 
guidance within which they have to operate and report redrafted. 
Value for Money 
It is clear on the basis of the evidence in this thesis and a study of other 
similar projects that the PFI project in Stoke-on-Trent represents excellent 
value for money for the rate-payer and tax-payer. The scheme was 
innovative in using a reduction in energy consumption as a major feature of 
the contract and it was evident that the risk undertaken by the private 
contractor in terms of the vandalism of school buildings proved expensive 
to meet. Whilst there are no figures which confirm precisely the profit 
element within the contract, it was unofficially suggested by a range of 
people that the profit element was much smaller than in other PFI projects. 
The Director of Education, Nigel Rigby, confirmed that the impact of the 
risk undertaken by Balfour Beatty was significant: 
Eric Wood: 
In terms of being tight, do you mean the profits for the private sector were much 
slimmer than anybody would have expected? 
Nigel Rigby: 
Yes we drove a hard bargain. I mean, I led it personally all the while and I think 
that had something to do with it. It gave them confidence, it gave the company 
confidence. They felt the decision making was quick and honest and 
straighfforward and they could live with the tightness of the contract. If they'd 
known they were going to take the vandalism hit, they probably wouldn't ever 
have agreed to that. But I think part of Balfour's always felt if we can get in and 
make a success of the project, even if it's a loss leader, there W be a long term 
gain from this. And there is for Balfour. I mean it's an area, schools'PFI, 
Balfour's have a good reputation. They do have a good reputation for this project, 
it wins lots of awards regularly and they keep putting it in for awards. 
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The Public Private Partnership 
From the research it is clear that there is an extremely strong powerful and 
effective relationship between the City Council and Balfour Beatty. This 
was confirmed in interviews with Mike Hudson of Transform Schools and 
corroborated in interviews with Councillor Beech, the Director of Education, 
Nigel Rigby and Mike Inman, a Senior Education Officer. The partnership 
is based upon a series of mutually agreed value statements and it is clear 
from the evidence that Balfour Beatty went out of its way to understand the 
philosophy of the City Council. Everyone interviewed spoke very highly 
about the professional relationship between Transform Schools and 
Members and Officers in the Education Department. From the data 
gathered in the case study it is clear that the operational working 
relationship between the Education Department of the City Council and 
Transform Schools is not formally signed up to in the shape of a protocol 
and operates, as a number of interviewees confirmed rather like the British 
Constitution. In other words there are mutual expectations which are 
'understood' rather than being spelt out. This approach clearly works well 
with the existing personnel in both the public and private sector. However, 
a significant change of personnel could affect the nature of this relationship 
and at some point it will need to be quantified. 
This informal working relationship has a strong performance management 
element and there is an ongoing dialogue on a regular basis between the 
private and public sectors. The interesting aspect of the research was the 
nature of the contract from a private sector perspective. Whilst there is a 
requirement to build in penalties for poor performance against a PFI 
contract there were no guidelines at the time of the Stoke-on-Trent PFI to 
enable incentives for performing beyond the contract to be built in as an 
encouragement for the private sector to aim for. It is, therefore, all about 
emphasizing the negative and failing to ensure the private sector has 
stretching objectives. At a time when stretching is the buzz word in 
education, this aspect of PFI ought to be considered. 
Over the next twenty years the PFI, on current performance will meet the 
objectives set out in 2000, in that the PFI solution should remove the 
backlog in maintenance and introduce a more comprehensive planned and 
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preventative maintenance programme for schools. It will also introduce 
certainty into the annual cost of the Council's maintenance programme and 
the use of more modern technology in design and construction will result in 
greater energy efficiency and achieve significant savings in energy, water 
and running costs. The project will provide demonstrable support for the 
Council's commitment to Local Agenda 21 and the environment and will 
represent value-for-money in the use of public funds. 
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Summary 
This chapter illustrates some of the issues which arose during the process 
of developing and concluding an agreement to implement a private finance 
initiative in the City of Stoke-on-Trent and covers the period between 1997 
and 2000. The project, at the time, was the largest private finance initiative 
in the United Kingdom in the education sphere and was designed to 
upgrade, maintain and supply energy to 6 special schools, 11 nursery 
schools, 88 primary schools and 17 secondary schools. Of these 122 
schools, 22 were voluntary aided and 2 were grant maintained. The 
contractual period was for 25 years, during the first five years of which the 
schools were required to be repaired to meet the specifications of the 
negotiated contract including all energy requirements. 
This chapter details the 'real life' steps in the process of securing the 
private finance initiative, the chronology of which included the following 
milestones which are expressed in the narrative: 
January 1997 GEST (Grants for Educational Support and 
Training) bid submitted by the City Council to the 
Department for Education and Employment 
March 1997 GEST funding awarded for 1997/98. 
May 1997 Liaison between the City Council and Public Private 
Partnership Programmes Ltd, (4P's) started 
November 1997 Liaison between the City Council and the Treasury 
Taskforce started 
November 1997 Publication of the contract notice in the Official 
Journal of the European Communities, (OJEC). 
December 1997 City Council receives pre-qualification submissions 
from interested parties 
January 1998 City Council issues an 'Invitation to submit outline 
Particulars' (ISOP) to interested parties 
February 1998 Initial selection interviews of potential bidders by the 
City Council 
March 1998 Selection by the City Council of four prospective 
bidders 
August 1998 City Council issues an Invitation to Negotiate, (ITN) 
to the four selected bidders 
November 1998 City Council receives the submission interrogation 
December 1998 City Council holds submission interrogation 
January 1999 Meetings with the four bidders 
January 1999 City Council selects two of the four bidders for 
further consideration 
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February 1999 City Council issues a 'Best and Final Offer', (BaFo) 
invitation to the two bidders 
April 1999 The two 'Best and Final Offer' submissions received 
by the City Council 
June 1999 City Council holds final submission interrogation 
meetings and selects a 'Preferred Bidder' 
June 1999 City Council and Preferred Bidder commence 
contract detail negotiation 
October 2000 Financial and contractual details confirmed by the 
City Council and agreement with the Preferred 
Bidder concluded 
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Conclusions 
The implications, following an analysis of the data and evidence collected 
in this Chapter and Chapter Three, covering both policy development and 
implementation, were considered in respect of the three principal research 
questions as set out on page 44 of this thesis and follow sequentially. 
Key Question One: 
Does the new governance of education require a new system of 
accountability? 
From the evidence gathered it can be concluded that the current 
governance of education does require the development of new systems of 
accountabilities, with models adapted to local circumstances, as in the 
case of the Private Finance Initiative in the City of Stoke-on-Trent. The 
democratic issue of accountability is dealt with in the conclusions to this 
thesis and a representational model of accountability, from a strategic 
perspective, is proposed. From the case study it is clear that Councillors 
and Officers in Stoke-on-Trent had to develop accountability measures and 
new contractual arrangements which bound together the City Council, 
Diocesan authorities, schools and the private sector consortium who 
successfully secured the contract to deliver the private finance initiative. 
The central features of the contractual accountabilities involved four areas 
where agreements had to be reached: 
"a written agreement with each school governing body covering the 
collection of contributions from delegated school budgets 
"a written agreement between the City Council and each of the two 
banks involved, regulating the relationship between the City Council 
and the banks with specific reference to any early termination of the 
Principal Agreement. 
"a set of written agreements between the City Council and the two 
Diocesan Authorities regulating the arrangements for the funding of 
voluntary aided schools 
"a series of written agreements, including warranties from the main 
contractors covering their liabilities to the City Council for 
professional negligence. 
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In addition a 'responsibility matrix'was included in the new accountability 
measures - indicating where the City Council, School and Contractor were 
accountable for particular areas of a school building. Alongside this a 
performance measurement system was developed to ensure that within the 
sets of contractual accountabilities each party could be held to account for 
such diverse areas as thermal comfort, lighting, water services, energy 
consumption, acoustics and fungal and pest control. These contractual 
accountabilities flesh out the issues considered in a theoretical context in 
the exchanges between Helen Jones, M. P. and Estelle Morris, M. P. on 
pages 60 - 61 of this thesis. The evidence of the case study places the 
City Council in the position of dominant partner in brokering arrangements, 
retaining democratic oversight of contractual delivery and, whilst not 
engaging in service delivery directly setting up a monitoring arrangement 
with the private sector contractor to ensure their being 'held to account' for 
performance. 
In considering the development of new systems of accountability within an 
increasingly complex world of education governance an area for 
development could be the consideration of written agreements, covering 
central government, local government, schools and students with clear 
indications of who is accountable to whom, for what, against schedules of 
responsibility and audit and this would, in part address the need for the 
adequate safeguards suggested by Whitty (2000). This would also enable 
the issue of 'who should have the right to scrutinise whom, for what and 
how'to be addressed, (Corry and Martin, 2005). 
Key Question Two: 
Does the performativity of the private sector require public scrutiny 
and regulation? 
As Chapter Three of this thesis indicates the growth of the private sector in 
education, as an element of neoliberalism, has been significant, with 
modest beginnings in the 1990's when compulsory competitive tendering 
arrangements were introduced for local education authorities and an 
accelerating trend under Labour since 1997, when public private 
partnership activity rose from f-75 million (1997) to an estimated E2.7 billion 
(2005) according to the Local Government Chronicle, 2003. Within this 
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area of private sector growth the private finance initiative has been the 
largest element of state investment, with the liabilities of the state 
estimated to be as large as E60 billion or 5% of gross domestic product, 
(The Times, 14/3/2005 pl 1). 
In addition, as indicated earlier in this thesis the market in the provision of 
private sector consultancy services to the public sector reached a cost of 
E2 billion by 2003 and showed every indication of continuing to increase. 
The cumulative scale of public sector expenditure on private sector 
services in itself warrants public scrutiny and regulation and underlines the 
need for this 'frontier market' (Rutherford, 2003) to be secured within a 
framework of democratic accountability. As Chapter Three of this thesis 
demonstrates there are significant areas of private sector activity in the 
public sphere where contractual and financial arrangements with the 
private sector are unobtainable, such as in the case of intervention in Local 
Education Authorities, the contracts for school and college inspection, the 
contracts for national strategy delivery and in private finance initiatives at 
local level. This absence of information makes judgements about 
performativity, (other than by the commissioner of the service), and value 
for money assessments impossible in terms of the citizen and the 
consumer of the service. The provision, therefore, of adequate information 
and openness, particularly on the part of civil servants, about private sector 
contracts is an essential pre-requisite for public scrutiny. Within this there 
should be an open code of practice for Civil Servants engaged in 
commissioning activity by the private sector and, as is the case of the 
Stoke-on-Trent private finance initiative, having the authority to endorse or 
deny local contractual arrangements, with clear parameters in respect of 
their powers to bring pressure to bear, as they did in the issue of support 
service provision in the Stoke-on-Trent private finance initiative, set out 
earlier in this thesis. The need for such a code, which would prevent Civil 
Servants exceeding their authority as commissioners on behalf of the 
citizen, is strengthened by consideration of the pressures brought to bear 
upon public officials in Stoke-on-Trent to engage the private sector in 
supplying support services despite evidence of better performativity on the 
part of the public sector supplying such services, as set out in this Chapter. 
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It is worth noting that, of 54 private finance initiatives the only project to 
exclude support staff, who were sub-contracted to the private finance 
consortia was in the City of Stoke-on-Trent, (Unison (b), 2001). A further 
implication of the evidence in Chapters Three and Four of this thesis 
involves the need for scrutiny across the new shape of public service 
delivery which is characterised by a plurality of providers from the public, 
voluntary and private sectors either acting separately or in a range of 
interconnectivities. This scrutiny should encompass public agencies or 
bodies, given that of the 450,000 individuals who act as governors of such 
bodies only 25,000 are elected and have a democratic accountability and 
that the plurality of current managerialist arrangements are semi-detached 
from a traditional model of representative democracy, possessing 
consultative strategies around an endowed authority to make decisions. 
The building of public scrutiny arrangements, which would strengthen the 
user voice, could be a prelude to the development of a new civic culture 
and build the argument for directly elected models of user control of public 
services thus making accountability transparent and relevant to citizens, 
particularly if such emerging models for recapturing democratic 
accountability were paralleled by broad and innovative public scrutiny of 
the private sector. 
A concluding implication of the evidence in Chapters Three and Four of this 
thesis concerns individual influence within the public sector and the multi- 
faceted roles played by individuals within the public/private sector interface. 
Within local authorities and in Parliament those who exercise power on 
behalf of the public have to declare all relevant interests and avoid a 
conflict of interest when voting. Within the new framework of public service 
delivery the construction, by regulation, of a register of interests embracing 
all who commission, manage or exercise elected or appointed power would 
enable a locality governance map to be created and the new magistracy 
within education to be identified. If applied, the citizen or user of public 
services would be able to know of the individuals in their locality acting on 
their behalf and, in the case of the private sector, begin to see the 
development of performative transparency beyond contractual targets, an 
individual as well as corporate accountability for decisions taken. 
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In dealing with Key Questions One and Two it is suggested that new 
models of accountability, with public scrutiny and regulation of the private 
sector and appointed public agencies are required. Key question three 
considers the issue of the locality governance of education. 
Key Question Three 
Is the new governance of education as dependent as the past on local 
actors to orchestrate delivery in a meaningful way for a local community? 
Chapter One of this thesis sets out the landscape of change in the 
governance of education, with new partnerships between the public, private 
and voluntary sectors engaging in the construction and delivery of 
education policy. The case study of the private finance initiative in the City 
of Stoke-on-Trent provides evidence of the need for local actors, principally 
in this case, the local authority, school governing bodies, professional 
associations and trade unions together with Diocesan authorities and the 
private sector to work together in partnership to deliver mutually agreed 
outcomes. The same need for local actors to work together could equally 
apply to School Organisation Committees, Admissions Forums, Early 
Years and Child Care Partnerships, Strategic Lifelong Learning 
Partnerships, Education Action Zones, Local Strategic Partnerships and 
the emerging Local Area Agreements. The common thread connecting the 
case study in this thesis and the broader nationally applicable partnerships 
is the changing nature of the local authority, as the one body to claim a 
democratic legitimacy for its exercise of power. In the case study of Stoke- 
on-Trent the local authority was, on the basis of the evidence, the central 
body orchestrating all interested parties and acting on behalf of citizens in 
ensuring an outcome which was in the best interests of the local 
community. 
Without the leadership of the local authority, guided as the evidence 
suggests, by a clear set of guiding principles endorsed by governors, 
headteachers and other local stakeholders the private finance initiative 
would not have been secured. In one sense an historical perspective 
comparing contemporary realities of governance with the past is unhelpful, 
in that the changes in the distribution of authority and power have required 
new ways of working between partners to be developed. Whilst the local 
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actors are essentially the same the significant change has been in the 
collective exercise of power and decision making and the undertaking by a 
local authority of a community leadership role which is what the case study 
provides ample evidence for in the case of Stoke-on-Trent Council. This 
mutual dependency and recognition of the need for effective partnership 
working and accountability was encapsulated in the 'Partnering Charter' 
signed in Stoke-on-Trent (page 110 of this thesis). The advent of the 
Children Act, 2004 and the establishment of Children's Trusts is leading to 
local actors within local communities, charged with the governance of 
services to children, coming together to agree a locality vision for the 
delivery of such services. The trend towards greater consumer choice, the 
use of contestability in public service delivery, with the commissioning and 
procurement function seen as separate from operational delivery, needs to 
be underpinned by local authorities re-emphasising their public or 
community management of places and localities which is greater than the 
service management function. 
The Children Act, 2004 will lead to the emergence of relationship 
agreements between locality stakeholders setting out their respective 
responsibilities to each other and engaging in the development of new 
accountability mechanisms. The lessons from the Stoke-on-Trent private 
finance initiative demonstrate how powerful local actors can be in securing 
an outcome which, for a local community, they jointly deem desirable and 
suggest that the response to this third key question is that the new 
governance of children's services is as dependent, in a different way, as in 
the past on local voices acting in chorus and in harmony. The challenge 
for local authorities is to exercise orchestral direction in a democratic 
fashion and conduct by assent, underpinned by the authority given to them 
by their citizens and answerable for their stewardship by new accountability 
and scrutiny processes. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
The Fourth Way - Is social democracy, citizenship and 
professionalism the way ahead? 
The third way strategies of modernisation have been considered in earlier 
chapters from both national and local perspectives, with both needing each 
other to achieve their objectives. That there has been a significant 
centralisation of authority over the public education service cannot be 
denied - but the case study is a clear example of the relevance of local 
power to the end result. In the absence of a codified constitution the 
centre-local checks and balances in the exercise of power and authority in 
the public realm, particularly with the emergence of the largely 
unaccountable private sector in the public domain, are worthy of comment, 
analysis and suggestion. 
Marquand (2000) charted the growth of the public domain to the mid 
twentieth century and commented that Social Democrats took the 
continued steady state public domain for granted. He did however, 
comment critically on the New Right strategies of the 1980's and 1990's 
which he described as 
a relentless kulturkampf, designed to rout out values of the 
public domain accompanied by an equally relentless attack on 
the institutions in which they were embedded. Deregulation, 
privatisation, public private partnerships, proxy markets, 
performance indicators mimicking those of corporate 
management and the systematic assault on professional 
autonomy narrowed the public domain lowering the distinction 
between it and the market domain. (p 28) 
The combination of the marketisation of education, reinforced by 
manageralist strategies has been a particular feature of the education 
agenda pursued by New Labour. Education is seen as a product or 
commodity, with competition driving efficiency and individual choice being 
preferred above collective and accountable political decision making. This 
view diminishes the role of the State to one of market promoter and 
regulator. 
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In trying to understand the Third Way two approaches can be considered - 
a sociological analysis of responses to globalisation and a normative 
approach which seeks for an ethical basis in isolation from the macro 
constraints faced by national states in managing capitalism and creating 
conditions for economic flexibility in a global market place. 
The portrayal of the Third Way as a value driven, moral project is a key 
feature of New Labour. Blair emphasises 'equal worth, opportunity for all, 
responsibility and community' (Blair, 1998b) and he insists thatHuman 
nature is co-operative as well as competitive, selfless as well as self 
interested; and society could not function if it were otherwise', (Blair, 
1998b). He thus seeks to reassert democratic socialist values and set 
these into an ethical framework grounded on the left. There is, however, 
no linkage between the rhetoric and how it relates in practice to a 
depoliticised and detraditionalised education policy in practice. Taken 
together the depoliticisation of policy and the remodelling of the rights of 
citizens and consumers, which the market has driven, require a response 
which could in political, consumer and citizenship terms give effect to 
some of the values agenda pursued within the Third Way and point to a 
Fourth Way. 
What conclusions can be drawn from the modernisation agenda of New 
Labour in order to inform discussion about the future direction of education 
and learning? First the private sector role in education is here to stay with 
strategies set out in future spending plans to significantly expand public- 
private partnerships. Secondly a move away from a welfare state, fuelled 
by the creation and acceptance of a perception that educational failure has 
caused economic stagnation, that reform is therefore essential and 
requires to be on-going in order to succeed economically and that through 
explaining relative economic decline in terms of failure within the state's 
infrastructure, attention is deflected away from the essential injustices of 
capitalism and the management of the public sector is called into question 
and drive demands for reform (Whitty, 1998). 
Thirdly there is a growing democratic deficit, with the centralisation of 
power to national government and the weakening of responsibilities at 
local democratic levels by the growth of appointed bodies. The rhetoric of 
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social democratic values have little meaning within a structural framework 
of governance designed to negate them. Fourthly an increasing tendency 
to view and assess the quality of public services in terms of the 
relationship between consumer and provider rather than, as Ranson and 
Stewart (1994) argued, the 'quality of consumer and citizen. ' 
Fifthly a low trust model of professionals within the public sector, with 
teachers seen as technicians as opposed to being driven by a 
social/vocational mission. 
Finally the marketisation agenda reinforces class division, sidelines social 
justice and equity considerations and has reinforced the achievement gap 
between areas of differential socio-economic composition - as there is a 
close correlation between academic and social stratification. With 
magnetic polarity 'advantaged parents and advantaged schools', (Whitty, 
1998 p 7) are drawn to each other. 
What visions might inform a Fourth Way? 
The nature of democracy and citizenship 
Firstly an acknowledgement that the Third Way deficit lies in a failure to 
recognise emerging theories of 'public value' and 'values based 
leadership' within the complexities of governance at local government and 
institutional level. This debate about putting values into practice requires a 
wider debate about accountability within the education system and about 
the nature and position of local democracy and the concept of citizenship 
within modern society. 
Hirst (1995) set out the concepts of a 'political constitution' and a 'social 
constitution' as means by which governance could be viewed and 
government held accountable. The political constitution defines the power 
of the state and establishes limits - the contract between the state and the 
citizen. The 'social constitution' is a complex of laws, practices and 
procedures that defines the ways in which the political institutions and the 
wider society interact (Hirst 1995). In asserting that both constitutions are 
now fundamentally flawed and that a new model of mutual accountability 
of State/Citizen should be developed Hirst (1995) points the way to a wider 
democractic debate. 
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Perhaps in suggesting a reassertion of the values of the public domain 
Hirst (1995) was adding to the work of Bogdanor (1994) who in arguing for 
a strengthening of local democratic accountability suggested that on six 
key principles, conventions governing local authorities, there was an 
urgent need to repair the 'democratic deficit'. The principles he outlined 
drew upon European experience and the British Constitutional experience: 
Directly elected local authorities shall have the right to provide public services in 
the interests of their local populations. 
Local authorities shall be recognised as the representatives of their communities. 
Local Authorities shall be given freedom to experiment within the law. 
Local Authorities shall be entitled, within national economic policy, to adequate 
financial resources of their own, commensurate with their responsibilities, part of 
which shall derive from local taxes. They shall have the right within the limits of 
statute, to determine the level of local taxation. 
Local Authorities shall have the right to be consulted on changes in their structure, 
powers organisation and finance. 
The principle of subsidiarity - that public services shall be undertaken as far as 
possible by those authorities closest to the citizen. 
(Bogdanor, 1994, p 2/3) 
He commented on the latter point that: 
It is time to begin the task of reinvigorating our system of local 
democracy with the same energy and determination that our 
Victorian forbears displayed a hundred years ago. 
(Bogdanor, 1994, p 3) 
The contemporary themes of subsidiarity and the debate about modernised 
forms of local governance are relevant at a time when the issues of 
regional government, elected Hospital Trusts, Police and school Boards 
are in the public domain. The'Holy Grail'of New Labour, delivering citizen 
centred public services (Blair, 1998b) will remain elusive if there is no 
movement on linking related policy initiatives, moving beyond voluntarism 
and stepping forward to enable, in education, a new settlement of rights 
within which the learner drives the system. 
There are clear signs that some aspects of the performativity agenda are 
softening -a lessening of the emphasis upon external targets for schools 
and LEA's, the development of 'compacts' - locally driven aspirations of 
education and social policy to which local and central government commit 
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resources and the drive to support Local Strategic Partnerships are 
evidence of shift at the margins. What is central is an emerging view about 
the citizen versus consumer debate, with a growing acceptance of the 
consumer as a citizen and the need to attune policy to mixed perspectives, 
aspirations and expectations. 
The evidence of the 2005 general election showing that New Labour 
received 4 million fewer votes than in 1997, with the 34 most marginal 
Labour seats having a cumulative majority of 29,000 votes in total and 
hence the government's majority resting on a wafer thin number of voters 
prompted Robin Cook, MP to reflect upon the'exposure of the limits of 
political cross-dressing' (Cook, Guardian, 17.6.2005 p 26). He expanded 
upon this theme in a speech to the Guard ian/Compass Conference on 
18.6.05 entitled 'Can Labour Renew Itself in Government. ' 
In arguing that Labour could only reclaim lost electoral ground by 
persuading voters that it remained a 'party with a coherent value based 
philosophy', Cook saw as a test case the issue of the market in public 
services: 
Whether Labour can rebuild a radical value base in this parliament 
will be the outcome of the debate over the role of the market in the 
provision of public services. 
The history of social democracy can be expressed as the struggle to 
set limits to the market and to define those areas where priorities 
should be set by social policy rather than commercial forces. Yet 
this government is dismantling the barriers that it's predecessors 
had erected to keep those commercial services off the public service 
turf. (Cook, 2005, p 26) 
In suggesting that'increased efficiency' is the government's motive for 
encroachment by the private sector on the lawn of the public sector Cook 
advances two arguments - firstly that private sector engagement will have 
an impact beyond the outcomes of the work in that 'a democratic public 
service marches to a value system that is different to a commercial, private 
operation and imposing commercial means will changes its end result', (p 
27) a view supported by Crouch (2003) who questioned the linkage 
between the private sector deployment and efficiency gains in public 
133 
service delivery and suggested that the use of the private sector affected 
the nature and character of the service. 
Secondly, in practical terms there is no evidence to support the greater 
efficiency argument in that: 
Private companies that have won contracts for educational services 
under this government include Serco, which builds missile warning 
systems, Jarvis, a construction engineering consultant and Group 4, 
the prison specialists. The factor that unites all these companies is 
that they brought no knowledge of education to their new business 
and began by hiring the expertise of the very public service staff 
whose alleged inefficiency they were supposed to remedy. 
(Cook, 2005, p 26) 
Cook urges Labour to make the ideological case for health and education 
as 'a public realm in which citizenship is more important than market 
power. ' (Cook, 2005, p 26) 
The recognition that the 'public realm' requires citizenship to be centre 
stage is a theme reflected throughout much of Marquand's work although 
he believed that a large public realm could exist with a small public sector: 
the public domain should not be seen as a 'sector' at all. It is best 
understood as a dimension of social life, with its own norms and 
decision rules, cuffing across sectional boundaries: as a set of 
activities, which can be (and historically have been) carried out by 
private individuals, private charities and even private firms as well as 
public agencies. It is symbiotically linked to the notion of a public 
interest, in principle distinct from private interests; central to it are 
the values of citizenship, equity and service it is a space, 
protected from the adjacent market and private domains, where 
strangers encounter each other as equal partners in the common life 
of the society .................. (Marquand 2004 p 27) 
The search for meaning within the public sphere is a quest which spans the 
ranks of Labour - the word 'new' being increasingly avoided - and extends 
to the respect agenda, where without a strong public realm, with vibrant 
public services, cherished public assets, safe public spaces and a strong 
public service ethos there can be a no decency in a decent society (Blears 
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2005). As part of the reclaiming of the public realm it is argued that the 
6 active welfare state', based upon 'rights and responsibilities for the 
individual and the state' needs the engagement of citizens in the design 
and delivery of personalised services because the role of government is to 
I mandate outcomes not regulate processes, ' (Miliband 2005 in Collins, P. 
p 55). 
The process of individualisation was seen by Giddens to be the area in 
which Third Way values should influence and shape outcomes agreeing 
with Blair that there should be 'no rights without responsibilities as a 
potential motto for third way politics', (Giddens, 1998,64 -5). In terms of 
citizenship an expanding individualism carried with it extended individual 
obligations in the public realm. 
However, there is a view that 'the concept of profit can and should play an 
increasingly important role in improving the quality of our public services' 
and that there should be incentives to reward and sanctions to punish the 
more or less responsible even to the extent that Ministers in the 
Department of Health can argue that 'tenants, for example, who pay their 
rent on time and who respect their neighbours should get faster access to 
repairs and improvement schemes'. (Collins, P. 2005 p 28). 
This sits presumably alongside the new Clause 4 of the Labour Party 
Constitution - to work for a just society which judges its strength by the 
condition of the weak as much as the strong! The emerging consensus 
around the new democratic agenda was summarised by David Miliband, 
Minister of State in the Cabinet Office: 
The heart of politics is the relationship between government, 
markets and civil society. These relationships define political 
traditions. The three vital components of social democracy are 
government that supports people, markets organised to serve them 
and an open civil society that extends rights and responsibilities. 
(Collins, P. 2005, p 50) 
Within this triangular arrangement the concept of power is seen to rest in 
the choices people have about their daily lives and the voice they have in 
governance, locally and nationally - this means connecting the 'voice' and 
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9 choice' agenda and reaching a new accommodation between the citizen 
and the state, a discourse of purpose, plan and a new performativity. 
If Clause 4 of Labour's Constitution defines 'community' (as opposed to 
public ownership) as the arena within which citizens are enabled to realise 
their full potential then market forces and the community need to be 
rebalanced/adjusted. 
Local councils have traditionally had an important role to play in developing 
a collective vision for their area, one that meets local needs and priorities 
and draws together all the relevant partners in order to achieve it. Three 
characteristics of local authorities that enable them to achieve this role 
have been identified as democratic accountability - representing all the 
people in their particular area; a sense of place - knowledge/experience of 
the geographical area the authority represents and an ability to bring 
together the full range of partners to best meet the needs and priorities of 
those who live in the area. 
However, over the past twenty years - Local Education Authorities have 
lost significant functions such as the entire post compulsory sector, their 
monopoly position as suppliers of services, their role in inspection and in 
terms of Academies any role at all. It could be argued, based upon the 
research carried out for this thesis that New Labour actively promoted and 
extended Thatcher's educational legacy in a range of policy areas such as: 
Workforce reform in schools and the casualisation of teaching 
Incentive driven funding to specialist schools, colleges, projects 
Tuition fees and the lessening of student mobility in higher education 
Private sector growth in LEAs and schools 
Private sector engagement in capital programmes, PFI/PPP 
The 'fast track' expansion of popular secondary schools 
The 'fast track' of Primary and Secondary schools to Foundation Status. 
The growth of Academies and Faith Schools. 
The increased powers to non-elected Admissions and School Forums. 
The growth of central control, accountability and direction over the school and 
college system. 
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As part of the research for this thesis I compiled a graph, based upon the 
evidence gathered from Partnerships UK, 2005 to illustrate the scale of 
investment in the Private Finance Initiative in order to represent visually the 
significant growth which had taken place following the election of a New 
Labour Government in 1997.1 then considered whether a visual 
representation of the 'Thatcher/Blair Project', which would test Hall's 
assertion (page one) about Blair adapting 'us' by the continuities of policy 
within Labour's actions in government could be constructed. This formed a 
mini-research project, constrained by time, but felt to be relevant to the 
three key research questions and the general thrust of the thesis and 
therefore a valid addition to the original research design. I decided to use 
three focus groups, each consisting of three members, representing 
Headteachers, Teachers and Education Officers in order to seek their 
perceptions of changes in the governance of education, focussing 
particularly on recurrent themes in earlier chapters of this thesis namely the 
power shifts as a result of 
Centralisation - increased authority to the Secretary of State for 
Education and Skills 
Localisation - increased authority to local education authorities 
School autonomy - increased authority to school governors 
Marketisation and Private Sector expansion 
Choice - increased rights for Parents 
(Appendix Two) 
The outline document for each focus group was the same and the 
legislative timeline set out in Gillard, (2004), was adapted to produce a 
framework setting out central government reports and legislation, in 
summary form. The focus groups met separately, the meetings were 
facilitated by me and the document for consideration, Appendix Two, 
circulated in advance. Each meeting was scheduled for a maximum of 
three hours and each group was asked to assess change in 'authority' as a 
result of the legislation enacted or the report implemented, using a simple 
scoring mechanism with a (+1) if 'power' had increased in a theme, (0) if 
the effect was neutral and (-1) if power had been reduced. The scores for 
each group were rounded at the end of the exercise and a graphical 
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representation of the aggregate outcomes developed. Whilst recognising 
the subjective nature of each participant's individual judgement I would 
argue that the outcomes have validity given the composition of the focus 
groups, the analysis they carried out and the fact that each group worked 
separately and each arrived at broadly similar judgements. 
The first issue considered was whether central government had acted to 
gain greater powers over the governance of education. 
TRACKCING POWER SHIFTS AS A RESULT OF NATIONAL LEGISLATION 
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The view was clear - that successive national governments had taken 
increased powers over education, and the direction of travel in this respect 
was consistent in establishing a centralising approach since 1978. This 
analysis bears out the evidence in Chapters One and Three in this thesis 
and the outcomes of the literature review, that the growth in state power 
and agencies of the state has been accompanied by a parallel weakening 
of the accountability of the state and its agencies, (Pattie, et al, 2003). 
Building on the work of Skelcher, 1998, the Public Affairs Select 
Committee, (2001), concluded that the growth in public agencies created to 
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manage the implementation of public policy had been significant, with 138 
executive agencies, 187 national executive quangoes, 414 advisory 
quangoes and 300 task forces discharging power across a range of public 
policy areas. The fact that the members of these bodies are appointed and 
not elected, and accountable to Ministers of the Crown, who appointed 
them in the first place, means that issues about their accountability can 
legitimately be asked. 
The second issue considered was the change in power exercised by local 
government. 
TRACKING POWER SHIFTS AS A RESULT OF NATIONAL LEGISLATION 
TABLE 8 
LLJ 
20 
w 15 
LLJ 
a 10 
w 
5 
LLI 
cl: 
U Neutral 
z 
W 
w 
-5 3.0 
0 
(L 
-10 
C'b 
"k 
. 0,00' Cý'bb cl, Cýý, 
b 
'ce ,, -(, ý N Nce No "cp ýp 6§ý p 
base year (power YEAR 
Olneutral) 
40ýLocal GovemmentILEA 
The graph indicates a steep decline in the power exercised by local 
government and local education authorities from 1983 to 1993 and a 
relative plateau thereafter until 2004/05 when there is a perceived increase 
in responsibility and authority. The decline in the role of local authorities 
has been accompanied by an average turnout for local government 
elections of less than 40%, with an accelerating decline in turnout between 
1993 and 2002 dropping to 25% between 1997and 2002, (Local 
Government Chronicle Elections Centre). The evidence, therefore, points 
to the fact that the Labour Government's programme of local government 
modernisation, with new forms of local executive, has failed to achieve the 
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democratic renewal which was one of the major justifications for the 
modernising agenda. As Bognador (2004) commented 
the problems facing local government are deep seated, resulting as 
they do from half a century of centralisation, from social changes 
which have weakened local communities, and from government 
reorganisations which have had the effect of severing local 
government from local communities. (p 6). 
The third issue considered was the change in institutional authority, and 
whether schools had greater or lesser power to deal with their environment. 
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The graph indicates a perception of increasing power being devolved to 
schools from local and central government, principally the former, starting 
in 1988 with the Education Reform Act and growing significantly from 2001. 
This trend towards the self-managing school does raise questions about 
school governance and accountability, the relationship between schools in 
a community and relationships with local government and other local 
agencies within the mosaic of the governance of education. The graph 
complements the evidence in Chapters One and Three of this thesis, 
indicating movement towards the vision set out by Sexton, 1987, page 18 
of this thesis. 
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The fourth issue considered was the impact of the private sector and 
market development in education Had power in the education sphere 
moved in this direction? 
TRACKING POWER SHIFTS AS A RESULT OF NATIONAL LEGISLATION 
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The graph reveals a significant, consistent year on year and accelerating 
growth in power in education exercised by the private sector. As indicated 
in Chapters One and Three of this thesis there are key issues of 
accountability which need to be addressed given this growth of the private 
sector, in particular the need for information about service delivery now 
held by private contractors to be considered for return to the public realm 
and its non disclosure on the grounds of commercial sensitivity challenged. 
As indicated earlier in this thesis when we have a national system of 
inspection in education delivered by the private sector, the national primary 
and secondary strategies delivered by the private sector and even sensitive 
areas such as criminal record checks delivered by the private sector, 
consideration should be given to 'accountabilities' alongside contractual 
delivery as an indicator of efficiency and value for money. 
The fifth issue considered was whether parents or citizens had been 
affected in terms of their individual authority within the system of 
governance. 
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Whilst the graph represents empowerment of parents/citizens the scale of 
empowerment does not appear to be significant. The choice agenda in 
terms of school places, and the engagement of parents as school 
governors and elected parent representatives sifting on local authority 
scrutiny committees, whilst important, are perhaps overshadowed by the 
growth in parental empowerment through the information available to 
parents through inspection reports, published league tables of school 
performance and annual reports from governing bodies. It is, however, 
questionable whether the accountability of institutions to parents has grown 
in importance other than in their (parental) exercise of choice of school 
which usually happens at one point in their child's education, leaving the 
issue of ongoing accountability to parents a difficult area within which little 
evidence for improvement can be found. 
The one area where facts are known and the evidence in Chapters Three 
and Four of this thesis confirms is in the growth of the Private Finance 
Initiative, measured by committed capital expenditure statistics, 
(Partnerships UK, 2005). 
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The dramatic growth in expenditure incurred through the expansion of the 
Private Finance Initiative since the election of a Labour government is set 
out above. This investment in the capital infrastructure of schools and 
colleges has been a marked feature of Labour's policy and the case study 
of the investment in the City of Stoke-on-Trent confirms the Labour 
government's commitment to improving the built learning environment for 
teachers and students. 
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If these graphs are consolidated a visual representation of the 
modernisation agenda can be seen. Whilst accepting the subjective and 
qualitative nature of the data the outcome stands as evidence, gathered 
from experienced educationalists, of a consistent theme - running across 
education policy since 1979 and the images contribute to the field of 
emerging knowledge as something to be improved upon or deconstructed. 
However interpreted it warrants discussion as an illustration of 
modernisation and a picture which confirms Hall's (2003) assertion of the 
Thatcher/Blair Project operating on a philosophical continuum. 
The overall trends in the shift in power, as set out in Table 13 confirm a 
series of trends from 1988 in an unbroken direction of travel in each of the 
five areas considered. The visual images, however imperfect, confirm the 
choice, centralisation and competition continuities (Ball, 2001 a, p 46) and 
the decline of authority on the part of local government. Table 14 indicates 
in a composite picture the scale of growth in the private finance initiative. 
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Table 14 
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The descriptive and visual evidence of New Labour in power since 1997 as 
set out in this thesis could be considered to provide evidence that Mrs 
Thatcher did have a project and that, far from adjusting us to it we have 
been acclimatised to go beyond it..... 
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Accountability and Scrut[ay 
Given the research evidence in previous chapters there is clearly a case to 
be made for the consideration of new scrutiny and regulatory arrangements 
for those who discharge power and responsibility in the 'new' public 
domain, whether a public, private, or voluntary body involving the use of 
public resources. 
Scrutiny and Regulation 
The globalisation of economic power has not been accompanied by global 
financial and statutory regulation and democratisation which would seek to 
identify with contemporary social issues in nation states. An open market 
for service provision should be subject to independent and open scrutiny 
and should be accompanied by a restructuring of the public service 
professions. Given the scale of current and planned private sector 
engagement in the public sector there is an urgent need to consider the 
issues of regulation and scrutiny to ensure accountability to the learners in 
the education sector and the exploration of community impact. 
In a sense the private sector, whether in fulfilling Private Finance Initiatives 
in the construction sector or operating an 'outsourced' function of a Local 
Authority are undertaking an activity within the public sector and should 
therefore be publicly accountable for their actions. This issue was noted by 
the Nolan Committee (1995) in looking at public spending bodies: 
They operate at the boundary of the public and private sectors. They 
have considerable freedom to set their own priorities, yet their 
decisions are in many aspects part of public policy. Their actions 
may have a significant impact upon their local communities, going 
beyond those who are directly involved in the organisations 
themselves. 
(Committee on Standards in Public Life 1995a: 5) 
Skelcher (2004) refers to the work of Hall and Weir (1996) who identified 
ten 'auxiliary precautions' intended to ensure transparency in the discharge 
of a public function and strengthen accountability in a situation where the 
governing body was not subject to election. It could be argued that these 
precautions should apply to private as well as public management in the 
expenditure of public resources and this would mean the imposition of 
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requirements upon the service delivery body; a requirement to publish 
annual reports and annual accounts and be subject to full public audit by 
the National Audit Office/Audit Office for Northern Ireland or Audit 
Commission/Accounts Commission (in Scotland). In addition they should 
be under the jurisdiction of an Ombudsman and be required to observe the 
Code of Practice on Open Government, with a public right to inspect a 
register of members' interests and to attend board or committee meetings, 
inspect agendas of meetings as well as a right to see minutes of meetings. 
The body should also be required to hold public meetings (Hall and Weir, 
1996, quoted in Skelcher 2004, p 5). 
Given that marketisation has generated a culture of distrust which has 
corroded the values of professionalism, citizenship, equity and service 
it must be a priority for modern social democracy to retrieve and reinvent 
the public domain seeking a new intellectual and political paradigm 
'combining insights from traditional social liberalism and traditional social 
democracy' (Marquand, 2000). 
The weakening of trust and social capital in modern society is linked to the 
decline of active citizenship and the values which were, at one time, the 
glue which held the Public Domain together. The elevation of profit and 
consumerism and the parallel lowering of respect for public service have 
diminished the vibrancy and relevance of a collective public realm within 
which individualisation has 'set' parameters. New Labour, with a focus on 
the expanded use of the 'more efficient' private sector in the public space, 
unfettering the individual by expanding choice, has allowed populism to 
dominate by default in the absence of dialogue. 
Perhaps the romanticism of Marquand is a yearning for an earlier age 
rather than a quest for a new and redefined civic society. In looking to this 
future and learning from the past what lessons might be informative? 
There is, for example, a dimension of cultural diversity in contemporary 
society for which there are few relevant historical guidelines around 
profitable community engagement. Similarly if the Welfare State has 
foundered on the rocks of citizen accountability (the lack of it) then a 
rebuttal of neo-liberal/third way criticisms is insufficient to design the way 
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forward, and the answer may be in scrutiny and accountability being 
refashioned for a new age. 
The development of a scrutiny role for local government has evolved over 
the period 2000 - 2005, with impetus stemming from the role of a local 
authority in health scrutiny being set out in the 2001 Health and Social 
Care Act. The scrutiny role has been a new one, and councils have had to 
experiment to use it effectively. A range of changes could be made to 
strengthen the scrutiny of activity in the public domain by those elected, 
including expanding the role of the full council in being able to require the 
executive to adopt specific scrutiny recommendations and requiring council 
scrutiny of local strategic partnerships. It could also be a requirement that 
council's external contracts include rights for scrutiny to hold contractors to 
account as well as powers to summons local MP's and MEP's along with a 
provision to permit the direct election onto scrutiny committees or panels of 
any resident. (LGIU, 2005) 
This enhanced scrutiny function needs to be seen within the context of a 
need for radical change in local governance. When public expenditure in 
the UK exceeds E500 billion annually and there are an estimated 450,000 
people involved in local governance it is surprising that there is no common 
code of conduct for public sector governance. In response to this gap 'The 
Good Governance Standard for Public Services'was published by the 
Independent Commission on Good Governance in Public Services, chaired 
by Sir Alan Langlands, in January 2005, following support for the work by 
the ODPM, CIPFA and the Joseph Rowntree Foundation. 
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The Commission see good governance as building on the Nolan Principles 
(1995) and having six core principles for public and non public sector 
spending bodies: 
Focusing on the organisation's purpose and on outcomes for 
citizens and service users 
Performing effectively in clearly defined functions and roles 
Promoting values for the whole organisation and demonstrating the 
values of good governance through behaviour 
Taking informed, transparent decisions and managing risk 
Developing the capacity and capability of the governing body to be 
effective 
Engaging stakeholders and making accountability real. 
(The Independent Commission on Good Governance in Public Services, p 5) 
Alongside the growth in the scrutiny function the public sector has 
developed risk management strategies and the growth of risk management 
and the associated analytical frameworks provide a helpful self evaluation 
tool for the development for local governance - particularly in respect of 
accountability. It is in their definition of 'real' accountability that the 
Commission raises the issue of discourse as a key issue, commenting that: 
Real accountability requires a relationship and a dialogue. The 
Public Services Productivity Panel (2002) said that accountability 
involves an agreed process for both giving an account of your 
actions and being held to account, a systematic approach to put that 
process into operation as a focus on explicit results or outcomes. 
Real accountability is concerned not only with reporting on or 
discussing actions already completed, but also with engaging with 
stakeholders to understand and respond to their views as the 
organisation plans and carries out its activities. 
(The Independent Commission on Good Governance in Public Services, p 23) 
In developing an accountability relationship through dialogue a distinction 
needs to be made between the citizen and the consumer, the public and 
the service user. To the former there is accountability; to the latter 
consultation and responsiveness, to both a greater engagement with 
process and scrutiny of outcome. 
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The Commission for Good Governance in Public Services (2005) suggests 
a series of questions based upon their six core principles of good 
governance which a citizen could (should) pose to both assess and 
challenge governance standards, those around 'real' accountability are 
both simple and direct. The questions complement the requirements set 
out by Hall and Weir (1996); - (see pages 123,124 of this dissertation): 
Can I easily get information to answer all these questions? 
Are there opportunities for me and other people to make our views 
known? 
Does the organisation publish an annual report containing its 
accounts for the year? Are copies freely available? Is the content 
informative? 
How do I find out what decisions were taken as a result of my and 
others'opinions being asked for? 
Are there opportunities to question the people in charge about their 
plans and decisions? 
Can I easily find out how to complain and who to contact with 
suggestions for changes? 
(The Independent Commission for Good Governance in Public Services, p 31). 
The major challenge is to consider whether, (and by whom), it is possible to 
construct a regulatory framework and policy that stimulates quality, 
efficiency and professional empowerment, as well as facilitating pedagogic 
and entrepreneurial discovery. Within this there must be a critical 
redefinition of democratic educational accountability and a greater 
transparency in the wider public domain of those who seek to work and 
profit within it. In the absence of a regulatory framework there cannot be 
an effective scrutiny of the performance of the private sector. A potential 
model of democratic accountability could be said to start with a view that 
'the public sphere is inescapably a political space because it is the space of 
collectivity, constituted to undertake the tasks that individuals cannot do 
alone but only together as a collectivity', (Ranson, 2003, p 473). 
If public accountability is held in stewardship by political authority with 
societal consent, and if in the public sphere it institutionalises a discourse 
about purposes and performance, then cultural reaffirmation of the consent 
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needs to be regularly sought. This must go beyond the traditional ballot 
box to an energised citizenship empowered to make a difference at a level 
that makes sense in daily life. If co-payment is a potential feature of a 
welfare state co-ownership of the discourse should be developed by an 
accountability narrative that is bespoke. 
The emergence of autonomous groupings - governing bodies, 
corporations, health forums, offer the potential for modelling community 
governance and discourse - to shape and ensure 'local' bottom up 
accountability. 
In a joint article Rod Aldridge, Chairman of Capita Group pic and Prof. 
Gerry Stoker, Chairman of the New Local Government Network suggested 
that private sector involvement in public services could enable the 
development of a new public sector ethos -a code covering probity, 
improvement in quality, accountability and community well-being 'which 
would apply to all public services and public service commissioners and 
providers, irrespective of whether they are in the public, voluntary, not for 
profit or private sectors' (Aldridge and Stoker 2002 p 2). 
In their view public services should be defined, commissioned and 
regulated by accountable bodies. 
Local area agreements offer an opportunity to a more flexible and 
responsive relationship between central government, local government and 
localities on the priority outcomes to be achieved on a local level - 
structured around three key themes - children and young people, safer and 
stronger communities and health and older people and driven by local 
government in partnership with the LSP they fit securely within the Local 
Public Service Agreements (LPSA). In Local Area Agreements there may 
be real potential and dynamic for change, with new models and 
accountability emerging: 
'The new progressive politics cannot be a reality unless we make local 
accountability work through reinvigorating the democratically elected 
mechanisms of local areas - local government'. 
(Speech by Rt. Hon Gordon Brown MP 22 October 2004). 
The reinvigoration of political parties should be considered with equal 
vigour. Political parties need to have the confidence to come out and 
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engage beyond party boundaries - their retreat has led to the 
apoliticisation of social change in localities. Increasingly local Councillors 
seek to exercise control over fewer and fewer functions and local elections 
become contexts for marginal power in the public realm - if control and 
power are equated. In fact the democratic locus provides a power of 
questioning, reporting, commenting and advising that is greater and more 
required than before. 
The emergent nature of a 'new' politics and the attendant cultural change 
has major implications for the major political parties. There are lessons in 
localism which can be learned from devolved government in Wales and 
Scotland and, in particular, Europe, such as the French respect for locality, 
with every commune having an elected mayor with powers over 
streetscene, planning and services enabling a human embodiment of the 
commune's aspiration and pride. As Jenkins (2005) comments: 
social capitalism works. It is a matter of choice I am not sure 
Britain knows how to make this choice any more. The government's 
dismantling of civic government has wrecked community self 
confidence. (Sunday Times, 21/8/2005 p 16). 
Etzioni (2000) quoted Lionel Jospin as confirming that the French socialist 
leader was 'not against market based economy but market based 
society' (p 27). 
What we need to do is to move beyond the assertion that a primary 
function of government is to establish the legal framework within which 
economic transactions occur (Stiglitz; 1988: 24) and consider in an 
increasingly privatised public sphere the content, accounting and enforcing 
of the regulatory framework for public expenditure. The European social 
market model in which 'society' still has conceptual precedence over the 
economy offers little assistance in new patterns of regulatory process being 
defined although professionals may hold one of the keys. 
The Restoration of Professionalism 
Crouch (2003) argues that the restructuring of the public service 
professions, with a revised professional model of evaluating service 
performance could restore the concept of a 'citizenship welfare state'. 
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Central to this restructuring is a balancing of the consultation between 
government, professionals and local communities about objectives and 
strategies fit for educational purpose within that community. This requires 
the policy agenda and the professional agenda to mutually inform each 
other and reach a consensus. If this were to happen then a local context for 
education could be moderated, having regard to, but not being driven by, a 
central or national agenda. 
As an example of this approach I would cite the development of community 
learning plans in Warwickshire. These are attempting to address the need 
for a differentiated education strategy in each of the five districts of the 
county, each with a differing and in some cases markedly different, socio- 
economic composition. Within each district all key stakeholders in 
education have come together to consider a bespoke development plan for 
the community. The values of co-operative measures and mutual support 
underpin debate and a collective set of objectives are being agreed. 
Underpinning this is the development of 'commonwealths of schools' 
starting initially with secondary schools. Secondary Headteachers are 
considering how the needs of the learner can be met within the local 
community, what joint professional development is needed and where 
pooled budgets can be agreed to act in the interests of the commonwealth. 
In seizing the agenda and having the professional courage to localise the 
national agenda, the professionalism within schools can be re-engaged 
and re-empowered. This professional ownership has the potential to 
create comprehensive learning communities and restore the principle of 
comprehensivisation beyond individual institutions. There is along way to 
go but the initial steps are promising - the longer term requires the 
cementing of trust between professionals and their schools and colleagues. 
New constructions of professionalism in respect of accountability - to 
whom, for what, how and when in a localist context could begin to 
challenge the shift from civic to user accountability driven over the past 
twenty years by marketisation (Ranson, 2003) and theories of new public 
management which ignore the wider public sphere and its legitimate 
expectations of engagement, thus promoting more grounded forms of 
professional accountability (Marquand, 2000). 
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As Gleeson and Knights (2005) indicated: 
Rescripted, the professional imagination resides in forms of 
democratic governance rather than from the imposition of the dead 
hand of unaccountable audit and managerial cultures which, as we 
have intimated, lack the embodiment and developed legitimacy that 
would otherwise engage professionals. (p 14). 
The new script could begin the task of framing a consensus against the 
definition of governance set out by the anarchist writer, Proudhon, in 1851, 
quoted by Caulkin: 
To be governed is to be watched, inspected, spied upon, directed, 
law-driven, numbered, regulated, enrolled, indoctrinated, preached 
at, controlled, checked, estimated, valued, censured, commanded, 
by creatures who have neither the right nor the wisdom nor the 
virtue to do so, 
(Caulkin, The Observer, 26 th May 2002). 
The drivers could well be the teaching profession itself - it may not stand in 
obedient and passive mode as the harsh economies of supply and demand 
become reality and the re-empowerment of a disenfranchised profession is 
seen as perhaps the only move left for policy makers to secure a high 
skills, high performing economy. It requires, in my view, a combination of 
democratic change, greater scrutiny and regulation and a restored 
professionalism, operating within a values framework, to enable a societal 
response to globalisation and the rediscovery that education and economic 
performance are partners in the same venture. 
The continued subservience of the former to the latter will only continue to 
drive a diminished view of education and of the nature of learning itself. 
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Conclusion - Beyond the Power of Three - The Fourth Way 
There are four principles which, in the judgement of the author of this thesis 
could be considered as central to a 'Fourth Way'- a refined 
modernisation' project. 
The rights and entitlements of 'citizenship' require redefinition, and 
legislative safeguarding as an essential first step in a renewal of the 
public realm. 
All providers of services in the public realm must be accountable to 
citizens and commissioners, within a model of accountability that 
gives equal, if not greater, emphasis to locally determined outcomes 
agreed and shaped locally - not imposed. 
A common code of practice should be binding upon all providers in 
the public realm, covering contractual transparency; adherence to 
values enshrined in human rights legislation and revised Codes of 
Practice for the allocation of public sector contracts at local and 
national level. 
A new constitutional settlement with a recognition of local 
government's role in the public realm and an acceptance of the 
importance of representative and empowered democracy. 
There are four process issues which could enable these principles to 
develop into practice: 
Professionals in the public realm need to reassert their knowledge, 
judgement and authority; to develop a dialogue of accountability to 
consumers and citizens which is capable of agreeing outcomes and 
shared professional accountability. 
People in communities should be empowered to participate in 
evaluations of the local environment, with consultative mechanisms 
developed to produced demonstrable change. 
Politics and politicians should be the promoter and guardian of 'well 
being' in communities, with representative and elected democracies 
leading on the scrutiny and accountability issues which form part of 
a citizen's entitlement and consumers rights within the public realm. 
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Partnerships between professionals, people and politicians should 
be developed and seen as a mainspring for community 
development. A new politics, embracing those who govern locally - 
school/college governors, health bodies, police, transport and the 
environment should be created and municipal strength/civic 
authority re-established. 
There is an urgent need to rediscover democratic connectivity in the public 
sphere, given the sustained assault on citizenship over the past twenty 
years. This is particularly true of the education realm. 
A model can sometimes illuminate the dynamics of an issue and 
interconnectivity in terms of what could happen - and, in part, this model 
builds upon Ranson's work on accountability. (Ranson, 2000,2003) 
Open debate Participation 
deliberation voice / dissent 
questioning 
Social Precondition 
Accountability 
Collective Collective 
I Rules Service 
Purpose Provision Economic P rofessional s Pre- -0-0- Events 
(Apcademics 
condition 
14 MI C Collective 
Efficiencies 
ol VI 
Accountability 
Political Precondition 
N Air 
Judgement Politics of difference 
collective rule the marginalised 
race / culture 
The yellow core is the essence of what the public realm should contain. 
The blue band of accountability should surround the core completely, be 
resolved in dialogue with society, and the green band, which is driven by 
socio-economic-political imperatives interacts through scrutiny and 
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accountability mechanisms with the core. The yellow, blue and green 
bands are mutually informing and reinforcing. The purple outer band 
represents the potential energy which could drive the system - first one 
way - then another and the bands are connected in both horizontal and 
vertical places. Perhaps, in the near future, momentum will initially come 
from the 'politics of difference' in alliance with 'professional energy and 
voice' as the New Labour focus on equality of opportunity is challenged by 
an emerging consensus around equality of outcome -a new and different 
realm of modernisation and a recognition of a new public realm within 
which all are accountable - from Stoke-on-Trent to Sanctuary Buildings, 
one to the other. It could be concluded that: 
Mr Blair had a project - Mr Brown's historic project is ........... 
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Postscript: The Research Process 
The research process for this thesis was a journey of discovery and moved 
from a survey of contemporary literature and documentary analysis to the 
excitement of a case study and hearing the voices of participants in a three 
year project to change the built environment of schools in Stoke-on-Trent. 
As a researcher the process embraced an isolated analysis of evidence 
and a shared process of enquiry through interviews and, in assessing both 
processes and the emerging trends, led to a mini research study and the 
use of focus groups to gather further evidence to confirm or otherwise the 
emerging picture. What emerged was a series of further questions for 
future enquiries about the nature of educational governance, citizenship, 
and theories of accountability within the pubic education realm. 
When I reflect upon the process I conclude that my professional knowledge 
has been extended by dealing with the range of material assessed and 
analysed, enriched by the individuals I interviewed and enhanced by 
attempting to make sense of the education policies pursued by New Labour 
since 1997 within the context of the modernisation agenda. The research 
process illuminated my understanding of the contexts of the modernisation 
agenda, which, in turn, influenced my own professional practice. It also 
confirmed my belief that the benefits of practitioner research are invaluable 
to the individual and if, in some small measure, the outcomes add to our 
wider collective knowledge then this represents a worthwhile and fulfilling 
pursuit. 
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APPENDIX ONE 
Capital Expenditure in Real Temis and Protect Breakdown for the UK 
Table 5 
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Figures may not sum because of rounding. 
4 ICT capital does not include matched recurrent funding. 
Z PFI credits do not represent investment by the public sector, but trigger a revenue stream to 
support the charges of the private sector providers 
3. Capital support can be either capital grant or supported borrowngs 
1 All figures have been converted to 2003-04 price levels using the September 2004 Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) deflators. 
source: Statistics of Education - Education Training Expenditure since 1994-1995 
Table 6 
Category Sector SumOfCapital Value C'm 
PFI Airports E 9.50 
PFI Barracks E 768.21 
PFI Buses E 26.00 
PFI Business Process Re-engineering E 21.50 
PFI Courts E 185.00 
PFI Data & Voice Communications E 292.26 
PFI District Community Trusts E 246.60 
PFI Emergency Services E 451.84 
PFI Energy E 116.77 
PFI Environment E - 
PFI Equipment E 1,176.31 
PFI Further F- 210-22 
PFI Higher E 441.80 
PFI Hospitals E 5,970.93 
PFI IT Infrastructure C 2,398.42 
PFI Libraries E 72.89 
PFI Museums E 42.00 
PFI Offices E 2,337.19 
PFI PFI Housing Projects E 396.07 
PFI Primary E 188.40 
PFI Primary & Secondary E 2,168.25 
PFI Primary Health Care E 78.55 
PFI Prisons & Detention Centres E 547.10 
PFI Property E 297.09 
PFI Public Leisure Centres E 50.01 
PFI Railways E 20.00 
PFI Roads E 3,029.30 
PFI Secondary E 1,368.79 
PFI Social Services E 23.60 
PFI Software E 214-50 
PFI Street Lighting E 222.00 
PFI Tram/Light Rail E 1,287.40 
PFI Underground Rail E 17,363.00 
PFI Waste E 1,230.54 
PFI Water E 292.40 
Total 43,544.44 
source Partnership UK Website 
APPENDIX TWO 
Education Timeline-policy direction 1979-2005 
Year Competition/ Privatisation Centralisatiorld Decentralisation Power to Social Policy Employment/ 
markets Regulation/ to LEAs/Councils Regeneration 
Power to SoS Sch(wWFE/HE 
1979 LEA Arrangements for Education Act 
the School Conservative 
Curriculum LEAS repeal of Labour's 
required to publish 1976 Act gave 
curriculum policies back to LEAS right 
to select pupils for 
secondary 
education at 11 
1980 Education Act Education Act Education Act Education Act White Paper A New 
parents right to assisted places appeals panels parents on Training Initiative: 
choose schools and scheme (public governing bodies A Programme for 
right to appeal if they money for some Action set out first 
didn't get the schools children to go to plans for Youth 
they had chosen, private schools) Training Scheme 
development of 
information booklets, 
exam results to be 
published 
1981 Education Act Education Act Rampton Employment and 
(following Warnock SEN assessment Report Training Act 
Report): Special on Appeals Panels precursor of the abolished 
Educational Needs 1985 Swann Employment Service 
Report, Agency and Training 
education of Services Agency. 
ethnic minorities. 
1982 Employment and 
Training Act 
removed trades 
unions from 
decisions about 
costs of training on 
emploVers. 
Industrial Training 
Act set up a 
regulatory framework 
for industrial training 
boards. 
1983 
1984 Education (Grants 
and Awards) Act 
introduced Education 
Support Grants (ESGs) 
central government 
funds given to LEAS for 
specific purposes. 
1985 Swann Report 
Education thr All 
major report 
(following on 
from 1981 
Rampton report) 
looking at 
education in a 
multiracial Britain 
1986 Education Act (2) Education Act Education Act (1) Education Act National Council 
extended parental (2) governors to LEAS to give (2) no political for Vocational 
choice with regard to publish annual governors indoctrination in Qualifications 
admissions report and hold information on schools, (NCVQ) established 
parents' meeting, funding. abolished to promote National 
composition of Education Act (2) corporal Vocational 
governing bodies LEAS to state punishment, Qualifications 
- was chanaed. policies -Qovernors 
to (NVOs) 
Red = reports/schemes/comment 
Education Timeline-policy direction 1979-2005 
Year Competition/ Privatisation Centrallsation/ Decentrallsation Power to Social Policy Employment/ 
markets Regulation/ to LEAs/Councils Regeneration 
Power to SoS Schools/FE/HE 
1987 _ Teachers' Pay and 
Conditions Act 
abolished negotiating 
procedures set up by 
the 1965 Act. Secretary 
of State imposed 
teachers' pay and 
conditions until 1991. 
1988 Education 'Reform' Education 'Reform' Education 'Reform' Education Employment Act 
Act arrangements for Act City Technology Act major act 'Reform'Act introduced bridging 
Testing and League Colleges establishing National Local allowance for young 
Tables Curriculum, new rules Management of people waiting to 
on Religious Education Schools (LMS), take up YTS place. 
and Collective Worship, more parent MSC renamed the 
OFSTED - privatised governors added Training 
inspection to school Commission. 
governing bodies, 
governors now Social Security Act 
hadlegal 16/17 year-olds 
responsibilities in required to register 
relation to for YTS. 
implementation of 
Local Government Act extended CCT to National Youth Training 
practically all ancillary services in local Curriculum and Guarantee 
government (e. g. building, cleaning, control of the introduced. No 16/17 
grounds maintenance, refuse collection) budget, apply for year-olds to be 
Grant Maintained without education, 
Status (GM), employment or 
training- 
1989 Elton Report Children Act Employment Act 
Discipline in Schools welfare of child abolished Training 
response to concerns of paramount Commission. 
about lack of discipline consideration, 
in schools stay with own 
family wherever 
possible, 
emphasis on 
support, 
protection and 
information 
1990 Education 
(Student Loans) 
Act introduced 
'Top--up'loans for 
HE students and 
so began the 
diminution of 
student arants- 
1991 Parents' Charter School Teachers' Pay Training 
gave parents the and Conditions Act CreditsNouth 
right to information established a review Credits Employment 
about the schools body but gave Department began 
and their Secretary of State the pilot schemes. 
performance final say. 1 
(updated in 1994). 
1992 Further and Higher PFI launched Education (Schools) Act Further and Higher 
Education Act introduced established OFSTED (Office Education Act 
competition for funding for standards in Education) - removed FE and 6th 
between institutions privatised school inspection Form Colleges from 
body. local authority control 
and established 
Further and Higher 
Further Education 
Education Act abolished the 
Funding Councils 
(FEFCs), unified the Council for National funding of higher 
I Academic Awards. education under the 
CCT extended to professional and technical services Higher Education 
i n local government (including finance, legal and Funding Councils 
personnel functions) 
I 
(HEFCs) 
I I I 
Red = reports/schemes/comment 
Education Timeline-policy direction 1979-2005 
Year Competition/ Privatisation Centralisation/ Decentralisation Power to Social Policy Employment/ 
markets Regulation/ to LEAs/Councils Regeneration 
Power to SoS Schools/FEIHE 
1993 Education Act 
changes to funding of 
grant-maintained (GM) 
schools, provisions for 
'failing' schools, new 
rules for pupil 
exclusions, National 
Curriculum Council 
(NCC) and School 
Examinations and 
Assessment Council 
(SEAQ combined and 
replaced by School 
Curriculum and 
Assessment Authority 
(SCAA). 
Dearing Report The 
National Curriculum 
and Its Assessment 
major review of 
National Curriculum - 
recommended 
reduction of content 
1994 Education Act Modern 
established Teacher Apprenticeships 
Training Authority piloted and 
(TTA) and regulated accelerated 
student unions. 
Special Needs Code 
of Practice on the 
Identification and 
Assessment of Special 
Educational Needs 
came into force - new 
independent SEN 
tribunals 
1995 Modern 
Apprenticeships 
introduced 
Youth Credits 
introduced - Youth 
Training name 
dropped 
1996 Nursery Education 1996 Education Act Education Dearing Report 
and Grant- huge act mainly (Student Loans) review of vocational 
Maintained Schools consolidating all Act extended qualifications for 16- 
Act introduced previous education acts provision of 19 year olds 
voucher scheme for since 1944. student loans 
nursery education 
(unsuccessful 1996 School Jobseekers Act laid 
scheme later Inspections Act down rules about the 
withdrawn by consolidated previous relationship between 
Labour), allowed legislation on school study and eligibility 
governors of GM inspections. for the Job Seeker's 
schools to borrow Allowance 
money. 
Red = reports/schemes/comment 
Education Timeline-policy direction 1979-2005 
Year Competition/ Privatisation Centrallsation/ Decentralisation Power to Social Policy EmploymenV 
markets Regulation/ to LEAs/Councils Regeneration 
Power to SoS SchoolsIFE/HE 
1997 _ Education Act wide- Education National 
ranging but much (Schools) Act Traineeships 
watered-down. abolished the introduced 
Qualifications and assisted places 
Curriculum Authority scheme. 
(QCA) established to Proposed binding 
bring together the work home-school 
of the National Council agreements (not 
for Vocational implemented). 
Qualifications (NCVQ) 
and the School 
Curriculum and 
Assessment Authority 
(SCAA), with additional 
powers and duties. 
Education (Mandatory Dearing Report 
Awards) Regulations review of higher 
set out the provisions education 
for mandatory awards 
made by LEAs under 
1962 Act. 
Kennedy Report 
reviewed under- 
participation in 
further education 
Investing in 
Young People 
announced by 
DfEE. Aim to 
increase 
participation in 
post- 16 
education. 
1998 School Standards School Standards and Teaching and School Disaffected 
and Framework Act Framework Act Higher Standards and Children Select 
established changed names of Education Act Framework Act Committee on 
Education Acton types of schools, limited abolished student empowered LEAs Education and 
Zones (sponsorship infant class sizes, maintenance and the Secretary Employment report 
from local grants, required of State to on 14-19 age group. 
businesses) students to intervene in 
contribute towards schools judged to 
tuition fees be failing' by 
OFSTED 
Education (Student Teaching and Higher Beacon schools 
Loans)Act Education Act programme 
transferred provision established General launched 
of student loans to Teaching Council 
the private sector. 
1999 Various 'failing' local Moser Report Improving Fresh Stan'scheme - Modem Apprenticeships 
authority services put out Literacy and Numeracy A 'superheads' expandea to 82 000 
to tender (as in Hackney Fresh Start National Literacy appointed to revitaose places. Investors in Young 
and Islington) and Kings' Strategy and National 'failing' inner-city People developed further 
Manor School in Guildford Learning Targets introduced comprehensive and renamed 
first to be handed over to schools ConneXions 
a private company 
Local Goverriment Act Best value introduced Education maintenance 
(challenge, compare, consult, compete), replacing Allowance (Eli pilot 
CCT schemes aimed at greater 
take-up of and 
achievement ir, post- 16 
education 
Red = reports/schemes/comment 
Education Timeline-policy direction 1979-2005 
Year Competition/ Privatisation Centralleationif Decentrallsation Power to social Policy Employmentl 
markets Regulation/ to LEAs/Councils Regeneration 
Power to SoS Schools/FEIHE 
2000 Consultants sent speclýilfsl Local 
into LEAs in schools scheme Government Act 
Bradford, Rochdale launched Community 
and Waltham Forest strategies, Power 
to advise on how of Wellbeing, 
improvements could changesin 
be made after political structures, 
OFSTED uncovered new ethical 
-serious framework 
weaknesses' in their 
work. Privatisation of Beacon Council 
Leeds LEA scheme launched 
2001 White paper Strong LPSAs pilots 
Local Leadership: launched 
Quality Public 
Services introduction 
of CPA 
2002 City Academies first Education Act Education Act 
opened - effectively more specialist large increase in 
schools paid for by schools number of 
the private sector schools run by 
religious 
orqanisations 
2003 Classroom 
assistants 
scheme launched 
2004 University top-up fees Children Act Children Act: Tomlinson Report Children Act Children Act Tomlinson Report 
MPs vote for variable fees . New powers of . Children's Radical Local Duty to Rationalised by small majority. intervention in failing Commissioner strategy for longer- Safeguarding Children safeguard and vocational pathways 
authorities (use of private term reform of learning Boards promote the welfare which capable of being 
sector as intervening body for 14-19 year olds in of children combined with gene(al 
England and academic subjects in 
mixed programmes 
Children and Young All 14-19 yo Director of New duty on 4ople's 
Plans have access to Children Services and agencies to 
coherent and relevant Lead Member cooperate to improve 
learning programmes well bring of children 
consisting of core and young people 
learning (maths, (Children's Trusts) 
literacy and ICT) and 
main learning (chosen 
by leamer) 
Framework for E)dsfing Power to set 
inspection and joint area system of qualification up a new database 
reviews be replaced by a with information 
framework of diplomas about children 
at entry, foundation, 
intermediate and 
advanced levels 
Assessment o Local Area Duty to 
main leaming and an Agreements (LAAs) promote education 
exiended project be pilots launched achievement of 
predominantly teacher- looked after children 
led 
Number of Ascertaining 
e, ams cit 
I 
children's wishes 
I 
Red = reports/schemes/comment 
Education Timeline-policy direction 1979-2005 
Year Competition/ 
markets 
Privatisation Centralisation/ 
Regulation/ 
Power to SoS 
Decentralisation to 
Schools/FE[HE 
Power to 
LEAs/Councils 
Social Policy Employmentl 
Regeneration 
2005 Education Act 1 14-19 Education and Skills 14-19 Education and 14-19 Education and Education Act 14-19 Education and 
national largc scai, White Paper Skills White Paper Skills White Paper Skills White Paper 
private companies picking 
up contracts - PFI, hard 
services, soft services, 
School Improvement 
Advssor functions 
Competition Follow up to More robust Responsibility Greater Rationalise 
arrangements for Tomlinson but met with teacher assessment of Local Authorities and public scrutiny of the current array of vocational 
secondary schools disappointment that not LSCs to commission additional inspectors qualifications into more 
extended from additional implement radical reforms provision where there who will be leading easily recognisable 
secondary schools to all proposed by Tomlinson are gaps the new inspection diplomas 
replacement secondary system and the 
schools standards which 
these inspectors 
have to achieve 
Reduction to 5 main Strengthens GCSEs Sector Skills 
contractors for Ofsted and A-Levels rather than Councils will take the lead 
inspections evolving into a new diploma in designing the new 
system. diplomas 
Introduce a general Education Act Education Act Movement will be 
(GCSE) diploma which be allowed between 
equivalent of achieving 5 A*- academic and vocational 
C grade GCSEs routes 
Age 16 no longer be Take into Regulations will 
fixed point in system account views of require LEAs to set 3 
headteacher, year budgets 
governing body, staff, 
pupils and parents 
when carrying out a 
school inspection 
Stronger Enhanced role 
accountability framework of Schools Forum 
School profile Local authorities to 
replace annual parents introduce School 
meeting and annual Improvement 
governors report Advisors into 
secondary schools 
Education Act School 
funding: money supply 
come direct in grant 
from Sec of State and 
not through Local 
Government Finance 
Settlement. 
Changes in school 
inspections including new 
powers for Ofsted, fewer days 
notice to schools, smaller 
inspections teams, greater 
self-evaluation, new 
categories 
No role for LEA in 
academies or city technology 
colleges 
Wider consultation for 
closures to rural schools and 
special schools 
Teacher Training 
Agency to become the 
Training and Development 
Agency for Schools, and 
remit covers whole school 
workforce 
Admission 
arrangements of maintained 
schools to give preference to 
looked after children 
Red = reports/schemes/comment 
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
CBI Confederation of British Industry 
CCT Compulsory Competitive Tendering 
CEO Chief Education Officer 
CPA Comprehensive Performance Assessment 
DETR Department of the Environment, Transport and the 
Regions 
DFEE Department for Education and Employment 
DFES Department for Education & Skills 
DTLR Department for Transport, Local Government and 
the Regions 
GM Grant Maintained 
HMC Head Masters Conference 
IPPR Institute for Public Policy Research 
KPI Key Performance Indicator 
LAA Local Area Agreement 
LEA Local Education Authority 
LPSA Local Public Service Agreement 
LSC Learning & Skills Council 
MID Member of Parliament 
NAHT National Association of Head Teachers 
NLGN New Local Government Network 
ODPM Office of the Deputy Prime Minister 
OfSTED Office for Standards in Education 
OPSR Office of Public Services Reform 
PFI Private Finance Initiative 
PPP Public Private Partnership 
PSBR Public Sector Borrowing Requirement 
PSNCR Public Sector Net Cash Requirement 
QUANGO Quasi-autonomous non/national government 
organisation 
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